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CPSU PARTY CONGRESS ON SOVIET NATIONAL DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 (signed to press 25 Sep 81) pp 3-9

[Unattributed lead article: "The 26th CPSU Congress and the Material-Technical Foundation of the Defensive Might of the USSR." Passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] Analyzing the contemporary international situation, the 26th CPSU Congress noted that aggressive imperialist circles, not wishing to accept present world realities, are pursuing a course of policy aimed at undermining détente, escalating the arms race, pursuing a policy of threats and interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples, and crushing of the liberation struggle. "Adventurism, willingness to stake the vital interests of mankind for the sake of one's own narrow selfish aims -- this is being manifested particularly glaringly in the policies of the most aggressive imperialist circles,"¹ stated CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. The Beijing leaders, who are readily engaging in a deal with the United States, with the other NATO countries and various reactionary regimes, are direct accomplices of imperialist reaction in the international arena.

Under these conditions the Communist Party and Soviet Government, displaying exceptional restraint, are placing in opposition to the doctrine of aggression of militant imperialism the Peace Program elaborated at the 24th and 25th and further developed by the 26th CPSU Congress. Following a Leninist peace-seeking foreign policy, top party and government officials are keeping vigilant watch on the intrigues of the aggressors, enemies of peace and détente, and are doing everything possible for reliable defense of the revolutionary achievements of socialism. "We have not sought and do not seek military superiority over the other side," it was stated at the 26th Congress. "That is not our policy. But we shall also not allow to be established such a superiority over us. Attempts of this kind, as well as talks with us from a position of strength are absolutely without prospect!"²

Displaying tireless concern for further strengthening the defense might of the Soviet State, the CPSU proceeds from the /objective necessity of defending the revolutionary achievements of socialism,/ dictated by the laws governing the class struggle, by the aggressive nature of imperialism and its endeavor to resolve the fundamental conflict of our era -- the conflict between socialism and capitalism -- by military means.

Our party's military policy is grounded on the Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. V. I. Lenin warned: "Under no conditions can we state that we are now guaranteed against war.... Therefore we must in any case maintain our military preparedness."³ Assessing the military strength of the newly-born socialist state, V. I. Lenin closely linked it with the distribution of social forces and their activities and with the new societal relations determined (in the final analysis) by the nature of the socialist mode of production. He especially stressed the dependence of military might on activeness by the masses. "We cannot consider this country to be defense-capable without the greatest heroism by the people, boldly and resolutely carrying out great economic reforms."⁴

Guided by V. I. Lenin's statement that without an economic upsurge in this country "there is no possibility of a substantial increase in the defense capability"⁵ of the young Soviet state, during the years of the prewar five-year plans the party was developing at an accelerated pace the vitally important branches and sectors of the nation's economy, especially heavy industry. The increasing direct threat of imperialist attack on the Soviet Union obliged the party and government to make every effort to develop and improve the defense industry. As a result of implementation of a policy of industrialization in the USSR, aircraft and tank plants, large enterprises for the production of artillery weapons, small arms, and ammunition were built and provided with advanced equipment, old military plants were renovated, steps were taken to expand the rail network, and state and mobilization stockpiles were established, which were to meet the needs of industry and the armed forces during a period of war reorganization of the economy.

Thanks to efforts by the party and government, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Union possessed a powerful military-industrial base. This subsequently made it possible successfully to accomplish the task of providing the Soviet Armed Forces with the latest and most effective weaponry in quantities exceeding the armaments of fascist Germany. Utilizing the advantages of the socialist system and the selfless labor of the Soviet people, during the war years the Soviet Union reached a level of arms and combat equipment production which was double that of fascist Germany, with Soviet arms and equipment possessing superior performance characteristics. This was one of the most important factors in our world-historic victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In the postwar period CPSU economic strategy was aimed at intensive development of all branches and sectors of the economy. In the course of building communism the party and Soviet Government, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, "did not ignore for a single day matters pertaining to /strengthening the defense might of this country and its Armed Forces."/⁷

Our party's wisdom and sagacity in guiding the further development of the socialist society lie in a dialectical unity of the building and defense tasks of the state. This country's economic might constitutes the foundation not only of social progress but also of our country's defense might, a reliable guarantee of its freedom and independence.

This is why the principal efforts of party and people are directed toward the economy, while CPSU economic policy occupies a leading position in all its diversified and immense activities. "Direction of the economy," stated Comrade L. I.

Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is the heart of all activities of the party and state, for the foundation of accomplishment of social tasks and strengthening the nation's defense capability, and the foundation of a vigorous foreign policy are laid down precisely in the area of the economy."⁸

Long-range /party economic policy/ provides for accomplishing large-scale economic and socioeconomic tasks. It is directed toward all-out development of productive forces and production relations, with the aim of building the material and psychological foundation of communism, improving socialist societal relations, and strengthening the material-technical foundation of national defense and the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Soviet State possesses great economic potential and a powerful material-technical base in conformity with a developed socialist society. The 26th CPSU Congress once again demonstrated this with great cogency. Gross societal product in 1980 was up 167 percent over the 1970 figure, and totaled 1,061 billion rubles. During this same time national income utilized for consumption and accumulation increased by 155 percent, industrial output by 178 percent, and agricultural output by 123 percent.⁹

The party is assigning even more grandiose tasks to the Soviet people in the 11th Five-Year Plan. "In its historic scale, significance and consequences," stated Comrade N. A. Tikhonov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the conversion of our nation's economy to the road of intensive development, which is presently being accomplished, can rightly be placed alongside such a profound transformation as socialist industrialization, which radically altered the countenance of our country."¹⁰

An all-out increase in the /efficiency/ of societal production is opening up favorable prospects for building communism, for strengthening the international position and prestige of world socialism, and for increasing the defense capability both of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 26th CPSU Congress that "the military-political defensive alliance of the socialist nations... possesses everything it needs in order reliably to defend the socialist achievements of peoples."¹²

We are forced to be constantly concerned with the security of the homeland and the entire socialist community by the adventuristic policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles, which recently have been conducting themselves particularly aggressively. Hiding behind the myth of a "Soviet military threat" and fabrications about USSR involvement in "international terrorism," the NATO countries, headed by the United States, are intensively arming, endeavoring to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations, in order subsequently to dictate their will to all the peoples of the world. The most generalized expression, scope and thrust of the military preparations of the NATO bloc are seen in the steadily growing volume of NATO military expenditures. In 1980, for example, NATO member nations spent a huge amount for military purposes -- approximately 250 billion dollars. In the current fiscal year actual appropriations for the Pentagon alone, in the opinion of U.S. experts, will exceed 200 billion dollars.¹³ The United States plans to spend a total of 1.5 trillion dollars up to 1986. That is almost as much as this country has spent on its armed forces in the last 12 years.¹⁴

In its foreign policy, as Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, points out, the United States has openly declared its intentions to resort to the employment or threatened employment of arms, including nuclear. The United States has proceeded to declare entire regions of the world to be a sphere of its "vital interests."¹⁵

In this complex situation, the party and government set the task of increasing the necessary efficiency of the defense establishment. V. I. Lenin stressed time and again that the military organization should be extremely powerful and mobile, but at the same time not excessively burdensome on the nation's economy.¹⁶ These statements by the leader of the revolution clearly express the idea of optimal size of peacetime defense establishment and delineate its boundaries. Any diversion of society's material and technical resources for the needs of national defense should be of a volume which would not place insuperable obstacles in the road of resolving the root problems of building communism.

On the other hand, economy and efficiency of party and government defense policy presuppose determination of the most efficient mode of expenditure of material resources with high-quality accomplishment of the tasks of increasing the defensive might of the USSR and achieving the greatest effectiveness of combat employment of the various services and arms of the Soviet Armed Forces with the allocated or even fewer resources. In this connection V. I. Lenin emphasized: "Defense of the Soviet Republic imperatively demands the greatest economy of resources and the most productive application of the people's labor."¹⁷ Proceeding from this, we must strongly emphasize: the Communist Party and Soviet Government are compelled to allocate for improving defense as much resources as are essential for maintaining a high level of army and navy combat readiness and for ensuring the security of the socialist homeland and our allies. /Precisely compelled, since the Soviet Union has never armed for the sake of armament, never has been and never will be initiator of an arms race./

Acquiring great importance in present-day conditions are such problems as a steady increase in the growth rate of aggregate societal product, increase in labor productivity, proportional development of interlinked branches and sectors, and the capability of the economy to function in any crisis situations. Successful accomplishment of these tasks depends to an enormous degree on the societal organization of production and effectiveness of division of labor, efficient distribution of major industrial centers and expedient organization of transport and communications system, existence in the nation's economy of backup production complexes, backup enterprises, etc. In establishing any elaborate modern technical complex, for example, for each prime contractor enterprise there is a large number of subcontractor enterprises directly participating in its production. All these enterprises form a complex economic system. The efficiency of organization of such systems aims at ensuring that in time of war they continue operating without interruption.

Successful resolution of the problem of strength and survivability of the economy will be promoted in large measure by accomplishment of such economic development tasks in the 11th Five-Year Plan as accelerated growth of the economic potential of the eastern regions of the Soviet Union and improvement in the distribution of the productive resources of the union republics and economic regions, establishment of

large territorial-production complexes (BAM, Western Siberian, Angara-Yenisey, Kansk-Achinsk, Southern Yakut, etc), improvement of intersectorial and intrasectorial proportions, plus a number of other measures.

The Basic Directions of USSR Economic and Social Development for 1981-1985 and the Period up to 1990," adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress, specify an extensive program of further growth of the base branches of industry -- /power engineering, metallurgy, machine building, and chemicals, which are not only the heart of the economy but also the foundation of the nation's defense might./

The following figures attest to the scale of development of the base branches of industry in the 10th Five-Year Plan: generation of electric power in 1985 will total 1,550-1,600 billion kilowatt hours, including 220-225 billion kilowatt hours at nuclear power generating plants; crude oil production (including gas condensate) will total 620-645 million tons; natural gas -- 600-640 billion cubic meters; coal -- 770-800 million tons; production of finished rolled metal products will increase to 117-120 million tons; in the chemical and petrochemical industry output volume will increase by 30-33 percent; machine building and metalworking output will increase by 40 percent.

Achievement of the targeted figures will be of importance for strengthening the material-technical base of the army and navy, furnishing them with modern combat equipment and weapons, and will make it possible steadily to supply the vital needs of the Soviet Armed Forces and to produce the requisite quantities of goods for military purposes.

Both prosperity of the Soviet people and national defense are inconceivable without a developed /agriculture./ Party agrarian policy is directed toward accomplishing two interrelated tasks: reliably supplying the country with foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials and establishment of requisite reserve stocks. V. I. Lenin stated: "The Red Army cannot be strong without large government stocks of grain.... Without this it is impossible to maintain the workers who are working for the army."18

On the basis of further industrialization of agricultural production and its intensification, the 26th CPSU Congress targeted average annual production figures in 1981-1985 as follows: grain -- 238-243 million tons; meat -- 17-17.5 million tons; milk -- 97-99 million tons; raw cotton -- 9.2-9.3 million tons; wool -- 470-480 thousand tons, etc. Increasing agricultural productivity will effectively promote strengthening of the defense might of the Soviet State.

This country's economic development and defense capability depend in large measure on the status of /transportation./ Transportation is, to use K. Marx's apt expression, the circulatory system of the nation's economy. It is also essential to the army and navy both for ensuring their vital activities and for accomplishing combat tasks. The 26th CPSU Congress specified a long-range comprehensive program aimed at further development of this country's transport system. It calls upon transport workers to work tirelessly to improve organization and management of the process of hauling goods and people; to improve the level of utilization and operational reliability of all technical means, and total mechanization of freight handling, repair and maintenance activities; to strengthen the material-technical

foundation of transport and to speed up adoption of new equipment, advanced technology and automated control and management systems; to improve the structure of rolling stock and merchant fleet, ensuring their more extensive specialization, etc. Successful implementation of party decisions is not only of great economic but also defense significance.

An important role in strengthening the nation's defense capability is also played by improving /communications/ -- the foundation of control of troops and naval forces.

The economy of mature socialism relies in its development on the firm foundation of /scientific and technological advance./ The Basic Directions state that the 11th Five-Year Plan development of science and technology should be subordinated to an even greater degree to accomplishment of the economic and social tasks of the Soviet society, acceleration of shifting the economy to the path of intensive development, and increasing effectiveness of societal development.

The paths of scientific solution to the problems of building communism, specified by the 26th CPSU Congress, are of great methodological significance for resolving the problems of strengthening Armed Forces combat power and combat readiness. The main task is to achieve continuous improvement of army and navy in full conformity with growth of the economic might of the state and the interests of its peoples, and acceleration of scientific and technological advance in military theoretical research directed toward effective resolution of the problems of strengthening national defense. "The economy, science and technology in the Soviet Union are presently at such a high level," emphasizes Mar S" D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "that we are capable of rapidly developing any kind of weapon on which the enemies of peace and socialism might wish to count."¹⁹

A uniform military-technical policy as a system of scientifically substantiated views on problems of development and improvement of arms and combat equipment promotes maintaining technical equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces at the level of contemporary demands. It offers the prospects of full and comprehensive satisfaction of the nation's defense needs in modern weaponry, ensures an alliance between industry and science in the interests of developing highly effective weapons and combat equipment with optimal performance characteristics, develops new methods of troop control, etc.

At the present stage of development of military affairs, /Soviet military science/ has become one of the most important factors in strengthening the nation's defense capability and achieving high-quality accomplishment of all tasks facing the Soviet Armed Forces. Accomplishing tasks of further strengthening army and navy combat power and combat readiness, "we constantly rely on Marxist-Leninist teaching, on the theses and conclusions of military science," stresses Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. "This enables us to see the development prospects for military affairs, precisely and correctly to determine the principal paths of improvement and concrete tasks of the army and navy."²⁰

The tasks of Soviet science are clearly defined in the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in the Central Committee Report to the

Congress: "...Science should be a constant 'disturber of tranquility,' showing in what areas stagnation and lagging have been noted, where the present level of knowledge affords the opportunity to move forward more rapidly and more successfully."²¹ The main-line directions of development of Soviet science lie in increasing the effectiveness of all research, substantially shortening the time required to adopt scientific and technological advances into production, to strengthen the joint work of scientists and practical experts, to improve coordination of the activities of scientific establishments, and to deepen links between basic and applied research on the one hand and production on the other.

These guidelines of the 26th CPSU Congress also apply entirely and in full measure to our military science. Relying on the wealth of experience of the Great Patriotic War and taking into account the constantly renewing military-technical base and contemporary development of military affairs, it has radically revised many traditional points of theory and has drawn up new recommendations on army and navy organizational development, the forms and methods of conduct of warfare, training and preparation of the nation's Armed Forces to repel an attack and crush an aggressor.

Elaborating current problems of military affairs, military science serves as a reliable compass for practical activities. Practical activities in turn -- military exercises, command and staff exercises, experimental exercises and maneuvers -- constitute a genuine scientific research laboratory and the principal criterion of the correctness of points of theory.

The economic program adopted at the congress for the 11th Five-Year Plan opens up new horizons of economic and social development of our society on the road toward building communism.

At the same time the economic might of the state constitutes the material foundation of its defense capability, which is an objective necessity for defending socialist achievements, as long as there exist aggressive forces of imperialism, seeking to plunge the world into another military catastrophe. "Marxist-Leninist theory and our experience teach us," stresses CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "that as long as imperialism continues to exist, we must be on guard at all times, in a state of full mobilization readiness, tirelessly strengthening our military might. The Soviet people stint neither manpower nor resources in order to increase the might of the Armed Forces."²²

Our country is completing the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. Soviet citizens are filled with optimism. Inspired by the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, they are striving to fulfill and overfulfill the planned targets. Reliably standing vigilant guard over the peaceful, productive labor of the Soviet people are their armed defenders, prepared to repulse any aggressor.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 20.
2. Ibid., page 22.

3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 42, page 130.
4. Ibid., Vol 34, page 197.
5. Ibid., Vol 36, page 168.
6. Footnote omitted.
7. "Materialy....," op. cit., page 66.
8. Ibid., page 31.
9. Ibid., page 32.
10. Ibid., page 107.
11. Footnote omitted.
12. Ibid., page 6.
13. ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 4, 1981, page 19.
14. PRAVDA, 25 July 1981.
15. Ibid.
16. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 42, pp 130-131.
17. Ibid., Vol 37, page 367.
18. Ibid., Vol 39, page 153.
19. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 391.
20. Ibid., page 39.
21. "Materialy....," op. cit., page 43.
22. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 102.

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REPORTS FROM A MILITARY-HISTORICAL CONFERENCE

Mar SU Sokolov

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 10-11

[Opening comments of First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense MSU Mar SU S. Sokolov to reports from a "Military-Scientific Conference of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War." The conference was held on 18 June 1981.]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War occupies a special period in the history of our homeland, a period connected with armed defense of the socialist homeland against an invasion by fascist aggressors, who sought not only to seize vast territory and the economic riches of our country but, first and foremost, to destroy the Soviet governmental and social system. This was the largest armed conflict between forces of imperialism and world reaction on the one hand and the world's first socialist state on the other.

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War was particularly difficult for our country, as a consequence of unfavorable conditions. On the side of the aggressor were material superiority, experience in conduct of combat operations, and the element of surprise. But the great strength of the Soviet people, guided by the Communist Party, and mass heroism on the battle front and on the home front made it possible not only to hold out in this fierce conflict but also to win a decisive victory over a powerful and crafty adversary.

The fierce struggle against German fascism, which lasted four long years, required enormous efforts on the part of the people and army, and mobilization of our country's material and moral resources in order to crush a powerful and crafty foe, under the guidance of the Communist Party, and to achieve an outstanding, world-historic victory.

Our Great Victory was won through the efforts of the worker class, the kolkhoz peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia, all our homeland's nationalities and ethnic groups. Soviet citizens had boundless faith in their party and in their Soviet Government. Their labor exploits merged with the military exploits of the fighting men of our army and navy.

Although 40 years have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, and more than 35 years since it came to an end, it continues to remain for us the harshest test and trial, which affected the fate of millions of people, and victory in that war constitutes for us the greatest accomplishment of the Soviet people.

The enormous and unabating interest in the events of the past war and its lessons is due first and foremost to the fact that they have retained their significance to the present day. Study and truthful analysis of these events and lessons enable us more correctly to understand and resolve many political, economic, ideological and other important problems of the present day.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War also is of great importance in further development of the art of warfare. It helps us more deeply understand the laws and patterns of development of military affairs, to improve training and indoctrination of command-political and engineer cadres, and all personnel. The combat experience amassed by the Soviet Armed Forces continues to serve as an inexhaustible source of development of contemporary military theory and practice.

The events of the last war have for a long time now been the target of attack and falsification on the part of bourgeois politicians and ideologists. Shamelessly rehashing the fascist propaganda lie and slander about Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR, today's falsifiers of history ascribe to the Soviet Union non-existent aggressive intentions and attempt to play down its contribution to the defeat of fascism and militarism. Grossly distorting even well-known facts, they attempt to utilize them to escalate international tension.

This is why, in noting the 40th anniversary of the commencement of the Great Patriotic War, we should once again show the true causes of and culprits in initiating the last war, recall its lessons, and reveal the decisive role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in crushing the aggressor.

We also set for ourselves the task of analyzing the significance of the experience and lessons of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War for further increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, for development of Soviet art of warfare, training and indoctrination of army and navy personnel, and showing the mass heroism of Soviet servicemen as a most important source of victory in that war.

The most important tasks of this conference include exposing the present aggressive, antisocialist policy of the imperialist nations, headed by the United States, and demonstration of the groundlessness of the myth of "Soviet military threat."

Participants in the conference include representatives of the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense, headquarters staffs of the branches of the armed forces, headquarters of the Moscow Military District and service academies, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, staff personnel from the Institute of Military History, the Academy of Social Sciences and Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, the humanities institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and central press personnel.

Pursuant to the instructions of USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU Comrade Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, I declare this military-scientific conference of the Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate, dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, officially open.

Army General Gribkov

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 12-19

[Article by Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact States Army Gen A. Gribkov: "The 40th Anniversary of the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Forty years have passed since Hitlerite Germany, acting as the striking force of world imperialism, raised the sword against our homeland. The Soviet people were forced to engage in a fight to the death with this most bitter enemy. A new, most difficult period in its history had begun -- the Great Patriotic War.

Fascist aggression against the USSR had long been in preparation. Over a period of two decades it was ripening within the bosom of capitalism. Utilizing the financial and economic support of U.S., British and French monopolies, Germany rebuilt and further developed its military potential within a comparatively short period of time, which enabled it to establish powerful armed forces. During the period from 1934 through 1940, Germany's military production increased 22-fold, while the numerical strength of its armed forces increased 35-fold. By mid-1941 they totaled approximately 7,300,000 men.

Under the pretense of "noninterference" and "neutrality," the Western countries were pursuing what was in essence a policy of encouraging and urging Germany to go to war against the Soviet Union. This policy was particularly vividly manifested in the 1938 Munich Agreement. Nurturing anti-Soviet schemes, the ruling circles of these countries thwarted our country's efforts to establish a collective security system. The British and French governments refused to support Soviet Government proposals calling for establishing an antifascist military alliance with them. In addition, they were playing a double game, the objective of which was to bring Germany and the USSR into a clash. Utilizing the 1939 Moscow talks as a means of exerting pressure on Germany, the Western countries were simultaneously holding talks with the Hitlerites, counting on concluding a "pact of four" nations -- Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, or a bilateral Anglo-German alliance. Great Britain, initiator of these talks, was willing to break off talks with the USSR, to repudiate the guarantees it had given to Poland and other countries, and to sacrifice the interests of its closest ally, France.

British political leaders expressed their willingness to give Germany a "free hand" in Eastern Europe and to share with it "collaboration" in the British Empire, China, and the Soviet Union. Britain promised to endeavor to convince France to repudiate its mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. The Western powers let Hitler know that a German attack on Poland would not encounter any opposition on their part.

Following the invasion of Poland by German-fascist troops, Britain and France, together possessing a more than fivefold superiority in forces over fascist Germany, failed to undertake any real military actions, as specified by the agreement signed in 1939. The ruling circles of these countries permitted the German-fascist troops

to crush Polish armed forces and to seize Poland. Even after the seizure of Poland, waging the "phony war," they failed to take the necessary measures to prevent further German aggression. In addition, during this period the Western powers were continuing to put together an anti-Soviet front and were nurturing plans to invade the USSR.

Anticommunism -- an ideology capable of camouflaging any forms of imperialist reaction -- constituted an instrument of international imperialism. The propaganda of the imperialist countries devoted considerable effort toward discrediting our country's policies and, by means of various fabrications, accusing it of preparing for initiating war. Slander directed against the Soviet Union was needed to justify preparations by the Western nations to attack it and to conclude an alliance with fascist Germany. Contrary to their calculations, however, World War II began with a conflict between two capitalist coalitions. A policy of connivance and complicity with aggressive forces on the part of governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States enabled Germany, Italy and Japan to commence a forceful redivision of the world.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government were closely watching the international situation and taking measures to prevent war. In connection with refusal by the British and French governments to enter into a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR, in August 1939 the Soviet Government accepted Germany's proposal to enter into a nonaggression pact with that country, which gave the Soviet Union time to complete measures which were being carried out to increase the nation's defense capability. In addition, the pact made it more difficult to achieve the planned unification of the two quarreling imperialist coalitions for a joint campaign against the USSR.

One of the important tasks of Soviet foreign policy on the eve of the war was to prevent Turkey and Japan from taking part in it. As a result of considerable efforts, a Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality was signed in April 1941. Turkey's neutrality was also secured.

Alongside diplomatic efforts, the Communist Party was undertaking measures to prepare the country to repulse the impending aggression. Foreseeing war, Soviet party and military leaders, in addition to equipping the armed forces, devoted considerable attention to their direct and immediate preparations for conducting combat operations. Pursuant to the law on universal military service obligation, the Armed Forces shifted to a uniform cadre system of organizational development effective 1 September 1939. Certain changes were made in the agencies of strategic leadership, directed toward refining and detailing their functions, eliminating unnecessary components, strengthening of centralization in leadership and direction of the branches and arms, and bringing the structure of the control edifice as close as possible to conditions of wartime operations. At the same time, the party solicitously worked to instill in Soviet citizens a feeling of love of the homeland, readiness and willingness to defend staunchly and fearlessly its honor, freedom, and independence. These excellent qualities firmly entered the consciousness of our people, their army and navy, manifested in mass heroism on the battle front and on the home front during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

"The socioeconomic achievements of the prewar five-year plans," noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "and the ideological-political unity of the Soviet society, forged out in the course of building socialism, laid down the foundations of the victory achieved by our people in the Great Patriotic War."¹

On 22 June 1941 fascist Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, launching an assault of enormous force from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Well equipped with arms and combat equipment, and possessing two years of experience waging a war in Europe, the German-fascist army, reinforced by troops of Germany's satellite countries and supported by the resources of the Western European countries, which had been enslaved by Germany, proceeded to sow death and destruction on Soviet soil. The invasion force included 153 German divisions (of the Wehrmacht's total of 214), including all panzer (21) and motorized (14) divisions. Together with troops of the satellite countries, the enemy readied 190 divisions for the invasion, which were supported by four (of the five in existence) air forces, and by naval forces. The enemy enjoyed a three to fourfold superiority in men and weapons over the Soviet troops on the most important axes.² The fascist command planned to crush the main forces of the Red Army and Navy with a surprise blitzkrieg attack, to reach the Volga and the Urals in one and a half to two months, and to win the war.

In an extremely difficult and complex situation, the Communist Party organized and guided all efforts by the Soviet people to defeat the enemy. The most important program document for Soviet citizens during the entire war period was the 29 June 1941 directive of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), the principal content of which was the following: "Everything for the front! Everything for victory!"³

The USSR State Defense Committee, headed by I. V. Stalin, was established on 30 June 1941 to direct the actions of all organizations pertaining to mobilization of this country's efforts to repulse the enemy, while direction of the armed forces and their combat operations was handled by Headquarters, Supreme High Command.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party, its Politburo, the State Defense Committee, and Headquarters, Supreme High Command accomplished an immense job within a short period of time, reorganizing the country and the Armed Forces for the needs of the war, which constituted the main prerequisite for subsequent successes on the battle front and on the home front.

Resolute support by the broad masses of working people abroad for the just struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist aggressors and that enormous scale which was assumed by the movement for active assistance to the Soviet Union constituted the main factors in determining the position of ruling circles in the United States and Great Britain as well as other nations of the future anti-Hitler coalition toward the USSR. Regardless of the selfish calculations and reactionary war aims guiding these circles, and regardless of their hostility toward socialism, nevertheless they were compelled, under the pressure of the masses, the developing situation and the distribution of forces, to take the side of the Soviet Union in the struggle against fascist Germany.

The heroic resistance offered by the Soviet people and its army to the German-fascist troops during the first weeks of the war took the Hitlerites completely by surprise.

By the Battle of Smolensk, Soviet troops had thwarted the enemy's plans of advancing to Moscow without a halt. The Hitlerite command authorities were forced not only to order Army Group Center to shift to the defense on the Moscow axis but also to make substantial revisions in their war plans.

By the end of November 1941, however, exploiting temporary advantages in personnel and weapons, the Hitlerites had seized a large part of the Ukraine, all of Belorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, a number of oblasts of the RSFSR, and had reached a point close to Moscow.

At the beginning of December 1941 Soviet forces at Moscow shifted to a decisive counteroffensive, which developed in January 1942 into a general strategic offensive along almost the entire Soviet-German front. In some sectors it continued up to the end of April. Enemy troops were forced back westward 150-400 km. A total of 50 Wehrmacht divisions were routed. The defeat of the Germans at Moscow and the successful Red Army offensive in the winter of 1941/42 demonstrated the total bankruptcy of Hitler's "blitzkrieg war" plan. The victory at Moscow laid down a firm foundation for our future successes and sharply changed the subsequent character of the conflict, which was becoming protracted and disastrous for fascist Germany. It constituted the beginning of a radical turning point in the war.

The Battle of Stalingrad was the most important military-political event of the Great Patriotic War and of World War II as a whole. The armies of the fascist bloc lost 1.5 million men in this battle, approximately one fourth of all their manpower and equipment on the Soviet-German front.

Having routed the German-fascist invaders on the Kursk Salient, Soviet forces launched a strategic offensive in the southwestern and western sectors extending along a total frontage of 2,000 km.

More than half of all German divisions operating on the Soviet-German front at the beginning of 1944 were knocked out of action in the first half of that year, and in the course of the summer-fall strategic operations of 1944 the Soviet Army expelled the enemy from Soviet soil once and for all. By year's end Soviet troops had advanced far westward, had liberated Romania, Bulgaria, a large part of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, northern Norway, had advanced right up to the German border, and had crossed it in East Prussia.

In 1945 the Soviet Armed Forces simultaneously conducted strategic offensive operations along a broad front stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Middle Danube. From 12 January to 3 May they fought their way westward more than 800 km -- from the Vistula to the Elbe. Units and combined units of antifascist coalition allies -- Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and forces of the Resistance Movement -- fought actively together with the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Berlin Operation was the culmination point on the road to total victory over the forces of aggression in Europe. The fall of Berlin signified the end of Hitler's Reich.

The collapse of fascist Germany was followed by the rout of the Kwantung Army in the Far East. The liberation of Manchuria, as well as Korea, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands from the Japanese occupation forces played a decisive role in a further upsurge in the national liberation movement in China and other countries in East and Southeast Asia.

World War II ended victoriously in the West and East.

The main battle front throughout World War II was the Soviet-German front, where 607 enemy divisions (including 507 German divisions) were destroyed, routed or captured, while the Anglo-American troops in North Africa, Italy and Western Europe defeated and captured only 176 divisions. Of the 13,600,000 officers and men lost by fascist Germany in World War II, 10 million were lost on the Soviet-German front. Imperialist Japan lost more than 677,000 men (mostly captured) together with all their weapons, in combat against the Soviet Army.⁴

In the course of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Armed Forces partially or fully liberated 12 countries in Europe and Asia. Fulfillment of this great liberation mission and their international duty demanded enormous exertion and sacrifice. Approximately 8.5 million Soviet servicemen took part in liberating the countries of Europe and Asia.⁵

The road to victory of fascism was incredibly difficult and long. It took our nation 1,418 days and nights of bloody fighting to achieve total defeat of the aggressor and unconditional surrender of his armed forces. A decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism was made by the Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces, led by the Leninist party which became a genuinely fighting party in the war years.

The Soviet people paid dearly for victory. Twenty million sons and daughters of our homeland perished in the war, including 1 million men killed while carrying out their liberation mission abroad. Incalculable material loss was inflicted on the Soviet Union. The fascist invaders demolished and burned 1,710 cities and towns, more than 70,000 villages, 32,000 industrial enterprises, 98,000 kolkhozes, and 1,875 sovkhoses. The country lost approximately 30 percent of its national wealth. No country in the world sustained such heavy losses as the USSR, and no other country could have withstood the trials which fell to our lot.

In this war the Soviet Union, its army and navy blocked the road to fascist aggression and accomplished a task which no country in the West was able to accomplish. In this savage struggle our Armed Forces helped the peoples of Europe and Asia become free of slavery and saved them from physical annihilation.

"The defeat of Hitlerite Germany," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "signified the victory of progress over reaction, humanism over barbarism, the victory of socialism over the obscurantism of imperialism. This victory opened up the way for an upsurge in the revolutionary struggle of the worker class, an unprecedented scale of the national liberation movement, and collapse of disgraceful colonial system."⁶

The peoples of the world celebrated with delight the great historic victory over fascism and militarism. They were joyous over the arrival of the long-awaited peace and hoped that it would be lasting. But hardly had the guns of the war fallen silent, hardly had the smoke settled from the villages and towns burned by the fascists, before the wounds of grief over lost loved ones had healed, ominous clouds began to gather on the peaceful horizon -- harbingers of World War III. The main military-political grouping of imperialist powers was established in 1949 -- the North Atlantic bloc (NATO), which with each passing year became increasingly sinister and aggressive.

Taking cover behind the threadbare fabrication of a "Soviet military threat," the United States and NATO leaders are undertaking persistent efforts to shift in their favor the military balance in Europe, to achieve superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations. The present U.S. administration has from the very outset adopted a policy of further aggravation of international tension and escalation of the arms race. Militarization of the economy is being carried out at an intensive pace, and military budgets are growing on an unprecedented scale. In the current fiscal year total NATO military expenditures will amount to almost 300 billion dollars.

The 1980 volume put out by the Stockholm International Institute for Studying the Problems of Peace, which can hardly be suspected of sympathies with the USSR, states that the United States and its NATO allies account for almost half of total world military expenditures. This is approximately twice what is spent, according to the institute's calculations, by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations.

The NATO bloc presently possesses enormous military might. Its main force grouping -- more than 80 percent of the total divisions and half of all combat aircraft -- is deployed in the European theater.

A 230,000-man "rapid deployment force" is being hastily assembled, which will have the mission of "protecting U.S. interests" in various parts of the world.

Further efforts on the part of NATO command authorities are being focused on re-equipping the troops, reducing strategic deployment time, and increasing their combat and mobilization readiness. Within the aggregate of these measures, special importance is attached to creation and development of means of delivering a preventive nuclear strike. Precisely this forms the basis of U.S. nuclear strategy. As we know, it has been approved by the majority of NATO members, as is attested by the resolutions of the December (1980) and May (1981) NATO meetings.

The principal content of U.S. and NATO nuclear strategy consists in achieving superiority over the military potential of the Warsaw Pact nations, which would enable U.S. and NATO military-political leaders to dictate their terms in today's world. In conformity with this strategy, approximately 600 intermediate-range nuclear missiles are planned for deployment in Western Europe in 1983-1988. President R. Reagan has decided to go ahead with full-scale production of the neutron bomb. Alongside development of nuclear forces, plans call for reequipping forces with the latest models of conventional arms and combat equipment.

Intensive troop tactical training is being conducted. Its principal trend in recent years has been a more resolute, aggressive character of exercises. Aggressive efforts are being made to bring Spain into NATO, and NATO's military penetration of the Near and Middle East is being stepped up. The unity of the Arab peoples is being undermined. The military presence in the Persian Gulf region is increasing.

U.S. imperialism cannot accept the fact that Afghanistan has taken an independent road of development.

More and more attention is being devoted to Asia. Here NATO is counting on the anti-Sovietism of the Beijing leaders and the militarization of Japan.

The Indian Ocean, which has been declared by Washington to be "a sphere of vital U.S. interests," continues to occupy one of the most important positions in the global policy of imperialism.

The U.S. administration is also engaged in vigorous activities on the African continent. One can clearly trace in NATO strategic plans pertaining to Africa the intention of subordinating the continent to NATO influence, resorting to the establishment of bases on and next to the African continent. Bases have already been established in Egypt, Oman, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia.

Continuing attempts are being made to damage the position of the socialist nations. The West is attempting to utilize in its military-political strategy the crisis situation being experienced by the Polish People's Republic and is doing everything it can to channel the development of events in a counterrevolutionary direction and to deal a blow at the ideological-political and economic unity of the socialist community.

More than 100 local wars and armed conflicts have broken out in various parts of the world since World War II with the direct or indirect participation of the United States and the other NATO bloc countries;⁷ the victims of these conflicts have run into the millions.

Appraising the international situation, one cannot help but see that it is extremely complex. It is therefore essential to be ready for any turn of events in Europe and other parts of the world. The Communist Party and Soviet Government, together with the brother parties and governments of allied countries, are doing everything possible to secure the achievements of socialism and to defend peace on a troubled planet.

Past years show that the international détente which occurred in the 1970's was to a decisive degree a result of vigorous, purposeful, well-coordinated actions by the Warsaw Pact member nations. Suffice it to recall that in recent years the Soviet Union and the other countries of this fraternal defensive military-political alliance have submitted more than 100 proposals, which have served as the basis for the majority of agreements reached at various times on matters pertaining to arms limitations and preventing a nuclear world war.

In the last several years our country and its allies have advanced concrete and realistic proposals on guaranteeing international security. They include proposals dealing with limiting nuclear, particularly strategic nuclear arms; proposals to stop building nuclear weapons and to begin reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles, right down to their total elimination; proposals dealing with banning all other mass destruction weapons, particularly radiological, chemical, and neutron weapons.

Matters pertaining to foreign policy and the campaign for peace and disarmament are always thoroughly discussed at our party congresses. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union brought forth a number of new concrete proposals, directed at settling the most acute international problems in the interests of peace and security of peoples, which have received vigorous and active support on the part of our friends and allies, as well as a positive response on all continents. It was particularly stressed in the Central Committee Report to the 26th

CSPU Congress that today there is no more important international task for our party, our people, and all the peoples of the world than the task of upholding the cause of peace. "The lodestar to tomorrow," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the Congress, "is not preparations for war, dooming peoples to senseless wasting of their material and spiritual riches, but rather strengthening of peace."

The past war was harsh, and difficult trials fell to the lot of the Soviet nation. Victory in this war constituted a triumph of the invincibility of the socialist system. The societal system of socialism, the ideological-political unity of our people, ardent patriotism and proletarian internationalism, friendship among the peoples of the USSR and solidarity behind the Communist Party -- these are the genuinely powerful sources of that victory. It was gained thanks to the heroic courage and staunchness of the Soviet people, unswerving faith in the invincibility of the world's first socialist state, and the wisdom of the Communist Party. Socialism continued to live, develop and to advance steadily. And we possess firm knowledge that our highest goal will be achieved, that communism will be built.

At the same time the lessons of the war teach us vigilance. We should constantly bear in mind the aggressiveness of imperialism and the forces which support it. The present international situation demands that each and every Soviet serviceman faithfully stand guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, serve as a bulwark of world peace, tirelessly increase vigilance, strengthen discipline, and always be in a state of combat readiness which guarantees an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

Today great responsibility lies on the shoulders of officer personnel, who must ensure high quality of combat training of personnel, and particularly field, air and sea proficiency.

Speaking at an official meeting in Tbilisi on 22 May 1981, dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Georgian SSR and the Georgian Communist Party, L. I. Brezhnev stated: "...We shall be unable to ignore the deployment on European soil of new U.S. nuclear missile weapons aimed at the USSR and our allies. We shall be obliged to think about additional defense measures. If necessary, we shall find impressive means to protect our vital interests. Then let the NATO planners not complain."¹²

We cannot permit a repeat of 22 June 1941. The defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan in the last war served then and serves now as an instructive lesson for those who nurture plans for a third, most destructive and devastating world war. Let today's claimants to world domination not forget that history harshly punishes those who ignore its lessons.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskiy kursom. Rech' i stat'i" [Following a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, page 90.
2. "Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, page 54; "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1975, page 21.

3. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1958, pp 354-356.
4. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. Concise History], Voenizdat, 1970, page 553; "Sovetskaya Voenennaya...", op. cit., Vol 2, page 65.
5. "Osvoboditel'naya missiya Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II], Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, pp 469, 470.
6. L. I. Brezhnev, "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda" [Great Victory of the Soviet People], Moscow, Politizdat, 1965, page 6.
7. "Sovetskaya Voenennaya...", op. cit., Vol 5, page 21.
- 8-11. Footnotes omitted.
12. PRAVDA, 23 May 1981.

Mar SU Bagramyan

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 20-27

[Article by Twice HSU, Mar SU I. Bagramyan: "The Character and Special Features of the Initial Period of the War"]

[Text] The problem of the initial period of a future war was extensively examined by Soviet military science in the prewar years. Such eminent Soviet military theorists as M. F. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and V. K. Triandafillov dealt with this topic time and again. In particular, V. K. Triandafillov's "Character of the Operations of Contemporary Armies" contained many valuable thoughts and ideas. In the period 1931-1934 the journal VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA published a number of articles which were devoted partially or in their entirety to problems of the initial period of war. Some authors came fairly close to a correct understanding of the nature and role of the initial period of the future war.

The experience of the initial operations of World War II was discussed at a conference of Red Army leader personnel in December 1940. Possible variations of initiation of war and conduct of combat operations by aggressor armies were correctly evaluated at this conference. Powerful response strikes against the enemy were specified as countermeasures. Troops of the first strategic echelon were assigned the mission of repelling the initial enemy attack, with the objective of securing the concentration and deployment of the main forces and creating favorable conditions for launching a response strike. No less than two weeks were allocated for deployment of the main forces. There was no doubt that the war would be of a protracted nature and that victory would be won by that side which would be able to supply the battle front with all requisite materiel for an extended period of time.

This thesis was based on astute foresight by M. V. Frunze, in a statement made by him at the beginning of the 1920's: "Even total defeat of the enemy's armies,

achieved at a specified moment, does not ensure final victory, since the shattered combat units are backed up by an economically and morally strong home front. With the availability of time and space securing new mobilization of the manpower and material resources necessary for restoring the army's war-fighting capability, the latter can easily reestablish a front and continue to fight, with the hope of success."¹ Thus our military theoretical thinking on the eve of the war assessed essentially correctly the aggregate of tasks facing the troops in the initial period of the war. On the whole correct practical conclusions were drawn from the theoretical points.

An initial period objectively occurs in every war. In spite of the different conditions of preparation for and conduct of the war, this period possesses a number of common features and patterns, constituting a part of the unified process of armed combat by the opposing sides. As we know, however, each war has its own specific features, and the initial period of each war is of course also specific to a certain degree. This is especially clearly traced in investigating the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, for it was distinguished by unusual complexity and acuteness of combat, especially in the initial stage.

At one time the problem of the initial period of the past war was the subject of rather sharp debate. In the course of this debate it was established that one cannot use a customary measuring stick in determining the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. As we know, in its traditional definition it is considered that this period ends when one of the opposing sides achieves its initial strategic objectives (routing the troops of the enemy's first strategic echelon and creating conditions for a victorious conclusion of the war) and deployment of the second strategic echelon begins.² In the course of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, however, neither side attained its initial strategic objectives, and only the Soviet side deployed its second strategic echelon, for fascist Germany had in fact even prior to the attack on the USSR not only mobilized but also gathered almost its entire land army into a single striking force.

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War is in our view that segment of combat operations in the course of which the contest was being conducted by forces deployed directly in or close to the future theater of war. It continued up to that moment when the military leaders on both sides realized that the initial strategic aims were unattainable on the scheduled timetable and took concrete measures to make a major revision in their subsequent actions.

From the very beginning of fascist Germany's treacherous attack on our country, the Communist Party and Soviet Government were compelled to carry out, under difficult conditions, measures pertaining to mobilization and strategic deployment of the Armed Forces, mobilization of this country's economic resources, and to implement an energetic foreign policy to strengthen the international position of the Soviet Union. The Hitlerite leaders initiated an extensive campaign of lies and slander, attempting to convince the peoples of the world that the Soviet Union threatened Germany and that therefore the war had been forced upon Germany and was of a preventive nature.

As we know, with the outbreak of World War II, when the probability of German aggression against our country increased, deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces began to be carried out on a large scale. A total of 170 divisions and 2 brigades

were stationed on the territory of the western frontier military districts. One should bear in mind that of this total number, the only divisions which were at wartime strength in personnel and weapons were those which were components of the covering armies protecting the nation's border. In the spring of 1941 three armies were deployed in the interior districts, which were subsequently hastily moved to the western frontier military districts. Thus the troops of the western districts, together with fleet forces, formed the first strategic echelon of the Soviet Armed Forces in the western theater of war.

Let us turn to the concrete events of the initial period of the war. Bourgeois falsifiers of history have the effrontery to view fascist Germany's aggression against the Soviet Union as an "improvisation" by Hitler or a collateral decision by the Nazi leaders, allegedly dictated by the requirements of the war with Great Britain. They use this argument in attempts to explain away Germany's crushing defeat in the war.

The German General Staff, making preparations for war against the USSR, counted most heavily on the devastating power of a surprise first strike by concentrated masses of aircraft, tanks and infantry and on swiftness of their advance to our homeland's vital centers. This adventure was grounded on the traditional doctrine of German militarism, formulated by Ludendorff, Seeckt, Kochenhausen, Guderian and others. The entire striking power of the fascist Reich and allies, the entire experience of preceding wars in Europe, and the entire skill of selected and trained military cadres were put precisely into the first strike. The Hitlerite leaders had so much faith in their own strength and power and the infallibility of their calculations of "blitzkrieg" success that they gave no thought whatsoever to any problems of a protracted war. The fascist strategists failed to assume resistance by the entire people, which from the very first days transformed the struggle of the Soviet people against the aggressors into a genuinely great war, into a Patriotic War. Plans were based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would be finished off by the end of 1941.

Early on the morning of 22 June 1941 our country was hit not by an "improvised" but thoroughly planned-out attack by the largest and most powerful war machine ever created by a capitalist society.

A question arises: to what degree were we prepared to repulse such a powerful attack, which in addition had the element of surprise? Precisely this circumstance was one of the main reasons for the dramatic events of the initial period of the war. I shall stress only the following. While Germany, preparing for an attack on the USSR which had been planned in advance, had already placed its economy on a war footing and had fully mobilized and deployed its armed forces for a sneak attack, the Soviet Union was unable to carry out like measures. In particular, because of miscalculations the Soviet command authorities were unable by the initiation of the treacherous enemy attack even to deploy for defense of the nation's border the covering armies which had been designated in the western military districts for this purpose. It is true that field fortification had been completed, overlapping onto fortified areas, construction of which was not yet complete. At the time of the treacherous attack by the German-fascist forces, only a few concrete pillboxes were occupied by duty garrisons in each fortified area. We should also note that enemy ground and air forces enjoyed overall superiority in the initial period of the war

as regards modern tanks and combat aircraft. Thus extremely unequal conditions arose for the conduct of combat operations.

In the first phase of Plan "Barbarossa," the Hitlerite command authorities intended to launch attacks by panzer groups and field armies, with air support, splitting apart the troops of the Soviet frontier districts on the Dvina, Minsk-Smolensk, and Kiev axes, destroying them west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, thus opening up an avenue of unimpeded advance on Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donbass. As already noted, the invasion of our country began with surprise attacks by enemy force groupings which had been fully readied for the attack. Enemy aircraft immediately proceeded to deliver massive strikes on airfields and troops in the frontier zone, as well as on many cities and towns. The Soviet troops, attacked with the element of surprise, were forced to accept battle in extremely disadvantageous conditions. In spite of this fact, from the very first hours of the war they offered staunch resistance to the enemy, regardless of casualties, and fought with unusual tenacity and heroism.

Combat operations stretched along a broad front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians (1,500 kilometers). Subsequently the front continued to expand, reaching 3,000 kilometers by mid-July, while on the main axes the depth of incursion ran 400-600 km. Additional forces were engaged: on the first day of the war the enemy engaged 117 divisions, while 10 days later, when combined units from the support echelons and satellite-nation troops swung into action, the number of enemy divisions operating in the first line increased to 171.³ On the Soviet side only the covering armies of the three western military districts were able to conduct combat operations in the frontier zone.

The enemy enjoyed a three to fourfold superiority over Soviet forces in personnel and weapons on the major axes. It is true that subsequently all troops of the western frontier military districts engaged, and their total strength ran to 170 divisions. One should not forget, however, that approximately half of these divisions entered the frontier battle at peacetime strength and were acutely short of transport, especially for artillery. Strategic reserves did not reach the combat area and commence to engage until the beginning of July. In the initial period of the war both sides engaged a total of 400 divisions, involving thousands of tanks and aircraft, tens of thousands of guns and mortars, and large quantities of other combat equipment and weapons.

The uncompromising, class nature of the commencing war dictated from the very outset the vast scale, high degree of aggressiveness and savagery of military operations. On the first days of the war Soviet command authorities sought to halt the advance of the enemy's battle groups, to push them back to their initial position and, with favorable conditions, to shift military operations to enemy soil. Stubborn defense in occupied positions was combined with continuous counterattacks, army and front counterthrusts, as a rule with the participation of tank combined units. When necessary, troops would withdraw to intermediate and rear positions. Encircled combined units and units fought fiercely and frequently broke out of encirclement, inflicting appreciable losses on the enemy. In all cases defense was of an aggressive character.

By the end of June it became clear to the Soviet High Command that the war plan drawn up before the war was not appropriate to the current situation, and it radically revised this plan. The main tasks assigned to the Armed Forces was to gain time for amassing strategic reserves, to alter the relative strengths in the course of combat operations, and to create preconditions for the Soviet Army to shift to a decisive strategic counteroffensive. Initially the possibility of such a counteroffensive involved engagement of the troops of the second strategic echelon deployed on the Dnieper.

Successful accomplishment of the strategic defense mission depended in large measure on where the main efforts of the Armed Forces would be concentrated. Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC) correctly determined that of the three strategic sectors, the western sector was of decisive importance, in which the Wehrmacht was pushing the main attack. The importance of this axis was also dictated by the fact that it led to this country's political, administrative and industrial center, its main highway center and center of all other communications, Moscow, the capital of our homeland. In July Hq SHC employed approximately 70 percent of its reserves in the western, Moscow sector. At the same time the northwestern and southwestern sectors were beefed up. These effective measures predetermined the failure of the enemy offensive on the main axis of advance and subsequently forced the enemy temporarily to shift to the defense in this sector.

A High Command Reserve army group began forming on 25 June, under the command of Mar SU S. M. Budenny; this army group was made up of combined units which were completing mobilization, and organized into four armies (19th, 20th, 21st, and 22d), deploying in the rear of the Western Front. This army group was assigned the mission of presenting a stubborn defense and providing reliable cover to the Smolensk sector. The 16th Army was also moved up into the Smolensk area and placed under the commanding general of this army group. Subsequently, reinforcing the western sector, Hq SHC issued a supplementary order calling for deployment of the 24th and 28th reserve armies to the rear of S. M. Budenny's army group, with the mission of taking up position along a line running Nelidovo, Yel'nya, Desna River (up to Zhukovka) and preparing for defense. On 2 July Hq SHC transferred the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22d armies to the Western Front in order to achieve immediate reestablishment of defense in the Smolensk sector.

These measures were extremely opportune, for the Hitlerite command authorities, leaving field armies to finish off the encircled Soviet troops in an area west of Minsk, moved the 2d and 3d Panzer groups forward to capture ground along the Dnieper. Although the Soviet troops of the second strategic echelon had not yet fully concentrated by the time these two panzer groups reached the Western Dvina and Dnieper, nevertheless the enemy encountered resolute resistance. Launching counterthrusts in the vicinity of Desna, Vitebsk, to the north and northwest of Orsha, the 22d, 20th, and 21st armies inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and delayed his advance. In particular, attempts by the 3d Panzer Group to seize bridgeheads on the east bank of the Dnieper without a halt and to exploit in the direction of Smolensk were unsuccessful. By the evening of 9 July the advance of the enemy's 2d and 3d Panzer groups had been halted along a front extending from the town of Disna to Zhlobin.

This was the general situation in which the Battle of Smolensk began, a battle which occupied an important place in the operations of the summer of 1941. "Although the enemy was not defeated, as had been planned by Hq SHC," Mar SU G. K. Zhukov writes in his memoirs, "his battle groups were exhausted."⁴ The Hitlerites lost 250,000 officers and men in the Battle of Smolensk, according to the admission of German generals. On 30 July the Hitlerite command authorities ordered Army Group Center to shift to the defense. At the beginning of July the troops of the Southwestern Front were fighting staunchly in a somewhat different, less complicated situation than in the western sector. In the period 23-29 June a large tank encounter battle was fought in the Lutsk-Radekhov-Brody-Rovno area, involving the participation of 1,500 tanks on both sides. The main efforts of the troops of the Southwestern Front were directed toward defeating the enemy's 1st Panzer Group. Hitlerite General H. Hoth had an interesting assessment of this battle: "Army Group South had the most difficult time of it. The enemy troops defending against the combined units of the northern flank were pushed back from the border, but they quickly recovered from the unexpected attack and, mounting counterattacks with their reserves and tank units deployed at depth, halted the German advance. By 28 June the 1st Panzer Group, attached to the 6th Army, had not achieved a tactical breakthrough. Powerful enemy counterattacks presented a considerable obstacle on the avenue of advance of the German units."⁵

Regrouping its forces following a week of intensive fighting, the German 1st Panzer Group, supported by the main forces of the 6th Field Army, then mounted an attack into the poorly covered junction between our 5th and 6th armies and penetrated through to Ostrog. On 7-9 July enemy mobile combined units reached the far approaches to Kiev. At the same time the German 11th Army and Romanian troops were advancing on Mogilev-Podol'skiy. There was now a threat not only that the enemy would capture Kiev, capital of the Ukraine, but also encircle the main forces of the Southwestern Front. Under the circumstances the commanding general of the front, acting pursuant to a 30 June directive of Hq SHC, accelerated withdrawal of the 6th, 26th, and 12th armies to a line of fortified areas along the former border. The armies expeditiously withdrew to the new position, avoiding encirclement. This was also promoted by the fact that simultaneously with initiation of withdrawal of the 6th, 12th, and 26th armies, the 6th and 5th armies mounted counterthrusts into the flanks of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group, forcing it temporarily to halt its advance on Kiev.

In the northwestern sector Soviet troops had dug in at the beginning of July on a line running Pyarnu-Tartu, after which they halted for approximately a month's time the advance of Army Group North on the Luga defensive line. Although by mid-July, that is, by the time enemy panzer troops had reached a line running Lake Peipus-Vitebsk-Orsha-Dnieper, Soviet command authorities had not yet succeeded in completing establishment of a continuous and stable strategic defensive front, large-scale organizational measures by Hq SHC were having important consequences. Soviet troops, withdrawing from the border with heavy fighting, were withdrawing to lines on which the forces of the second strategic echelon were already deploying. Thanks to stubborn resistance by the Soviet troops, the enemy's rate of advance was sharply reduced -- down to 6-7 km per day as compared with 30 km on the first days of the war.

By mid-July German headquarters began to realize that the Wehrmacht could no longer count on Plan "Barbarossa." Directive No 33, "Subsequent Conduct of the War in the East," was issued on 19 July, stating that "Army Group Center will require considerable time to wipe out strong enemy battle groups which continue to stand between our mobile combined units. Aggressive actions and freedom of maneuver of the northern flank of Army Group South are hindered by the fortifications of the city of Kiev and actions by the troops of the Soviet 5th Army to our rear."⁷ This directive did not state such decisive missions as in Plan "Barbarossa." In particular, the mission of Army Group Center was as follows: "Continuing to advance on Moscow with the forces of infantry combined units, mobile combined units which will not be taking part in the advance southeastward beyond the Dnieper⁸ shall cut the Moscow-Leningrad line of communications and shall cover the right flank of Army Group North, which is advancing toward Leningrad."⁹ This directive speaks of the capture of Moscow in very vague terms. It is true that three days later Hitler changed his mind and, in a special supplement to Directive 33, endeavored to concretize this objective, although once again he employed rather vague expressions: "After the situation improves in the Smolensk area and on the southern flank of Army Group Center, the forces of the fairly strong infantry combined units of both component armies¹⁰ shall crush the enemy force which is holding out in the area between Smolensk and Moscow, with the entire left flank advancing as far eastward as possible and capturing Moscow."¹¹

The order to capture Moscow was hedged by the locution "as far as possible," but Field Marshal Brauchitsch, commanding general of ground forces, expressed his disagreement, to the extent subordination permitted, even with this formulation of the task, calling it "monstrously difficult." He felt that accomplishment of the operational plan specified in the directive was impossible at the present time, in view of the situation which had developed on the fronts, in particular along the frontage of Army Group Center. "As a time calculation indicates, there can be no possibility of resuming a decisive offensive in the direction of Moscow before the beginning of September."¹² The conclusion contained at the end of this unique memorandum is particularly significant: "Thus in the final analysis he¹³ has achieved what he needed to achieve. As a result of the constant threat created by him on our flanks, he is forcing us to disperse our forces. At the same time he has succeeded in postponing by several weeks an immediate threat to Moscow and thus in achieving not only a sufficient political success but also in maintaining control of Moscow's vitally important industrial enterprises for a relatively extended time, as well as a transport center of decisive importance for moving troops."¹⁴

Hitler was forced to agree with the conclusions reached by his subordinate and to rescind his own order in the following Directive 34, dated 30 July 1941, for the first time since the beginning of World War II. The new document stated: "The development of events in recent days, the appearance of large enemy forces facing and on the flanks of Army Group Center, the supply situation and the need to give the 2d and 3d Panzer groups approximately 10 days to rebuild and replenish their combined units have made it necessary temporarily to postpone accomplishment of the objectives and tasks specified in Directive 33, dated 19 July, and the directive supplement dated 23 July."¹⁵

The new directive, restricting the range of offensive missions of army groups North and South, ordered Army Group Center to shift to the defense, utilizing the most

suitable terrain for this purpose.¹⁶ Essentially it constituted acknowledgement of the fact that the Wehrmacht had failed to accomplish the missions specified by Plan "Barbarossa" on any of the strategic axes. Plans of defeating the main forces of the Soviet Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers and to bring the war to a swift end had failed. The enemy was forced to shift from an offensive along the entire front to an offensive on two strategic axes, and not simultaneously, thus limiting the scale of offensive operations.

The Hitlerite leadership was for the first time giving serious thought to the fact that the war was assuming a protracted nature. It was precisely in connection with this that Hitler suddenly began talking about the necessity of seizing the Soviet Union's most important economic regions before advancing on Moscow. The time factor, which the leaders of the Reich so mortally feared, had become their enemy and our ally. The war was entering a qualitatively new stage, unforeseen by the German strategists. The fact that the strategy of blitzkrieg on the Soviet-German front had produced a mortally dangerous crack is attested by the following statement by the chief of staff of the armed forces supreme high command, Hitler's chief military adviser Field Marshal Keitel, to the commanding general of Army Group Center on 25 July 1941: "Deep tactical envelopments, in conformity with theory developed by the general staff, were correct in the West, as the enemy's flanks were vulnerable and he had little will to resist. But when applied to the Russians, they do not lead to complete success. The Russians sometimes attack our enveloping flanks with large forces, immobilize our forces, and avoid encirclement and complete annihilation.... Panzer forces, which are particularly valuable, sustain excessive losses as a result of enemy flank attacks."¹⁷

The Soviet political and military leadership, as a result of thwarting of the German-fascist plans, gained time to carry out measures to achieve further development of a defense disposed in depth in the western sector and to ready strategic reserves, which played an important role in the Smolensk Operation, in the defense of Kiev and Leningrad, and subsequently in our first strategic victory at Moscow, which constituted the beginning of a radical turnabout in the course of the war.

Thus one can consider that the initial period of the Great Patriotic War came to an end on 10-20 July. In spite of the fact that fascist Germany had played all its resources on the "blitzkrieg war" card, including the military potential of the occupied countries of Western Europe, it failed to crush the Soviet Armed Forces. The magnificence of the deed accomplished by the Soviet fighting men lies in the fact that they withstood an initial attack of enormous force, on which the enemy was counting heavily in the war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Armed Forces made the first, very substantial contribution toward thwarting the monstrous scheme of Plan "Barbarossa" and prepared the conditions for a turning point in the course of the war.

The lessons of the Great Patriotic War, especially the initial period, are unquestionably instructive for our military leader cadres. We, the older generation, know well what efforts and sacrifices were required to overcome the difficulties caused by certain errors of omission which occurred on the eve of the war. It is our direct obligation to communicate our experience to the present generation of military cadres, so that there will never again be a repetition of that which took place 40 years ago.

We should not forget that in a future war, if the imperialists start one, the initial period will radically differ from the initial period of the last war. Precisely for this reason the Communist Party and Soviet Government constantly demand of the Soviet Armed Forces the very highest degree of vigilance and constant combat readiness, to ensure that at any time they can offer a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1957, page 133.
2. "Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1978, pp 554-555.
3. "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945 gg. Voenno-istoricheskii ocherk" [World War II, 1939-1945, A Military-Historical Sketch], Voenizdat, 1958, page 196.
4. G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Reminiscences and Reflections], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1969, pp 287-288.
5. G. Got, "Tankovyye operatsii" [Panzer Operations], Voenizdat, 1961, page 80.
6. Footnote omitted.
7. "Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya!" [Top Secret! For Command Authorities Only!], Moscow, Nauka, 1967, page 262.
8. The divisions of the 3d Panzer Group are meant.
9. "Sovershenno...", op. cit., page 263.
10. The 9th and 2d Field armies are meant.
11. "Sovershenno...", op. cit., page 266.
12. Ibid., page 296.
13. The adversary -- the Soviet Army -- is meant.
14. "Sovershenno...", op. cit., page 296.
15. Ibid., page 269.
16. Ibid., page 270.
17. Ibid., page 299.

Army Gen Kozlov

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 28-35

[Article by Chief of the K. Ye. Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Army Gen M. Kozlov: "Special Features of Strategic Defense and Counteroffensive and Their Significance for Development of the Soviet Art of Warfare." Passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] Theory of the art of warfare has long viewed the strategic offensive and strategic defense as the two principal interrelated types of strategic operations. The offensive was considered the main and decisive component. Strategic defense was acknowledged to be a temporary, subordinate type of strategic operation. Its use was recommended under adverse situation conditions.

History contains many examples where armed forces, following a skillfully conducted strategic defense, shifted to a decisive counteroffensive and, seizing the strategic initiative, gained total victory over the enemy. This is how Russian troops routed the French army in the Patriotic War of 1812. This is how the young Red Army defeated the troops of Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin and the White Poles during the civil war of 1918-1920. The Great Patriotic War provided vivid examples of a strategic counteroffensive.

In the Moscow counteroffensive the Soviet Armed Forces crushed the main battle group of the German-fascist forces, which was advancing on the Moscow axis. Hitler's plan of "blitzkrieg war" against the USSR was thwarted, and conditions were created for a general Soviet Army offensive. The counteroffensive at Stalingrad resulted in encirclement and annihilation of a 330,000-man enemy force. This counteroffensive signaled the beginning of a radical turning point not only on the Soviet-German front but in the course of the entire World War II.

Two powerful enemy forces were defeated in the counteroffensive at Kursk -- the Orel and the Belgorod-Khar'kov force, which were advancing toward Kursk. Soviet troops seized once and for all the strategic initiative from the enemy's hands and created conditions for initiation of a general offensive along the entire Soviet-German front.

A strategic defense preceded the counteroffensive at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk. It was prepared for and executed under various conditions of military-political and strategic situation, which exerted considerable influence on its objectives and organization, as well as on the forms and modes of military operations.

In the first period of the Great Patriotic War strategic defense, due to the prevailing circumstances, was the principal type of strategic operation of the Soviet Armed Forces. It was employed in two campaigns: in the summer-fall campaign of 1941 and the summer-fall campaign of 1942, was of a forced nature, and was dictated by the extremely unfavorable strategic situation.

The situation was especially difficult and complex in the summer of 1941. As a result of the treacherous sneak attack by fascist Germany, the troops of the frontier military districts sustained heavy casualties. The fully mobilized

German-fascist army, equipped with the latest military hardware, launched an attack in all strategic sectors. An attempt by the Soviet command authorities to slow the enemy's advance by means of counterthrusts was unsuccessful. Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, Soviet troops were compelled to withdraw into the heartland.

Under the circumstances the Soviet Supreme High Command (SHC) made the decision to shift to a strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front. Its objective was to halt the enemy's advance with tenacious and aggressive defensive actions, to hold important political centers and economic regions, to harass and wear down the enemy by attrition, and to gain time to prepare for a counteroffensive.

The shift to the defense was accomplished in conditions of savage battles, when strategic deployment of the Armed Forces was disrupted. The Hitlerites possessed overwhelming superiority in personnel and weapons, especially on the main axes of advance. German-fascist air forces possessed air supremacy and launched heavy attacks on Soviet troops and installations in the rear areas. The situation was complicated by the fact that at the time we did not have defensive lines prepared in advance in the rear areas of the fronts and did not possess the necessary reserves.

/The strategic defense in the summer-fall campaign of 1941/ was carried out by means of tenaciously holding important areas, with subsequent withdrawal by Soviet troops from one hastily established defensive line to another. In the course of the strategic defensive operations which were conducted in the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern sectors, army and front counterthrusts were mounted. Partial offensive operations were mounted in certain sectors of the front. Maneuver of personnel and equipment between strategic axes and from the heartland was extensively employed. Soviet fighting men displayed unprecedented staunchness and courage, mass heroism and self-sacrifice. All this heightened the stability of the strategic defense. In defensive battles Soviet troops inflicted enormous casualties and combat equipment losses on the enemy and halted his strategic offensive. The objective of the strategic defense was achieved by the beginning of December 1941.

/Strategic defense in the summer of 1942/ was also conducted in an adverse situation. Taking advantage of the lack of a second front in Europe, the Hitlerite command authorities transferred up to 35 divisions to the Soviet-German front between 1 January and 10 March 1942¹ and began preparations for a new strategic offensive.

Concentrating on this front a substantial percentage of all available manpower and equipment, they not only replaced their combat casualties but increased by almost 800,000 men the numerical strength of German forces on our front.² By the summer of 1942 the Soviet Army had also become considerably stronger and more experienced than at the beginning of the war. Our industry, however, was not yet able fully to provide it with the necessary quantity of modern combat equipment, and we were considerably inferior to the enemy in technical equipment, especially aircraft. Numerous measures to establish strategic reserves and to provide the troops with new combat equipment were not yet fully completed. There was a shortage of arms and reserves. In addition, the partial offensive operations undertaken in the spring of 1942 at Khar'kov, in the Crimea, at Leningrad and Dem'yansk failed to produce the anticipated results. Due to insufficient manpower and equipment, as well as deficiencies in organization of combat operations, our troops were unable to improve the operational-strategic situation and to thwart the enemy advance.

The German-fascist army, having seized the strategic initiative, launched powerful attacks in the southwestern sector. Under the onslaught of numerically superior enemy forces, the troops of the Soviet Army were once again forced to shift to a strategic defense. But while in the summer of 1941 fierce defensive battles were being fought practically along the entire Soviet-German front, stretching 3,000-4,000 km, in the summer of 1942 such battles were being fought only along the southern part of the front.

In the course of the strategic defensive operations conducted between the end of June and 19 November 1942 in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Northern Caucasus sectors, the Soviet Armed Forces harassed and bloodied the enemy's battle groups and halted their advance. Nevertheless we should note that even in this defensive campaign our troops, just as in 1941, were forced to yield considerable ground.

/The strategic defense at Kursk in the summer of 1943 was fundamentally different./ Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC) discovered as early as May preparations for an enemy offensive in this area. Enjoying an overall superiority in manpower and equipment and possessing the capability to conduct an offensive, the Soviet command authorities decided deliberately to shift to the defense. Its objective was to inflict a defeat on the advancing enemy in positions prepared and occupied in advance, to knock the enemy's tanks out of action, and thus to create favorable conditions for shifting to a counteroffensive and for achieving total defeat of the enemy's weakened battle groups.

Careful advance preparations for the defense on the Kursk Salient predetermined the success of the operations of the Soviet forces. In contrast to the forced strategic defense in the summer-fall campaigns of 1941 and 1942, which lasted from 5 to 6 months, the defense at Kursk lasted only a few days.

In the summer of 1941 the enemy advanced 850-1,200 km deep into our territory, 550-700 km in the summer of 1942, and only 12-35 km at Kursk in the summer of 1943, and only in two narrow sectors. In the summer-fall campaign of 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces were compelled to conduct eight strategic defensive operations to achieve strategic defense objectives, four in the summer-fall campaign of 1942, and only one, at Kursk, in the summer of 1943. Vigorous defensive actions on the Kursk Salient were conducted along a total frontage of only 140 km.

The Soviet command authorities had to resolve a number of complex problems in preparing for and conducting strategic defense. One of them was the prompt and correct determination of the enemy's main axis of advance. The main efforts of the defending troops were concentrated, defensive lines constructed and reserves concentrated precisely on this axis. In the summer of 1941 the western (Moscow) sector lay on this axis.

In the process of repulsing the advance of superior enemy forces in conditions of total fascist air supremacy, coordination and troop control were frequently disrupted. Depth of defense was shallow, not exceeding 20-25 km. Due to insufficient time, the defensive lines set up to the rear were poorly prepared. As a consequence of this the defense displayed little stability. Three times the German-fascist troops succeeding in breaking through the defense.

In assessing the situation which existed in the summer of 1942, Hq SHC believed that the German-fascist army would continue to mount the main drive toward Moscow. Therefore the strongest Soviet force grouping was concentrated in the central sector of the front. After the enemy offensive commenced, when it was discovered that his main efforts were being concentrated in the southwestern sector, Hq SHC was forced to redeploy troops to that sector quickly.

In the course of the summer-fall campaign of 1942 Hq SHC assigned from its reserves just to the Stalingrad sector 72 rifle divisions and brigades, 11 tank and mechanized corps, 2 cavalry corps, 38 tank brigades, 100 artillery and 10 air regiments. Reserves were employed to reinforce the defending fronts, to reestablish the disrupted strategic defense frontage, and to establish battle groups to mount counterthrusts and conduct partial offensive operations. An insufficiently developed road network, however, and enemy air superiority prevented accomplishing the redeployment at the necessary pace. The situation frequently made it necessary to engage reserves unit by unit, under enemy air attack, on unprepared terrain, which diminished the effectiveness of their employment. As a result in the summer of 1942 defense in the southwestern sector once again proved to be insufficiently stable. Nevertheless, thanks to intensification of defense activeness and improvement in the combat skill of Soviet fighting men, the enemy's rate of advance steadily declined. In June-August enemy troops were advancing at an average rate of 15-20 km per day, in September the figure was 2-3 km, and only 1-2 km per day during the fighting on the Stalingrad defensive perimeters.³

Hq SHC displayed a high degree of field generalship talent and genuine strategic foresight ability in organizing the defense at Kursk. Determining in a prompt and timely manner the direction of the enemy's main efforts, it was able to concentrate in advance a large force on the Kursk axis. A total of 58 percent of rifle divisions, 70 percent of guns and mortars, and 87 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery were concentrated in a sector of the Kursk Salient comprising 31 percent of the total extent of the Soviet-German front.^{3a}

Soviet troops took up prepared positions in advance, prior to initiation of the enemy offensive, to a depth of 120 km, and constructed a system of artificial obstacles. Principal attention was devoted to preparing an antitank defense. Deployed behind the Central and Voronezh fronts was the Steppe Front -- the most powerful large strategic formation of reserves ever established in the course of the war. The deliberate defense proved to be highly effective and impenetrable to the enemy.

A high degree of activeness became /a characteristic feature of strategic defense/ of the Soviet Armed Forces. The degree of activeness increased as troops became better equipped with new weapons and other hardware, as their organizational structure improved, and with development of forms and modes of combat actions. This active aggressiveness was manifested in the launching of army and front counterthrusts, in the conduct of partial offensive operations, and in continuous delivery of airstrikes and artillery fire on the enemy, in the conduct of artillery counterbombardment, and in extensive maneuver of reserves in the course of defensive operations.

A particularly high level of aggressiveness was achieved in the summer of 1943 in the defense at Kursk. Tank corps and tank armies, as well as large air forces were more extensively employed in mounting front counterthrusts. In the period of

preparation of the defense at Kursk, two air operations were mounted to destroy the enemy's air forces, and artillery counterbombardment was successfully conducted. Troops fought stubbornly to hold each defensive position.

The forms of conduct of strategic defense were also improved. At the beginning of the war these were front defensive operations, while defensive operations of front groups became the principal form of strategic defense beginning in August 1941.

The principal mode of forced strategic defense was a combination of rigid positional forms of defensive actions to hold important political centers, economic regions, large natural and man-made defensive lines with maneuver actions, which were characterized by execution of counterthrusts, withdrawal of friendly troops from enemy attack, and withdrawal of troops from one position to another.

Strategic defense was organized and executed in close coordination with a subsequent strategic counteroffensive. Successfully executing defensive missions and harassing the advancing enemy, the Soviet Armed Forces laid the foundation for victory in a counteroffensive.

/The objective of the strategic counteroffensive was as follows:/ to defeat in detail the enemy main forces which were advancing on the main strategic axis, to seize the strategic initiative, to capture important areas, and to create conditions for a shift to a general offensive.

/The commencement of the strategic counteroffensive signified a shift by the Soviet Armed Forces from strategic defense to a strategic offensive./ The counteroffensive at Moscow, for example, kicked off the strategic offensive in the 1941/42 winter campaign. The counteroffensive at Stalingrad was the beginning of the strategic offensive in the 1942/43 winter campaign, while the counteroffensive at Kursk was the beginning of the 1943 summer strategic offensive.

All these counteroffensives were of a strategic scale. Several fronts took part in each: three at Moscow and Stalingrad, and five fronts at Kursk. In addition, large long-range motor forces and National Air Defense Forces were involved. The large strategic formations and combined units which took part in a counteroffensive operated under the general direction of Hq SHC.

/An important feature of the counteroffensive/ was the fact that as a rule preparations for it were conducted under highly complex situation conditions -- during fierce defensive battles. Therefore the Soviet command authorities had to resolve two problems simultaneously: first of all, to direct combat operations aimed at repelling and thwarting the enemy's offensive; second, to mass forces, to establish reserves, to plan and comprehensively prepare for a counteroffensive. In this complex situation great courage, strategic foresight, and field generalship talent were required of Hq SHC, the General Staff and the commanding generals of the fronts, in order intelligently and wisely to expend available manpower and equipment, to hold important defensive lines, and to keep forces in reserve for the shift to a decisive counteroffensive.

The objectives and plans of the counteroffensive were specified in the course of defensive operations; detailed plans of combat operations were worked up; at the

same time troop redeployments were executed and battle groups of fronts and armies established; efforts of large strategic formations and combined units of the various services and arms were coordinated in time, place and objective; matters of tactical and logistic support were resolved; measures were taken to achieve the element of surprise in the counteroffensive; enormous political work was done in the line units to benefit the forthcoming counteroffensive.

Establishment of reserves was a particularly complex task. Gathering of forces for the battle groups of the fronts commenced in advance. Training and preparation of reserves for the counteroffensive at Moscow, for example, began 35 days before the operation commenced. On 1 November 1941 Hq SHC made the decision to form 10 reserve armies, containing 62 rifle and 16 cavalry divisions designated for the counteroffensive. The fronts operating simultaneously at Moscow were reinforced by Hq SHC and draft of reinforcements. A total of 30 divisions and 12 rifle brigades were redeployed to the Moscow area just between 27 November and 3 December.

Planning of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad swung into action early in October 1942. Hq SHC transferred to the Stalingrad-sector fronts one third of the total draft of reinforcements in men, guns, mortars and tanks, as well as more than 60 percent of its reserve combined units. In October and November the fronts received 25 rifle divisions, 6 tank and mechanized corps, 9 cavalry divisions, 2 composite air corps, and a large number of artillery units. Long-range bomber combined units were also redeployed to this sector.⁴

As for the Kursk counteroffensive, preparations began long before the enemy launched his offensive. Simultaneously with preparing a deliberate defense, Hq SHC was carrying out a great many measures pertaining to the subsequent counteroffensive. Immediate preparations for the strategic counteroffensive, however, were conducted in the course of the defensive operations at Kursk.

We should note that in spite of bringing in large strategic reserves, the Soviet command authorities were unable to establish a large superiority over the enemy in men and equipment. In addition, in the counteroffensive at Moscow our troops had half as much artillery as the enemy, one third fewer tanks, and exceeded the enemy only in aircraft, and this was with obsolete models. As a result of the generalship skill of Hq SHC and the commanding generals of the fronts, however, manpower and equipment were decisively concentrated on the main axes, where a substantial superiority over the enemy was established.

The counteroffensive at Moscow and Kursk began following successfully executed front counterthrusts, which significantly weakened the enemy's advancing battle groups and halted their progress. At Stalingrad it began in a situation where the enemy, having depleted his manpower and weapons, began to shift to the defense, but was unable to establish a solid defense.

Experience has shown that /choice of time of shift to a counteroffensive/ is of exceptional importance. A surprise shift to a counteroffensive, as was the case at Moscow and Stalingrad, stunned the enemy and contributed to the success of the Soviet forces.

A no less important role is played by correct selection of main axis of advance and mode of defeating the enemy. An analysis shows that this matter was determined in

relation to the concrete situation prevailing in the area of the counteroffensive. At Moscow, for example, the main attack was launched against the strongest enemy forces, which were threatening our capital from the north and south. Their defeat was accomplished by a number of splitting attacks. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad the main attacks of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts were mounted against the enemy's weak flanks. They advanced along converging axes, which led to the encirclement and annihilation of a large enemy force. In the counteroffensive at Kursk, both enemy forces (the Orel and the Belgorod-Khar'kov) were smashed with cleaving and splitting attacks.

Many factors were considered in selecting the main axis of advance and mode of defeating the enemy: status of the defense, composition and location of forces, nature of terrain, availability of friendly forces and weapons, etc.

Successful execution of the counteroffensive was ensured by precision organization and by maintaining strategic coordination between the strategic force groupings operating on the Soviet-German front, between fronts involved in the counteroffensive, and between the different military services. This coordination was organized by Hq SHC and the General Staff.

In support of the imminent counteroffensive at Moscow, for example, Hq SHC organized a number of offensive operations on the flanks of the strategic front -- at Tikhvin and Rostov, to which the enemy was compelled to assign substantial forces from his strategic reserve. Just prior to commencement of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, aggressive offensive actions were being conducted, on orders from Hq SHC, in the Velikiye Luki, Rzhev, Mozdok, and Nal'chik areas. During the battle of Kursk offensive operations were mounted by the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts in the Izyum area and on the Mius River, which diverted significant enemy forces.

The counteroffensive was promoted by combat actions by tactical air and long-range bombers aimed at gaining air supremacy. Thanks to the employment of substantial air forces and their skillful utilization, the Soviet Air Force was able to gain tactical air supremacy in the counteroffensives at Moscow and Stalingrad, although the enemy enjoyed strategic air superiority during this period. Soviet air forces possessed total air supremacy during the counteroffensive at Kursk.

/Strategic leadership and direction of the Armed Forces was an important factor ensuring successful accomplishment of strategic defense and counteroffensive./ Headquarters, Supreme High Command and the General Staff were the principal organizer of their preparation and execution. Hq SHC exercised immediate supervision of strategic force groupings through intermediate (operational-strategic) echelons -- the high commands of the strategic sectors (1941-1942) and their representatives, as well as through the commanding generals of the fronts participating in strategic defensive operations or in a counteroffensive.

We should note that in the course of World War II the armies of the capitalist nations also repeatedly employed the counteroffensive against an advancing adversary. Not once, however, did they assume a strategic scale or produce decisive results. The German-fascist army, for example, shifted to a counteroffensive against advancing Soviet troops in the spring of 1943 in the Khar'kov sector, at Kiev in the

fall of 1943, and at Lake Balaton in 1945. And in all cases the troops shifting to a counteroffensive were localized, harassed to exhaustion, and routed. The German-fascist command authorities proved incapable of accomplishing the mission of a strategic counteroffensive.

Attempts were also being made to employ the counteroffensive in the Western European Theater. In December 1944, for example, the Hitlerites shifted to a counteroffensive in the Ardennes. It was not very successful, however. The massive Soviet Army offensive undertaken in January 1945 at the request of the British and U.S. Government, forced the German-fascist command authorities to shift large forces from the Ardennes to the Soviet-German front and to break off the counteroffensive.

* * *

/The experience of strategic defense and counteroffensive/ in the Great Patriotic War played an important role in development of Soviet art of warfare. Many points of this experience, in spite of fundamental changes in weaponry, have not lost their value and remain valid in present-day conditions.

The war demonstrated quite convincingly that the strategic offensive is the principal type of strategic operation. Only with a decisive offensive can one achieve total defeat of the enemy, seize his territory and undermine his capability to continue prosecution of the war.

Strategic defense is also possible, however, in individual continental theaters or strategic sectors, with unfavorable situation conditions, clear enemy superiority in manpower and weapons, or if the enemy has seized the strategic initiative.

It is evident from the experience of the Great Patriotic War that strategic defense can be not only forced but also deliberate. In all instances its effectiveness depended entirely on thorough preparation. Defense should be stable and aggressive, capable of withstanding all types of weapons, of successfully repelling attacks by superior enemy forces from the air, land and sea, of maximally weakening the attacking enemy forces by inflicting casualties and losses, and of creating conditions for a subsequent shift to a decisive counteroffensive.

Meriting considerable attention is the experience of the strategic counteroffensive as a special, most complex type of offensive.

As experience indicates, the most favorable conditions for shifting to a counteroffensive are created when the forces of the advancing adversary are exhausted, his reserves are depleted, but a defense has not yet been set up.

According to the experience of the war, success in a counteroffensive was secured by advance preparation of strategic reserves and establishment of battle groups on the main axes, by decisive massing of men and equipment in the most important sectors and at the decisive moments of an operation, by the element of concealment, secrecy and thorough execution of all preparatory measures, by skillful selection of the main axis of advance and moment of shift to the counteroffensive, by gaining air supremacy, and by close teamwork and coordination of all forces and weapons.

Thus strategic defense, the strategic counteroffensive and subsequent general strategic offensive are interlinked types of strategic operations. Only skilled employment of all types of strategic operations, taking into account concrete situation conditions, can ensure victory over the enemy. This was convincingly confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, page 111.
2. Ibid., Vol 4, 1975, page 21; Vol 5, page 121.
3. Ibid., page 323.
- 3a. Ibid., Vol 7, page 135.
4. Ibid., Vol 6, 1976, page 33.

Col Gen Zheltov

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 36-41

[Article by HSU Col Gen A. Zheltov: "Mass Heroism of Soviet Warriors -- a Major Source for the Victory"]

[Text] In scale and ferocity, the Great Patriotic War was unprecedented in the history of mankind. The fate of socialism and social progress was being determined on the fields of great battles and engagements. Our victory began to be forged out from the very first day of the war. In an unusually short period of time the Soviet economy was shifted to a war footing. Leading this noble struggle was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which, guided by Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, elaborated a precise, all-encompassing program of action in conditions of war, accomplished mobilization of all manpower and military hardware, and raised the masses up into the struggle with fascism.

Two implacably opposing ideologies met in an uncompromising, fierce clash: the socialist ideology -- the most advanced and progressive, expressing the root interests of the worker class and all working people, and the fascists -- reflecting the most aggressive aspirations of the reactionary forces of world imperialism.

The Hitlerite soldier, hypnotized by the adventuristic idea of world domination, performed his murderous actions, attempting to enslave our people. But history had time and again confirmed the truth that adventurism always leads aggressors to catastrophe. This was also forcefully demonstrated by the Great Patriotic War.

At a difficult time for the homeland, our entire people, acting as one, rose up in its defense. In a great battle they defended the new society, which had given man the most priceless treasure -- freedom and social equality. Soviet citizens had defended them on the battle fronts of the civil war and had consolidated them during the years of national collectivization and industrialization. Toughened in

class battles and cognizant of the greatness of liberated labor, Soviet citizens met the date of 22 June 1941 in a state of complete ideological-political and moral preparedness.

The war confirmed that the ideas and deeds of the party had always been a life-giving source of physical and moral strength to the builders of communism. Building communism and the struggle for happiness of working people make heroes not only out of certain individuals but of entire peoples. Our people became precisely thus, crushing the German-fascist hordes, presenting the world with examples of inimitable heroism, and confirming Lenin's prediction that such a people cannot be defeated.

Heroism is a historical phenomenon, and specific standards of heroism and types of heroism are characteristic of each socioeconomic system. But only under socialism, in which a moral-political unity of society is inherent, are the objective preconditions created for mass heroism, which is most vividly manifested during abrupt historical changes, revolutions, and wars in defense of the socialist homeland. V. I. Lenin noted that socialism alone prepares people "with a heroic awareness of complete self-sacrifice for the common cause -- liberation of working people."¹

An enormous aspiration on the part of Soviet citizens selflessly to defend their homeland against the aggressors was manifested from the very outset of the war. News of it brought millions of working people to the military commissariats and induction stations. They included workers and peasants, office employees, scientists and writers, people in the arts, people of different ages and nationalities. They did not come because they were ordered to, but were heeding the call of their heart. Hundreds of thousands of people joined home guard units, partisan detachments, and fighter battalions. This enormous patriotic enthusiasm of the masses was a consequence of the mighty revolutionary spirit of our people.

Border guards and personnel of the frontier district garrisons, who received the brunt of the powerful enemy sneak attack, displayed indomitable staunchness and extreme heroism during those first days of the Hitlerite invasion, which were so difficult for our country. The Brest Fortress held out for a long time against the elite 45th Infantry Division and reinforcing units. Instead of the promised victory parade in the first Soviet city, this famed combined unit, which had conquered Warsaw and Paris, was withdrawn to the rear to be rehabilitated.

Hitler planned to take Moscow in August 1941, but on 30 July he was forced to halt the advance of the bloodied and exhausted Army Group Center. At the beginning of September our troops, mounting a surprise counterthrust, liberated Yel'nya and held it an entire month. It is impossible to enumerate the marvelous feats of heroism which were displayed by our enlisted men, noncommissioned officers and officers in besieged Leningrad, Odessa and Sevastopol', in the battles of Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk, Moscow, and Tula, Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and Kerch', on the Kursk Salient, and in battles for hundreds of thousands of other Soviet towns and villages.

In factory shops and on kolkhoz fields, women and young teenagers replaced men who had left for the front. Heroism on the home front became a natural continuation of the heroism displayed on the fields of battle.

The significance of the heroic individual example in combat is determined by the fact that it signals the beginning of a mass movement. In the war years exploits similar to those of Aleksandr Matrosov, Nikolay Gastello, and Viktor Talalikhin were performed hundreds of times. We all remember the Soviet fighting men who, grenade in hand, threw themselves in the path of enemy tanks, pilots who rammed enemy aircraft, and soldiers who covered a death-spouting firing port with their chest. Manifested in their deeds was a total mobilization of moral resources and the highest sense of military duty. For exploits performed on the battle fronts of the Great Patriotic War, more than 11,600 persons were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union; 98 of these were awarded this honor twice, while G. K. Zhukov, I. N. Kozhedub, and A. I. Pokryshkin were awarded it three times.

Heroes of the Soviet Union included people of different nationalities and ethnic groups, and fighting men of all branches of the Armed Forces. More than 8,000 of these were members of the Ground Forces, more than 2,000 were in the Air Force, and approximately 500 were in the Navy. The Gold Star was awarded to 87 women. Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya was the first of these to be named Hero of the Soviet Union. More than 7 million persons were awarded medals and decorations, while 10,900 combat decorations were awarded to combined units, units, and naval ships.²

Communists, displaying examples of heroism, marched in the front ranks in the battles for the homeland. The majority of Heroes of the Soviet Union were full members or probationary members of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). By the end of the war there were more than 3 million Communists in the ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy.³ Many of these joined the party during the war years, during these days of severe trials, when the question of the existence of the Soviet State was being decided on the fields of battle. They expressed their loyalty to the ideals of the Leninist Party in words which were laconic but coming from the heart: "Today I am going into battle. Please consider me a Communist." Inspired by the example of their senior comrades, Komsomol members fought heroically against the foe. During the war years 3.5 million Komsomol members were awarded decorations and medals, and many products of Komsomol were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.⁴ The Komsomol organizations of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol', and Odessa were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

These are the historical facts. They persuasively confirm that the mass heroism of the Soviet people and their fighting men constituted an enormous life-giving force which ensured our victory. Its foundation was ardent Soviet patriotism, multiplied by hatred of the invaders.

In constructing their insane aggressive plans to enslave our people, the fascist leaders committed a major mistake. They considered the Soviet Union to be a "colossus with feet of clay," predicted the social split of the world's first socialist society, placed their hopes on allegedly existing class and ethnic discord, but encountered an insuperable sociopolitical monolith, the foundation of which was the inspiring and organizing force of the Communist Party, the solid unity of the peoples of our nation, the Soviet system, and socialist ideology.

Attempting to play down the significance of our victory and to delude working people and especially the younger generation in their countries, bourgeois falsifiers of history are making every effort to distort the essence of the

patriotism of the Soviet citizen. They attempt to explain away the steadfastness and courage of our fighting men by the "enigmatic nature of the Slavic soul," "the natural characteristics of the Russian," caused by the "harshness and meagerness of the land and by the Asiatic incursions." There are also those who shamelessly slander the Soviet soldier, denying the great humanity of the fighting man who defended the world against fascist tyranny. Some bourgeois historians go further, assessing the victory of our people as a great calamity for the West. For example, in a book entitled "Myth of Victory" by noted bourgeois historian R. Hobbs, published in the United States in 1980, the author draws approximately the following conclusions: during World War II the interests of the Western Allies were much closer to those of Germany than to the interests of the Soviet Union; giving in to the will of the Russians in demanding the unconditional surrender of Germany, the West played right into the hands of the Soviet Union and laid the foundation for that great tragedy for which it is now paying; agreeing to cooperate with Russia against Germany, the West sowed the seeds of World War III. It is easy to understand that such propaganda serves imperialism and its revanchist policy. But no matter how hard the bourgeois falsifiers try, they will be unable to prove the unprovable.

The international mission which the Soviet soldier performed during World War II is bearing fruit today as well. It is promoting the establishment of a united front in the struggle against imperialism.

For more than 36 years now our people have not heard the bursting of shells and bombs or the clanking of enemy tank tracks. At their party congresses Communists issue an appeal for peace to all the nations of the world, regardless of their societal system. The 26th CPSU Congress advanced a new package of peace initiatives. The Soviet people are patiently and persistently campaigning for peace, stinting neither material nor spiritual energies. And they are doing this because they know better than anyone else just what war is.

A new confirmation of this is the Appeal to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, adopted in June 1981 by the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which states: "History taught a stern lesson. Peoples paid too high a price for the fact that they were unable to prevent war, to turn away in time the threat which was hanging over them. We cannot permit the tragedy to be repeated."⁵

V. I. Lenin wrote that "militarism is a result of capitalism... as a military force used by capitalist states in their external clashes... and as a weapon serving in the hands of the ruling classes to crush all kinds (economic and political) of proletarian movements..."⁶ Today's rampant growth of militarism in the United States and other major capitalist countries clearly confirms this Leninist conclusion.

Attempting to check the spread of the ideas of communism, the bourgeoisie is engaging in an uncompromising ideological clash with the new world. It has chosen the youth of the socialist countries as one of its principal targets. Western ideologists are actively utilizing the so-called theory of deheroization, that is, are arguing that the scientific and technological revolution which is taking place in the world allegedly levels man's individuality, leaving no place for elevated bursts of feelings, a striving toward heroism, transforming man into a faceless robot on the battlefield. American scholar A. Rappoport claims in his book

"Strategy and Conscience" that the heroic component of war is disappearing as military technology advances.

Under the banner of debunking the heroic, the bourgeoisie seeks first and foremost to sow seeds of individualism and selfishness in the consciousness of the people of the new society. The principal thesis of the advocates of the theory of deheroization is that there is no hero inspired by a lofty idea but there is a superman, who knows more than a hundred ways to kill a person, who despises the concept of conscience and honor. Everything in this chain of reasoning is akin to Nietzsche, who asserted the ideal of the "blond beast," the "superman." And it is no coincidence that fascism was nurtured on the reactionary premises of this bourgeois philosopher. We remember well that "superman" with a swastika, who burned our villages and towns, who murdered, hanged and robbed. And today imperialism seeks to revive the ideas of fascism.

Preaching deheroization, bourgeois ideologists are playing a card not only on the present but on the future as well. They are seeking to ensure that in case of imperialist aggression we shall have no Matrosov, nor Young Guardists; they seek to reduce to zero the effect on young people of the glorious revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people, and its Armed Forces.

But these schemes are without foundation, since traditions arise in the process of people's activities, their intercourse, are reinforced by society, by the entire course of its historical development, and become a social value of a class, a nation, a state. Whatever is the social nature of a socioeconomic system, such are its traditions. And the greater the depth of Communist transformations, the loftier the prospects of societal achievements, the more firmly the heroic element is established in man. What force can compel our people to forget their heroic past, the names of fallen and living heroes and their deeds? There is no such force, and the fighting traditions, born on the fields of battle, by just, righteous combat will never be removed from our arsenal.

"Great is that people," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the official dedication ceremony for a memorial complex in the hero-city of Kiev, "which constantly senses a living link with its history, which can take all the best from its historical traditions and make this the property of the present day."⁷

The postwar years give us many examples of heroism and courage on the part of Soviet citizens. These include the exploits of the conquerors of space, the virgin-land farmers, those who are building the Baykal-Amur Mainline, the farmers of the non-Chernozem zone, and the submariners who circumnavigate the globe submerged, plus others. We are proud of our servicemen who are helping the Afghan people defend their revolutionary achievements. Their role is very responsible and complex. But they are performing it with honor, as befits the sons of those who have always come to one's aid as a friend, a liberator, a defender.

The point stated at the 26th CPSU Congress on the combat potential of our Armed Forces as a fusion of excellent technical equipment, military skill and indomitable morale also deeply reveals all those new elements which are inherent in the very terms "heroism" and "exploit."

The party educates Soviet citizens in a spirit of political vigilance and constant readiness to come to the armed defense of the Soviet Union and to carry out their constitutional duty. Assessing the world situation in a Leninist manner, profoundly and comprehensively, and utilizing the wealth of experience of building communism and defending the homeland, as well as the best material and spiritual potential of our society, the CPSU is concerned on a daily basis with the heroic-patriotic indoctrination of the people and instills in all working people a sense of historic responsibility for the fate of socialism. A powerful force promoting this is a force of revolutionary, combat and labor traditions, the indoctrinational effect of which consists first and foremost in persuasive example, which impels new generations of Soviet citizens to follow in the footsteps of their elders, to build upon their glorious deeds, to serve the cause of communism.

Today's youth did not participate in the revolution and in wars, did not experience the harsh school of struggle and trials of the war years. Knowledge of the past helps young men and women, who lack adequate life experience, obtain a correct understanding of the heroic history of the Communist Party, the glorious combat journey of our Armed Forces, and the difficulties of past years. This is particularly important today, since "in some young people education and knowledgeability are at times combined with political naiveness, and professional competency with an insufficiently responsible attitude toward labor."⁸ The CPSU Central Committee Decree dated 26 April 1979, entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological, Political Indoctrination Work," addresses the indoctrinational significance of the succession of traditions.

The Soviet Armed Forces play an enormous role in accomplishing this task. Service in the ranks of the army and navy fosters a deep understanding of one's social role, the role of armed defender of the interests of the working people, and consequently of one's own people, and indoctrination of Communist moral fiber, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The very nature and essence of the Soviet Armed Forces and their mission is an objective precondition for forming these qualities in the individual. Young men enter military service in the army and navy precisely at that age when they are entering the period of their social maturity. The Soviet Armed Forces are a school of ideological-moral indoctrination of youth.

Public organizations make an inestimable contribution to the cause of military-patriotic indoctrination of Soviet citizens. Diversified work in the area of forming and shaping heroic-patriotic awareness in our country's young people is performed by Komsomol and by Central Headquarters for Excursions, headed by Mar SU I. Kh. Bagramyan. Hundreds of thousands of young people are taking part in the excursion to sites of revolutionary, combat and labor fame of the Soviet people. Accompanying veterans to sites of past battles and along partisan trails, young people become cognizant of the deeds accomplished by the older generation.

Activities by veterans of the party, war and labor are of great significance in indoctrinational work with young people. At the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev highly praised their work. This inspires veterans to take active part in production and civic affairs. An active part in the activities of the veteran community is taken by councils and groups of war veterans from the same unit. We should emphasize that they are doing practical work under the immediate supervision of sections of the Soviet War Veterans Committee. Many of them, on the recommendation

of party committees, serve as patrons of schools, vocational schools, DOSAAF training organizations, student and worker dormitories, and publicize Lenin's precept on strengthening the nation's defense capability.

Any form of indoctrinational work, be it a get-together of veterans of the war in defense of socialism or heroes of the first five-year plans with children at school, with workers at enterprises, farmers, Soviet military personnel, or a vivid recounting of battles of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, published in a newspaper or magazine -- all this inspires young people, arouses in them a desire to accomplish exploits, and teaches them the meaning of struggle. The slogan "Nobody is forgotten, nothing is forgotten" is acquiring particular resonance today. Today we should seek to ensure that the heroic legacy of our past is not only preserved but also maximally utilized in indoctrination work.

The resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, which focus the party on high results in ideological activity, demand that Communist indoctrinators and propagandist activists take into consideration the enhanced level of awareness and cultural level of the Soviet citizen, more aggressively conduct indoctrination work, and display initiative and innovativeness in development of forms of influencing people's minds and hearts.

The road to victory was long and hard. Not simply years but an entire era lies between those two dates -- 22 June 1941 and 9 May 1945. It tested the strength of our societal and governmental system, tested the firmness of the glorious fighting traditions of the proletariat, engendered by the revolution and forged out in the flames of the civil war, and created new ones, to be passed on to the younger generation of fighters for communism. And it is our sacred duty to strengthen these traditions, to indoctrinate youth in a spirit of historic responsibility for the fate of socialism and constant readiness to defend their homeland.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, page 322.
2. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, page 539; "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, page 651.
3. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy...", *ibid.*, page 375.
4. "Istoriya VLKSM. Zhivaya letopis' v tryekh tetradnykh" [The History of Komsomol. A Living Chronicle in Three Volumes], Volume Two, Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1967, page 331.
5. PRAVDA, 24 June 1981.
6. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol 17, page 187.
7. PRAVDA, 10 May 1981.

8. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 67.

Lt Gen Zhilin

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 42-50

[Article by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Lt Gen P. Zhilin: "The Collapse of the Fascist Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Its Contemporary Followers"]

[Text] The political character of a war and its aims determine the corresponding strategic modes of its conduct. V. I. Lenin, studying the book "On War" by K. von Clausewitz, took down the following note: "The Character of the political objective has decisive influence on the conduct of a war...."¹

The experience of wars, including World War II, confirms this important Lenin thesis. Fascist politicians and strategists, making preparations for a war to destroy the socialist state, also employed the military doctrine of blitzkrieg, which corresponds to these aggressive, reactionary aims.

What is the essence of this doctrine?

In its literal meaning blitzkrieg is "lightning war," and consequently the theory of its conduct presupposes attainment of swift victory. "Blitzkrieg," writes West German scholar D. Bradley, "should develop like a hurricane wind, like a phenomenon of nature which nothing can stop. It should overwhelm an unsuspecting, unprepared adversary, and strike him down like a bolt of lightning, by means of elemental violence."²

It is evident from this graphic definition of the essence of blitzkrieg that such a principle of conduct of war is a means of aggressive policy and is calculated at surprise employment of large military forces and their stunning effect.

The entire organizational structure of German-fascist forces was subordinated to the idea of blitzkrieg. "Our tasks in regard to Russia," Hitler instructed his generals, "are to crush its armed forces and destroy the nation."³

Such a mode of warfare is not new, and Hitler did not invent it. Many sought the secret of swift warfare. A model of such warfare was elaborated by the ideologists of Prussian militarism -- Moltke, Schlieffen, and Ludendorff. The idea of "lightning strike" is clearly expressed in their writings "Cannae" (Schlieffen) and "Total War" (Ludendorff). Later it was further developed by such blitzkrieg theorists as Fuller, Seeckt, and Guderian, who assigned a decisive role in this strategy to aircraft and tanks. In full agreement with the idea of "blitzkrieg war," fascist Germany's military leadership -- generals Keitel, Jodl, and Halder -- placed great hopes on it in the struggle against the USSR.

The blitzkrieg doctrine is not an improvisation by the Fuehrer, as some in the West today try to portray it. It expressed the aggressive policy of fascist Germany, the adventurism of its political and military leaders, and was a continuation of the historical traditions of German militarism. An analysis of fascist military

doctrine shows that its substance and defects possess deep historical roots, dating from the era of "Prussianism," when a cult of naked force prevailed.

The blitzkrieg doctrine found concrete embodiment in the strategic plans of the German-fascist army and particularly in "Operation Barbarossa." The enemy's principal strategic idea consisted in mounting a sneak attack on and invasion of the USSR, concentrating main efforts on three selected strategic axes -- in the center, in the north, and in the south, mounting a powerful attack on the opposing troops of the Soviet Army, annihilating them, rapidly penetrating toward the country's political and economic centers -- Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev -- and bringing the war to an end with a single brief campaign.

Signing Directive 21 on 18 December 1940 ("Operation Barbarossa"), Hitler was firmly convinced that the blitzkrieg doctrine was a patent device which guaranteed him success of the entire campaign, that Moscow would fall by mid-August, and the Soviet Union would be completely on its knees by 1 October.⁴

Just what was in the Hitlerite strategists' minds in undertaking such a dangerous and adventuristic action? Their thinking was strongly influenced by those comparatively easy victories which the German-fascist army had won in Western Europe, for Germany had essentially not spent more than one to one and a half months on any of the previously conducted campaigns and had not sustained significant casualties and losses. Indeed, the war with Poland had lasted only 3 weeks, Belgium was occupied within a span of 18 days, and France had surrendered on the 44th day of the war, not to mention the fact that Hitlerite Germany had needed only a few days to seize such countries as Denmark and the Netherlands.

Military operations in the West gave the Hitlerite strategists grounds for assuming that blitzkrieg would also bring them success in the war against the Soviet Union. They believed that the only difference would lie in the degree of preparation for war and the timetable for completing it.

The Hitlerite strategists were sure that the "Russian problem" could be settled with a single short campaign. "Hitler was firmly convinced," writes West German historian H. A. Jacobsen, "that he would be able to crush the Soviet Union in a single swift campaign. We must admit that he was not alone in this view. At that time a similar opinion was held by top military officials not only in Germany (OKW, OKH) but also in the United States and Britain."⁵ But the banality and deficiency of fascist strategy was manifested precisely in this, a strategy which underestimated the material and moral resources of the Soviet socialist state.

Hitler of course realized that the Soviet Union was not Poland or France. Therefore preparations for war against the USSR were conducted for an extended period of time and on a large scale. It encompassed the military, economic, ideological, and diplomatic realms of fascist Germany. Initially the aggressor possessed certain advantages.

First of all, fascist Germany established an army of more than 5 million men for the attack on the USSR, an army equipped with modern weapons and which was for the most part concentrated close to our western borders.

Although the numerical strength of the Soviet Armed Forces had increased by 180 per cent during the two prewar years, when the war broke out they were scattered over vast frontier areas, while many combined units were stationed in interior districts. In addition, the Soviet Army was in the initial stage of rearmament and reequipping with new military hardware.

Secondly, the economy of fascist Germany had long since been shifted over to a war footing. Germany's industrial enterprises, working at full capacity, were turning out large quantities of modern military equipment and weapons. The entire economic potential of the occupied European countries was being utilized for military purposes. The Soviet economy, however, was developing in the interests of peacetime construction and was not shifted over to military production until shortly before the war, and for the most part during the course of the war.

Thirdly, when it began the war against the USSR, fascist Germany already possessed an aggressive coalition, which included Japan, Italy, Finland, Hungary, and Romania, while the anti-Hitler coalition was formed in the course of the war.

Fourth, the German-fascist army had at its disposal a well-equipped airfield network with adequate capacity, as well as an elaborate network of rail lines and highways. The Soviet border troops which were stationed on the new (since 1939) western border had poorly fortified defensive positions, which were for the most part of the field type.

Fifth, in conformity with "Operation Barbarossa," preparations for the invasion of Soviet territory were taking place in secrecy. Deception and dissemination of false information were extensively employed. Redeployment of German-fascist troops from west to east, for example, for the most part from France to the territory of occupied Poland, was being carried out allegedly with the aim of attacking Britain, while in actual fact it was for the purpose of establishing a powerful force grouping which would be poised in readiness to invade Soviet territory.

All these factors created extraordinarily difficult, disadvantageous conditions of combat for the Soviet Armed Forces.

Execution of the plan of fascist blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union began on 22 June 1941.

The element of offensive surprise achieved by the German command authorities constituted a major advantage for fascist Germany. The initial military successes overjoyed Hitler's generals, who were confident that their theory of "blitzkrieg war" would also prove fully valid in the war against the USSR. The German press at that time was filled with exultant, boasting reports from the Eastern Front about the victories of German arms.

On 4 July Hitler announced: "For all practical purposes the enemy has already lost the war."⁶ Colonel General Halder, summarizing the results of 2 weeks of combat on the Soviet-German front, also drew a hasty conclusion. "...It will be no exaggeration to state," he wrote, "that the campaign against Russia has been won in 14 days."⁷ Reasoning further, Halder of course concluded that the Russian campaign was not over, but it was a matter of a few weeks, with the main objectives already achieved, resistance smashed, with nothing left to do but to move swiftly across a vast territory.

Believing that the USSR no longer constituted a substantial military threat, he suggested that efforts be shifted to the realm of economic neutralization of this country: "When we cross the Western Dvina and Dnieper, it will not be a question so much of defeating in detail the enemy's armed forces as of seizing the enemy's industrial regions and preventing him from utilizing the gigantic might of his industry and his inexhaustible manpower reserves to establish new armed forces."⁸ And further, as if confirming the correctness of his conclusions and proposals for the future, on 14 July Halder wrote the following in his journal on the situation on the Eastern Front: "On the whole one should assume that the enemy no longer possesses adequate forces for serious defense of his new line, which runs from the former Russian-Estonian border along the Western Dvina and Dnieper, continuing southward.... In the course of the advance of our armies all enemy attempts at resistance will evidently be quickly smashed. Then we shall be faced in earnest with the question of seizing Leningrad and Moscow."⁹

The Hitlerites were confident of a rapid conclusion to the Russian campaign and were already dreaming of soon shifting military operations to India and the countries of the Near East. Directive 32, "Preparations for the Period Following Execution of Operation Barbarossa," was signed in June 1941. Documents reveal to us the global aims of German fascism and its schemes of establishing a world empire. First of all plans called for going to war against England, to seize North Africa, Gibraltar, the countries of the Near and Middle East, and then to advance across Afghanistan into India, the "pearl" of the British Empire. The fate of all continents was indicated on maps of the "German world empire." Following completion of the "eastern campaign," Hitler intended to undertake vigorous actions against the United States.

But these were wild schemes. Things worked out differently in actuality. Hitler was premature with his plans for establishing a "world empire," and the conclusions by Hitler's strategists that the Soviet Army was incapable of offering resistance proved hasty; they were too precipitous in predicting the subsequent course of military operations. For the Soviet people the real war was just beginning.

Having recovered from the first powerful blow, our country began intensive mobilization of all manpower and resources to repulse the enemy. The forming of new combined units proceeded at full speed. The mobilization effort resulted in rapid conscription into the army of 5 million men, almost 300 divisions were formed, and the number of operating fronts doubled -- from 5 to 10.

Hundreds of thousands of patriots joined the ranks of defenders of the homeland, voluntarily joining partisan detachments and home guard divisions. Industrial regions, especially in the Urals, were being transformed into powerful military equipment production bases. The country's entire life was shifting to a war footing.

Tireless activities by the Communist Party to mobilize economic and moral resources soon led to quite substantial results on the battle front and behind enemy lines. The enemy, who had been driving rapidly toward vitally important economic centers, was halted on the principal strategic axes.

In July 1941 the fascist blitzkrieg already showed the first serious cracks. Military events in the south, north and in the central sector were developing differently

from what Hitler's strategists had assumed. The German-fascist offensive was encountering increasingly more tenacious resistance. The Soviet Army was inflicting enormous casualties and losses on the enemy, killing the finest cadres, destroying combat equipment, and forcing the enemy more and more frequently to shift to the defense. "The stubborn Russian resistance," noted General Halder, Ground Forces Chief of Staff, in his war diary, "is forcing us to fight according to all the rules of our field manuals. In Poland and in the West we could take certain liberties and deviate from the basic principles; now that is no longer possible."¹⁰

Alarming reports began to appear in the fascist press in place of victory notices. "The fighting in the East," we read in the 2 July 1941 issue of the DEUTSCHE ALL-GEEMEINE ZEITUNG, "is of a quite particular nature. The battle which is taking place along the entire Eastern Front is distinguished by the fact that everywhere the Russians are offering fierce, stubborn resistance."¹¹

The year 1941 was a most difficult year of the war. It was filled with dramatic events, great sacrifices and enormous destruction. The gravest crisis situations are connected with it. But it is also rich in many heroic exploits by our army and people. Precisely the heroic, not the dramatic, as has sometimes been portrayed in literature, was the main element in the great contest between the Soviet Army and the fascist barbarian hordes.

The just, liberation aims of the Great Patriotic War also determined the modes of its conduct. At that time, in the summer of 1941, the Armed Forces were faced with the task of halting the enemy, harassing him, seizing from him the strategic offensive initiative. An important role in accomplishing this task was played by Soviet art of warfare, the art of waging combat in conditions of a disadvantageous strategic situation of the first period of the war. And in spite of enormous difficulties and temporary setbacks, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics proved their superiority over the art of warfare of the German-fascist armies.

Military theory and combat experience attest to the fact that decisive victory is achieved only through aggressive offensive actions. The shift by Soviet troops at Moscow from defense to a counteroffensive without a pause demanded a high degree of military skill. In the most complex conditions the Soviet command authorities, for the first time in World War II, carried out this form of combat on a large strategic scale. It subsequently experienced further development in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk.

As regards the principal results and consequences of the military contest between the USSR and fascist Germany, one should first of all point out that the Soviet Armed Forces, fighting under the most difficult conditions, not only withstood but defeated the aggressor in detail, thwarted his plans of achieving world domination, and led to collapse of his military-theoretical foundation of waging war -- the blitzkrieg doctrine.

There is no other example in history where a nation which was in such a difficult situation at the outbreak of -- gained such a convincing victory over a most insidious and powerful adversary. A member of the British Parliament wrote A. Eden in August 1941: "I shudder merely at the thought of the possible fate of Great Britain if an onslaught of the force of that which Hitler launched against Russia were undertaken against us, in an isolated position."¹²

And the fact that the blitzkrieg doctrine failed in the first, most difficult period of the war placed fascist Germany and its Wehrmacht in an exceptionally difficult position. Between the commencement of the war and 12 December 1941, according to the patently understated figures of General Halder, Germany lost 775,078 men,¹³ plus an additional 300,000 men between the time the Soviet Army shifted to a counter-offensive at Moscow and 10 January 1942. Thus total casualties in killed and wounded exceeded 1 million men.

Particularly important is the fact that the enemy lost his best officer cadres. Some were killed in battle, while others were removed for reasons of a psychological nature -- sharply increased depression, pessimism, and a panic mood. A "crisis of confidence" arose in the army. In connection with the failed Moscow offensive, Hitler conducted a purge of general officers. Dozens of generals were cashiered, and the commanding generals of all army groups were removed -- field marshals Bock, Rundstedt, and Leeb, commander of General Guderian's 2d Panzer Army. Field Marshal Brauchitsch, commander in chief of ground forces, also resigned. "Such a shakeup of general officers," writes Fuller, "had not been seen since the battle of the Marne."¹⁴

Collapse of the blitzkrieg plan, the defeat at Moscow, and the catastrophic events on the Soviet-German front shook fascist Germany and its army.

All this had enormous international resonance, made radical changes in the overall course of World War II, and laid a firm foundation for future great victories.

The question of the reasons for failure of the blitzkrieg and collapse of "Operation Barbarossa" still remains today one of the most acute questions in foreign historiography. A great deal is being written about this in the West even today, especially in the FRG and the United States. They are concerned with how it could happen that the grandiose "blitzkrieg war" plan, with preparations of such a scope and scale, could fail so quickly.

Attempting to answer this question, bourgeois historians resort to fabrications, contrived concoctions, and outright lies. They trumpet the traditional arguments of "chance defeat," Hitler's "fatal mistakes," the great numerical superiority of the Soviet Army over the adversary at the time it shifted to the counteroffensive in December 1941, and the extremely cold temperatures at Moscow, which allegedly dipped as low as 50 degrees below zero.¹⁵ In short, as General Buttlar states, "it was not the Russian army but the god of weather which halted the swift advance of the German Panzer forces at the moment when their objective was quite near."¹⁶ All this of course is nothing but fiction, the groundlessness of which is revealed as soon as we turn to the historical facts and documents. But this is of little concern to those who are carrying out a social imperative, who utilize falsification of history as a weapon in the contemporary ideological struggle.

Bourgeois falsifiers of history seek to distort or ignore the true causes of failure of the plan of "blitzkrieg war," to substitute various contrived versions in place of the true causes, to whitewash the Wehrmacht, its art of warfare, and particularly the blitzkrieg doctrine which, in the opinion of today's reactionary military theorists, can be modernized and modified taking into account new weapons, and applied against the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community in a future war.

Strategists from the Pentagon display particular interest in this question. They commissioned a large group of Wehrmacht generals, especially F. Halder, H. Manteuffel, E. Koestring, and L. Rendulitsch, who were taken prisoner by the Americans, to write detailed reports, including on the Eastern Theater, which became part of a series of books published in the United States (24 volumes) under the general title "German Military Research on Problems of World War II."

This series devotes considerable attention to an elucidation of the reasons for the defeat of the German-fascist army on the Soviet-German front. In their "studies" such as "Barbarossa -- Plan of Invasion of the Soviet Union," "Decisions Which Influenced the Course of the Russian Campaign, 1941-1942," "Battle of Moscow," "Russian Methods of Combat Operations," "Military Improvisations in the Course of the Russian Campaign," "Influence of Weather Conditions on the Course of Combat Operations in Russia," plus a number of others, Hitlerite generals share their sad experience. But they do not share it in an unbiased manner, but with an interested bias, tailored to order, to give advice to those who today are inventing more and more new doctrines of struggle against a mythical "Soviet military threat."

But objective studies have also been made in the West. West German historian Klaus Reinhardt, in a book entitled "The Turning Point at Moscow. Failure of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941/42," having studied previously unavailable documents from the archives at Freiburg (FRG), came to the conclusion that "Hitler's plans -- and together with them the chances for successful conduct of the war by Germany -- had failed by October, or at the very latest by December 1941, with the beginning of the Russian counteroffensive at Moscow. The blitzkrieg strategy... following the defeat of Army Group Center at Moscow, was finished. Germany could no longer make up for its growing shortage of manpower resources, which was increasingly limiting its military and military-economic potential."¹⁷

D. Bradley, author of the book "Colonel General Heinz Guderian and History of the Modern Blitzkrieg," is of the opinion that from the moment of defeat of the Germans at Moscow "the time of blitzkriegs for the German side was irrevocably a thing of the past."¹⁸ Another scholar, Englishman B. Leach, in a book entitled "German Strategy Against Russia, 1939-1941," having posed the question why the blitzkrieg had been a failure, gives a definite answer to this question: "Germany's leaders made a monstrous mistake in believing that their blitzkrieg was capable of defeating the Soviet Union." Their gravest mistake "was that of underestimating the resources of the Soviet Union."¹⁹

One must agree with this conclusion. It is indisputable that in their planning Hitler's politicians and strategists were counting on weakness of the Soviet system. They assumed that following the very first successes of the German-fascist army the alliance between the worker class and peasantry would collapse, the Soviet economy would prove unable to provide the battle front with everything that was needed, the USSR would be isolated in the international arena, and the Soviet Army would be unable to withstand the successful onslaught of German panzer and air forces.

Reality proved different. The determining factor among those which led to the failure of the blitzkrieg was the stability of the Soviet societal and governmental system. Our system confirmed its vital and invincible strength during the difficult war years; it proved capable of mobilizing material and spiritual resources for

defense of our homeland. The Communist Party directed the struggle by all the people against the enemy, unified people and army, and instilled in them such lofty qualities as ideological-political unity, courage and heroism, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. It transformed the struggle against the aggressor into a war of all the people, the country into a unified military camp, raised up and inspired Soviet citizens to perform great deeds. Hitler's strategists were counting on fighting only the Soviet Army, but they encountered resistance by the entire people.

The Pentagon strategists and their military partners in Bonn, those who are today elaborating doctrines of "deterrence," "forward positions," and "preemptive strikes," those who are attempting to adapt the old or create a new doctrine of "super-blitzkrieg," should be reminded how the fascist "blitzkrieg war" adventure against the Soviet Union ended.

In present-day conditions the blitzkrieg doctrine, whatever name it may bear, has not changed its political essence. It was and remains a doctrine of aggressive war, which will end in failure for its advocates, since it will not save the aggressor from response strikes of enormous destructive force.

One should bear in mind that the fascist blitzkrieg doctrine was directly linked with the false lie of a "preventive" war by fascist Germany against the USSR. When fascist blitzkrieg had already been put into motion against the Soviet Union, Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop handed the Soviet ambassador to Berlin a memorandum in which were formulated or, more correctly, fabricated political and military interpretations of an allegedly "preventive" war being undertaken against the USSR. The concluding part of the memorandum claimed that a Soviet Government policy which was hostile to Germany had been accompanied in the military area by a steadily growing concentration of all military forces available to the Russians along an entire vast front extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It also stated that since the Russian general mobilization, not less than 160 divisions had been deployed against Germany, while the deployment of Russian troops, especially motorized and armored combined units, was taking place in such a manner that the Russian Supreme High Command would be able at any time to launch an aggression against the German borders.

The purpose of this completely lying document was to substantiate the "preventive" character of the war being undertaken by Hitler allegedly against a Communist threat to Europe, including to Germany. This was not only a propaganda maneuver but also disinformation aimed both at forming false public opinion at the foreign policy level and at its dissemination within Germany, particularly among the troops of the Wehrmacht. This is also indicated by the secret telephoned telegram from the Fuehrer's headquarters on 25 May 1941, which drew the attention of the entire officer corps to the fact that in coming weeks the Russians might undertake preventive actions and therefore it was essential fully to ensure prevention of such actions.

Incontrovertible facts, all historical reality and the foreign policy thrust of the Soviet State refute the campaign undertaken at that time for anti-Soviet purposes, claiming an alleged "military threat" to Germany by the Soviet Union. Today it has become impossible and simply ridiculous to expatiate about a "preventive" war on the part of Hitlerite Germany, even by those who at one time were disseminating this ridiculous, lying story.

And although this was in contradiction then and is in contradiction now to the basic meaning of the Soviet sociopolitical system, today a myth of a "Soviet military threat" is once again being extensively disseminated in the West and, as a consequence, the notorious theory of preparation for a "preventive" war against the USSR is being revived.

The theory of "preventive" war was and remains a camouflaged policy of aggression, a policy of preparation for and initiation of wars by aggressive imperialist forces against the socialist countries. The aggression by fascist Germany against the Soviet Union was precisely of such a treacherous, unprovoked nature.

The experience of war, including World War II, confirms the truth that aggressive, imperialist war aims also engender an adventuristic doctrine. A doctrine which proceeds from unrealistic political aims, which idealizes one's own capabilities and minimizes those of another country, inevitably leads to defeat. And although operational or tactical errors and miscalculations can be corrected during the course of a war, although requiring certain outlays, errors of military doctrine are irremediable. As a rule they lead to fatal consequences. This has happened in the past; such was also the case with the fascist blitzkrieg doctrine.

Disseminating in our time the myth of "Soviet military threat," bourgeois ideologists and propagandists seek to distort Soviet military doctrine and to ascribe to it an expansionist thrust which is alien to our peace-seeking policy.

Today, 40 years after the treacherous attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, we are witnesses to a new twist in dissemination of the myth of a "Soviet military threat." Reactionary bourgeois and Maoist literature is literally flooded with all kinds of materials on this subject. A book was recently published in Japan, for example, entitled "The Soviet Army Assault on Japan. World War III." It was later published in China in a large press run. The imagination of its authors knows no bounds. They even present in detail the strategy and tactics of a Soviet "invasion" of Japan and China. In China a book entitled "Initial Period of War," has been translated from Russian into Chinese, a book prepared by the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff Academy and published in 1974 by Voenizdat. The introduction, prepared by the Chinese publishing house, grossly distorts and falsifies the basic content of the work. The publisher claims that the book allegedly reveals "Soviet aggressive and expansionist appetites."

All this of course is a barefaced lie. Soviet military doctrine has served and continues to serve the interests of defense of the socialist homeland. "Our strategic doctrine," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "has a highly defensive thrust."²⁰ Of course the defensive thrust of our doctrine cannot be equated with the principles of Soviet art of warfare, which are characterized by aggressiveness and decisiveness of combat operations carried out in the interests of defense of our homeland.

Our political and military doctrine is clear and understandable to all. Pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, championing the cause of peace, and at the same time knowing well from past experience the habits of our bitterest enemies, the imperialist aggressors, we organically combine both a unified process of building socialism and its reliable defense. This is the basic thrust of the defensive doctrine of the Soviet State, the correctness and reliability of which have been tested by time.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Leninskiy sbornik" [Lenin Collection], Vol 12, Moscow-Leningrad, 1931, page 429.
2. D. Bradley, "Generaloberst Heinz Guderian und Die Entstehungsgeschichte des modernen Blitzkrieges" [Colonel General Heinz Guderian and History of the Modern Blitzkrieg], Osnabrueck, 1978, page 204.
3. F. Gal'der, "Voyennyy dnevnik" [War Diary], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1969, page 429.
4. Klaus Reyngardt, "Povorot pod Moskvoy. Krakh gitlerovskoy strategii zimoy 1941/42 goda. Istoricheskiy ocherk" [Turning Point at Moscow. Failure of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941/42. A Historical Sketch], translated from German, Voenizdat, 1980, page 51.
5. H. A. Jacobsen, "1935-1945. Der zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten" [World War II in Chronicle and Documents], Darmstadt, 1959, page 471.
6. "Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht" [War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command], Vol 1, pp 1020-1021.
7. Gal'der, op. cit., Vol 3, Book 1, 1971, page 79.
8. Ibid., page 80.
9. Ibid., page 84.
10. Ibid., page 60.
11. Ibid., pp 15-16.
12. Public Records Office, Premier, 4/21/3, page 621.
13. Gal'der, op. cit., Vol 3, Book 2, 1971, page 120.
14. Dzh. F. S. Fuller, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945 gg." [World War II, 1939-1945], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1956, page 169.
15. K. Toppel'skirkh, "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II], translated from German, Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1956, pp 206-207.
16. "Mirovaya voyna 1939-1945 gody" [The World War, 1939-1945], translated from German, Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1957, page 179.
17. Reyngardt, op. cit., page 24.
18. Bradley, op. cit., page 233.
19. B. Leach, "German Strategy Against Russia, 1939-1941," Oxford, 1973, pp 91, 240.
20. PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.

Professor Kondakova

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 51-52

[Article by Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Kondakova: "Some Aspects of the Ideological Struggle of the Communist Party Against Fascism." Passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] The struggle on the ideological front was an integral part of the Great Patriotic War. In the uncompromising contest between two polar-opposite ideologies, the historical advantage was on the side of the socialist ideology. This does not mean, however, that its victory was automatically assured. Victory was achieved as a result of purposeful and continuous activity by the Communist Party.

/Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism/ were the main content of the furious attacks by fascism against the Soviet people and the Communist Party on the ideological war front. They were manifested in an endeavor falsely to blacken our system, the guiding and directing role of the Leninist Party, to spread poisonous slander against its leaders, and to weaken the unity of the people behind the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and its Central Committee, to undermine the Soviet home front from within, and to reestablish an exploiter system. The fascists used an extensive arsenal of devices toward these ends, not disdaining to employ even the vilest of them.

Following were the principal focal areas of the party's fight against the anti-Sovietism and anticommunism of the fascists: dissemination of Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland; explanation of the just character of the Great Patriotic War; demonstration of the party's role in building and defending socialism; strengthening of the friendship among the peoples of the USSR and unswerving faith in ultimate victory over the enemy; exposure of the aggressive, antipopular essence of the policy of the invaders, substantiation of the inevitability of their defeat, indoctrination of servicemen and working people in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism and burning hatred toward fascism and the German-fascist invaders.

The Communist Party directed ideological work toward exposing the antipopular policy of the Hitlerites, strengthening socialist societal relations, and mobilization of working people for conserving national resources and stepping up assistance to the front. It was explained to the people that the fascists had looted and ransacked on Soviet soil thousands of plants and factories, livestock units and machine-tractor stations, had stolen incalculable numbers of livestock, tons of grain, had installed a system of serfdom with corporal punishment for the slightest offense, were turning over the people's property to German colonists, and were not only failing to assist "starving Europe" but were robbing it as well. In our country alone the Hitlerites demolished 1,710 cities, towns and villages, destroyed 32,000 industrial enterprises, and pillaged approximately 100,000 kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

/Chauvinism and racism/ are the most reactionary manifestations of imperialist ideology. The fascists were counting heavily on them. In the course of the war against the USSR they tried hard to cause a split in the Soviet society on the basis of nationality and ethnic affiliation. Bourgeois-nationalist views were

in the final analysis called upon to justify the predatory aims of imperialist Germany and to discredit and weaken the main force of the international antifascist struggle -- the Soviet Union.

A campaign against the ideology of nationalism and racism was waged by the Communist Party first of all by demonstrating the scientific bankruptcy of these ideas, and secondly, by overcoming vestiges of bourgeois nationalism in the consciousness and conduct of a segment of Soviet citizens, and thirdly, by explaining the significance of friendship among peoples and proletarian internationalism.

Realizing the failure of their plans to unite the capitalist countries in a crusade against the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites attempted to prevent the formation of an anti-Hitler coalition and to drive a wedge into the military alliance of peoples. In connection with this, Soviet propaganda and agitation during the war years placed emphasis on /strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition and intensifying the anti-fascist struggle of the peoples of the world./

The experience of activities of the Communist Party indicates that the campaign against reactionary ideology can be effective only when it is accompanied by an equally consistent unmasking of imperialist policy. The party proceeded in this manner during the war years. Mercilessly exposing the murderous atrocities perpetrated by the invaders, the Communists showed the people the dialectical link between the appeals issued by fascist ideologists and the all-destroying actions by the Hitlerite Wehrmacht.

The enemy's plans to obtain support from anticommunism, anti-Sovietism and nationalism, as well as the survival of private ownership vestiges and antiscientific notions in the consciousness of the Soviet worker class, peasantry, and intelligentsia came to naught. The great majority of Soviet citizens remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism and its embodiment -- the socialist system.

The victory of the Soviet Union over fascism on the ideological front during the years of the Great Patriotic War became possible because /Marxism-Leninism constituted the theoretical foundation of all party activity./ "The life-giving source of our strength," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "has been, is now and will continue to be Communist moral fiber."¹ The just character of the Great Patriotic War and the conformity between party policy and the vital interests of the masses, which had a vital stake in victory, became the moral-political foundation of party work with the masses.

The party concentrated its efforts on accomplishing root ideological tasks -- further strengthening of socialist ideology, its transformation into a material force in the struggle by the entire people against the imperialist aggressors, and on exposing the antiscientific and antipopular essence of fascist ideas. The main emphasis in the ideological struggle during the war years was placed on fascism, as the most dangerous and reactionary variant of bourgeois ideology.

All this would not have played its proper role if the party and its Central Committee had not been accomplishing such key tasks of intraparty affairs as further ideological and organizational strengthening of all party organizations, increasing

their militance, strengthening the personal example of each and every Communist, and uniting the people behind the Leninist party.

/The historical experience of the struggle against fascism and the lessons of the Great Patriotic War remind us of the necessity of continuing today to direct all efforts toward further consolidation of Communist ideology, an uncompromising struggle against alien ideologies, and on training and preparing Soviet citizens for defense of the socialist homeland./

FOOTNOTE

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskii kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 5, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, page 289.

Professor Sevost'yanov

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 p 53-55

[Article by Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences P. Sevost'yanov, chief of the Historical and Diplomatic Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Published Documents of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union During the War Period"]

[Text] Extensive literature on the Great Patriotic War has been written in our country. Particularly valuable are document publications prepared on the basis of the wealth of archival materials of the Committee for Publication of Diplomatic Documents of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Studies and documents enrich Soviet historiography and promote further detailed study of the problems of the Great Patriotic War and drawing of lessons for today from the events of this war.

The Fourth Edition of "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1980 gg" [History of USSR Foreign Policy, 1917-1980] in two volumes, enlarged and revised, was prepared and published under the editorship of A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev, in honor of the convening of the 26th CPSU Congress; this work covers the period from Lenin's Peace Decree to L. I. Brezhnev's trip to the Republic of India in December 1980. In particular, this work contains an analysis of the origin, course and results of World War II. It discusses some new and important aspects of USSR foreign policy on the eve of World War II, its initial period, and comprehensively examines the foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

A large contribution to study of the problem of the genesis and character of World War II is made by "Dokumenty po istorii myunkhenskogo sgovora. 1937-1939 gg" [Documents on the History of the Munich Deal, 1937-1939],² prepared from archival materials and published in 1979. This is a joint work by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Czechoslovakia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It unmasks the perfidy of the schemes of the imperialist nations, which gave Czechoslovakia to fascist Germany.

The question of the causes of World War II has retained its importance, in spite of the fact that more than 40 years have passed since the war began. At the present time scholars and large segments of the public in many countries have become particularly interested in the international relations which prevailed on the eve of World War II. In addition, many new documents dealing with that period have been published in a number of countries in the postwar years. In connection with this it was decided to bring out a new, enlarged edition of "Dokumenty i materialy kanuna vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Documents and Materials From the Eve of World War II] (in two volumes).³ Alongside Soviet documents which reveal the true culprits to blame for World War II, it contains documents from the archives of Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as former classified documents of other Western powers.

In discussing this publication, one should emphasize that it gives a clear and exhaustive answer on the reasons impelling the Soviet Union to sign a nonaggression treaty with Germany in 1939.

On the eve of World War II the USSR was doing everything possible to establish a reliable front to defend the peace. The Soviet Government was of the opinion that at that time peace in Europe could still be preserved through the joint efforts of all nations interested in preventing German aggression. Unfortunately all efforts by our country proved unsuccessful, due to the policies of Britain and France. After military talks with Britain and France reached an impasse in August 1939, as a consequence of the latter's disinclination to cooperate with the USSR, and information was obtained which indicated that secret talks between Germany and Great Britain had begun in June 1939, the Soviet Government, soberly assessing the international situation, became convinced that it was absolutely impossible to achieve effective cooperation with the Western powers in organizing joint resistance to the fascist aggressor and made the only correct decision -- to sign a Soviet-German nonaggression treaty on 23 August 1939. The Soviet Government took into account the fact that since May 1939 Soviet and Mongolian troops had been engaged in stubborn fighting with the Japanese aggressors in the Far East, in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River.

The Soviet Government had no illusions whatsoever regarding the anti-Soviet plans of the Hitlerites and their aggressive "Anti-Comintern Pact" allies. Having signed a nonaggression treaty with fascist Germany, however, the Soviet Government gained certain time, which enabled it to carry out additional measures to strengthen national defense. Also important is the fact that this treaty hindered creation of a unified anti-Soviet front.

The foreign-policy activity of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government during the Great Patriotic War was reflected, for example, in such a basic publication as the second edition of the correspondence of the leaders of the three Allied powers, which has already become a bibliographical rarity.⁴

The story of how the outline of today's world was born in the course of the savage clash with Hitlerite Germany is told by a six-volume collection of documents prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with Soviet diplomatic activities at major international conferences held during the war years in Moscow, Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks, the Crimea, San Francisco, and Potsdam.⁵

Each conference is examined in this work in a close link with those great battles which the Soviet Armed Forces were fighting against the Hitlerite invaders. It stresses that the Soviet Union, utilizing conferences of heads of state and government, as well as diplomatic correspondence, in spite of all difficulties, achieved effective cooperation within the anti-Hitler coalition throughout the entire war.

The documents published in this six-volume work show that Soviet diplomacy, engaged in intensive negotiations and talks with the allies, persistently and consistently defended the national interests of the USSR, sought to obtain a guarantee of its territorial integrity, and restoration of the historic rights of the Soviet people, which in the past had frequently been violated by neighboring countries on the orders of the imperialist powers.

Today there very frequently occur hostile statements in the West, especially in the United States, about a so-called "Soviet military threat." This thesis has been borrowed from the arsenal of the Hitlerites. In a memorandum handed to the Soviet ambassador to Berlin on 22 June 1941, after German forces had commenced the invasion of Soviet territory, Ribbentrop attempted to explain Germany's attack on the USSR precisely in this manner. The memorandum stated that the Soviet Government was seeking to "undermine Germany from within," "to prepare to seize and Bolshevize the Western European nations," "an invasion of the Balkans," "to seize the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles," etc. In conclusion this staggeringly slanderous document claimed that the Soviet Government might launch aggression against Germany at any time. It was this "dangerous situation," lied Ribbentrop, which allegedly forced the Nazi Government to forestall an attack on Germany by the USSR and to initiate a "preventive war." In June 1941 British and U.S. leaders, for example, held an identical position regarding a "preventive war," viewing Germany's attack on the USSR as an act of unprovoked, deliberate aggression. British Prime Minister W. Churchill stated this in a radio address on 22 June 1941, while the U.S. Government, stated Acting Secretary of State S. Welles on 26 June 1941, considered the USSR to be a victim of "unprovoked, totally unwarranted aggression."

Documents published by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with the period of the Great Patriotic war also enable one to make a comprehensive analysis of the creation and role of the anti-Hitler coalition. The anti-Hitler coalition during the Great Patriotic War was an event of great historic significance. The formation of this coalition was caused by the mortal danger presented by the fascist bloc to all opposing nations which, in spite of sociopolitical differences, joined into a military alliance for achievement of a common objective -- defeat of the fascist bloc, and particularly Hitlerite Germany. The Soviet Union played a leading role in forming the anti-Hitler coalition.

This historic example of cooperation among countries with opposing social systems is of great importance today as well, when mankind has the goal of preserving peace and preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Precisely herein lies the meaning of that Peace Program for the 1980's which was formulated at the 26th CPSU Congress and which is consistently being implemented by the Soviet State.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1980 gg.," A. A. Gromyko and B. M. Ponomarev, editors, 4th edition, revised and enlarged, Vol 1 (1917-1945), Vol 2 (1945-1980), Moscow, Nauka, 1981.
2. "Dokumenty po istorii myunkhenskogo sgovora. 1937-1939 gg.," Moscow, Politizdat, 1979.
3. "Dokumenty i materialy kanuna vtoroy mirovoy voyny" (in two volumes), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981.
4. "Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s prezidentami SSHA i prem'yer-ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg" [Correspondence between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Patriotic War, 1941-1945]. In two volumes, second edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976.
5. "Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg. Sbornik dokumentov v 6-ti tomakh" [The Soviet Union at International Conferences in the Period of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. Collection of Documents in Six Volumes], A. A. Gromyko, editor in chief, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978-1980.

Mar SU Sokolov

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 56-58

[Closing comments of the First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense HSU Mar SU S. Sokolov. Passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] I shall probably be expressing our common opinion when I state that the conference has been interesting, held on a sufficiently high ideological-theoretical level, and will have scientific and practical significance for military cadres.

Both the keynote address and the brief scholarly addresses examined a broad range of questions pertaining to the initial period of the Great Patriotic War and the war as a whole, showing its causes, as well as those to blame for it, and profoundly exposing the anti-Soviet policy and strategy of the leading capitalist powers, which made every effort to direct against the USSR the main striking force of world imperialism -- fascist Germany.

The Great Patriotic War in which the entire Soviet people took part, under the leadership of the Communist Party, constitutes a vivid example of a just war in defense of the socialist homeland. Entry into the war by a socialist state evoked a radical change in its sociopolitical character.

The implacable class character of the war between the Soviet Union and Hitlerite Germany and the uncompromising nature of the aims of the warring sides determined the unprecedented scale and ferocity of military operations. The Soviet-German

front, to which had been deployed the overwhelming bulk of fascist Germany's ground and air forces, immediately became the main and decisive front of World War II.

The Great Patriotic War constituted vivid evidence of the superiority of Soviet military science and art of warfare over that of fascist Germany. As a rule the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces were distinguished by decisiveness, innovation in modes of action, realistic consideration of the concrete situation, and took the enemy by surprise.

/Soviet military strategy/ resolved such important problems as organization and conduct of strategic defense under heavy attacks by enemy forces, training and utilization of strategic reserves, shift from strategic defense to a counteroffensive with subsequent buildup into a general offensive, conduct of a strategic offensive to great depth and on a broad front, teamwork and coordination among all services and arms.

A fundamentally new form of Armed Forces strategic operation was found and successfully employed, in the form of front group operations, characterized by decisiveness of objectives, enormous spatial scale, dynamic combat actions, and achievement of large-scale military-political results.

/Soviet operational art and tactics/ successfully resolved problems of massing men and equipment on main axes of advance, constructing combat formations, penetration of the enemy's defense and development of tactical to operational exploitation, encirclement, splitting enemy forces and destroying them piecemeal, conduct of encounter battles, comprehensive support of combat operations, and firm troop control. Such effective forms of delivery of fire on the enemy as artillery support for the attack and offensive air support were found and utilized.

All these and other questions of strategy, operational art and tactics which were resolved in a new manner in the course of the war, have retained their value to a significant degree in present-day conditions as well. Their comprehensive cognition, comprehension and innovative utilization comprise one of the most important sources of development of Soviet military science and art of warfare in the present day.

In present-day conditions, in organizing operational and combat training of troops and staffs, including during the conduct of exercises, we must make more use of the experience of the war and take from it everything which retains its significance today. We should constantly turn to the experience of the war because it constitutes a great asset of the entire Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces.

The keynote address and other presentations have convincingly shown that today's falsifiers of history have revived the myth of a "Soviet military threat" and are pushing it for all it is worth. Officials in Washington, London, Bonn, Beijing and other capitals are pounding away about this mythical threat.

Pentagon military strategists are using fabrications about a "Soviet military threat" primarily to cover the elaboration of war plans against the USSR and the other socialist countries, and to justify launching a nuclear first strike with the objective of seizing the strategic initiative. It is precisely for this reason that bourgeois

propagandists falsify both the history of the last war and the present-day policy of our party and the Soviet State.

Through the fault of the imperialist powers, and particularly the United States, the world situation has today become sharply aggravated. Reactionary forces are attempting to revive an atmosphere of war psychosis, are maintaining and creating conflict situations, and are escalating the arms race. Arms growth is being reinforced by aggressive military-political actions by the imperialist nations in various parts of the world. They are encouraging actions by West German revanchist circles, and focal points of tension have been created in the Near East, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in the Persian Gulf. NATO leaders are establishing increasingly closer ties with Japan and the Beijing leaders, who in turn are encouraging NATO to pursue a "tougher policy" toward the nations of the socialist community. Playing the "China card" and drawing Japan into their alliance, the leaders of this bloc plan to establish in the East a "second front" against the socialist nations, hoping for the unification of all reactionary forces to oppose world socialism on a global scale.

The nations of the socialist community consistently implement a policy aimed at strengthening peace. In contrast to the imperialist nations, they propose not only maintaining the established military balance but also to make it a point of departure in arms and force reductions. The Warsaw Pact member nations are especially concerned with ensuring security in Europe, where the most powerful military groupings are located. In view of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, the socialist nations are compelled to take necessary measures to guarantee the security of their peoples, to maintain the combat power of their armed forces at an adequate level, and to be concerned with their continuous combat readiness.

In light of all this, great importance is acquired by thorough study of possible modes of initiation of war and conduct of combat operations in its initial period. We must bear in mind that our potential adversaries maintain powerful armies in peacetime, armies which are prepared to initiate combat operations immediately. The existence of nuclear weapons and other powerful weaponry has increased the danger of enemy sneak attacks, which can be avoided only with a continuous high state of combat readiness by all armed forces branches, arms, all combined units, units, subunits, and weapon crews.

/Study of the experience of the war is a task not only of military historians, but should be given constant attention by all commanders, staffs, and political agencies./ The importance of thorough study and utilization of combat experience is particularly increasing in connection with the fact that today there are practically no war veterans in the military. And it is necessary to seek methods and forms of study and adoption of experience of the past war which would enable young officers to assimilate it. The attention of our service academies should also be drawn to this. Taking from the past all that which is useful for present-day conditions, we should direct our efforts to the future. Scientific and technological advance and acquisition by the Armed Forces of increasingly more modern and powerful combat equipment and weapons inevitably results in significant changes in the organizational structure of troops, the modes of their combat employment, and in control methods. Therefore both in theory and practice one should not rest on one's laurels. It is necessary to move forward constantly and purposefully, to enrich

Soviet military science with new theses which reflect the true patterns of development of military affairs, and swiftly to adopt new innovations into practical troop activities. This is a primary obligation of central and main directorates, staffs of the Armed Forces branches, service academies and institutes, all commanders, staffs and political agencies.

The difficult, heroic years of the past war confirmed the wisdom of the prewar policy of the Communist Party, which invariably combined concern for ensuring peaceful conditions for building a new society with strengthening of the nation's defense capability and indoctrinating Soviet citizens as steadfast and courageous defenders of the homeland. This remains one of the main tasks in the activities of the Communist Party and Soviet State. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress: "During the period under review the party and state did not for a single day ignore matters dealing with /strengthening the defense might of our country and its Armed Forces./ The international situation obliges us to do this."¹ This activity of the party and its Central Committee, headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, wins strong support and approval by all Soviet citizens and all progressive mankind. Today, when our planet is oversaturated with nuclear missile weapons, when the imperialists are increasingly escalating international tension and are conducting material preparations for a new world war which are unprecedented in history, the Soviet Armed Forces must keep in a state of continuous readiness reliably to defend the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the security of the entire socialist community.

FOOTNOTE

1. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 66.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: COMBAT ENGINEERS IN DEFENSE OF MOSCOW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 59-64

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by HSU Lt Gen Engr Trps (Ret) I. Galitskiy: "Combat Engineers Closed the Road to Moscow." During the period described I. P. Galitskiy was deputy chief of the Main Military Engineering Directorate and chief of staff of Soviet Army Engineer Troops.]

[Text] It was the harsh month of November 1941. The attention of Soviet citizens was riveted on Moscow. They were following with alarm the events which were taking place on the close approaches to the city. Following a brief pause, the main forces of Army Group Center had begun a second "general" offensive on the capital of our homeland. Engineer units and subunits were helping hold back the onslaught of the enemy hordes. They were constructing obstacles and blowing up bridges and roads in the enemy's path.

On 19 November I was summoned by the chief of the Main Military Engineering Directorate (GVIU), Maj Gen L. Z. Kotlyar. He informed me that on that day he had received an order from Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC), which stated that three engineer operations groups (OIG) were to be formed, with the task of constructing strong artificial obstacles in order to delay the advance of the fascists. The obstacles were to be placed on the near northwestern approaches to Moscow. I was placed in command of OIG-2. Our group was assigned the mission of constructing antitank and antipersonnel obstacles in a zone running from the south shore of the Moscow Reservoir to the Leningrad Highway, Zavidovo, Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Chernaya Gryaz', Dmitrov, and Yakhroma. Col Ye. V. Leoshenya, who was named my second in command, had departed for Klin several days earlier to arrange for setting up obstacles in the zones of the 30th and 16th armies.

I arrived in Klin on 19 November. I learned from the commandant of the city that Ye. V. Leoshenya was at the east edge of town, on the Rogachev Highway. I headed over that way. Yevgeniy Varfolomeyevich briefed me on the situation. Our OIG-2 contained two motorized rifle battalions of NKVD troops, six independent combat engineer battalions (127th, 214th, 244th, 266th, 382d, and 122d), and two independent combat engineer companies. In addition, the front had given the OIG as reinforcements a special equipment platoon under the command of S. P. Baturin and an independent controlled minefield detachment under the command of Military Engineer 1st Rank Ya. M. Rabinovich. The engineer operations group consisted of three obstacle construction detachments under the command of Lt Col I. D. Mel'nikov

and Majors M. K. Shperov and P. N. Vakulovskiy. But it turned out that they had just the previous day begun performing their missions. Shperov's detachment, to be true, had set to work somewhat earlier. As soon as the fascists had kicked off their offensive, he dynamited the Leningrad highway from Zavidovo to Yamuga and the bridge across the Moscow Reservoir at Seliverstovo. Now this detachment was laying mines and preparing to demolish the Leningrad highway on the section Yamuga-Klin-Solnechnogorsk.

Following discussion of urgent matters, we decided to complete preparation of a map of obstacles in the zone of the 30th and 16th armies, running from the main line of resistance to the Volga-Moscow Canal. Headquarters had no technical communications whatsoever. Command and control of the units was handled through runners and personal trips to the field. We adopted the following procedure: in the mornings Leoshenya would go out to one group and I would go to another, and in the evening we would meet at headquarters to exchange information and to draw up operational instructions.

It began to grow light. Hurriedly eating breakfast, we headed out for the detachments: me to Lieutenant Colonel Mel'nikov's, and Leoshenya to Major Shperov's. Both were operating on the main axes of advance.

There was a good deal of traffic on the Klin highway. Trucks and horse-drawn vehicles were moving in both directions. Nevertheless we reached the village of Zubovo without any particular difficulty, from which we proceeded to search out Lieutenant Colonel Mel'nikov. Soon the highway was running on a high embankment. About a company of combat engineers were digging holes on the sides of the highway for demolition charges at close spacings, charging them on the spot. We stopped. I stepped out of the car and saw Mel'nikov nearby. He gave a brief report on what his detachment was doing. Two combat engineer battalions were mining the highway from Klin to Rogachev.

I advised Mel'nikov to set up in each company a demolition team consisting of NCOs and trained Red Armymen under the supervision of the commanders. This was very important. They would be performing the final operation of arming the charges, and the fastest working and most knowledgeable combat engineers should be assigned to these teams.

Returning to Pokrovskoye, where our headquarters was located, I saw that Leoshenya was also back. He had been out to Shperov's detachment. We exchanged our impressions. We immediately sat down to prepare an obstacle map and plan. The work advanced smoothly. Leoshenya and I sketched out the obstacle points and belts, expressing our general tactical plan, so to say, while Lieutenant Colonel Anisimov and lab assistant-technician Kalabin worked up the obstacle map and plan in final form. We prepared the map in two copies, for each army. It was well after midnight when the job was completed, but the next morning we once again took to the field: I to General Rokossovskiy and Leoshenya to General Lelyushenko.

The 16th Army command post was located near the Istra Reservoir, on a sovkhos north of Shchekino. On my arrival I sought out the army engineer troops chief, Col F. M. Savelov, and briefed him on the layout of obstacles which were being constructed by the detachments in the 16th Army's defensive zone, from the forward defended

localities to the canal inclusive. Fedor Mikhaylovich in turn told me how they were employing minefields against enemy tanks. Following a brief conversation, Colonel Savelov and I went to the commander of the 16th Army, Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy. I told him the purpose of my visit and, spreading the map out on the table, briefed him on the plan for constructing obstacles in the zone of the 16th Army. Konstantin Konstantinovich closely examined the map, and then asked how we would proceed with roads leading rearward when they were to be demolished.

I showed on the map what roads were already being demolished and mined, and what roads remained for vehicle movement, but they too were being mined. They would be demolished in case of withdrawal of combat units. In order to blow up bridges at the requisite time and to prevent their premature demolition, I requested that the army commander assign to the roadhead sections of the mined roads permanent representatives from the headquarters of the units operating in these sectors. It would be up to them to issue at the critical moment the order to demolish roads and bridges. We would coordinate the point for these meetings with Colonel Savelov.

The army commander signed the obstacle map, and I headed back to Pokrovskoye.

Leoshenya was already waiting for me. He had signed the map at General Lelyushenko's headquarters without any changes. It now remained to implement our plans.

On 21 November the fascists captured Zavidovo and Reshetnikovo stations. By this time Lieutenant Colonel Mel'nikov's detachment had prepared for demolition and mined the highway from Rogachev to Klin. The following day I went out to Klin and from there to Yamuga, to see how badly the stretch of Leningrad highway was demolished north of that locality. Shperov's detachment was performing the job.

My vehicle sped along the asphalt. Suddenly I saw up ahead a heavily-demolished Leningrad highway. The demolition charges had blasted enormous craters, and large pieces of asphalt and concrete were scattered all around. It was now unlikely that enemy tanks could pass. The combat engineers had done a good job.

I stood for a while by the craters and then headed back to my car. I was less than half way to the car when shots rang out in the forest on my left. The shooting increased in intensity. Soon a line of enemy infantry appeared: the Hitlerites were advancing on Yamuga. I headed for my car at a dead run, jumped in and shouted to my driver: "Go!" The car lurched into action. Mortar shells were impacting all around us, but by some miracle the driver managed to dodge the bursts which seemed to be about to straddle us. Soon the danger was behind. Friendly batteries opened response fire on the enemy. About an hour later I reached Pokrovskoye, where Shperov's report awaited me. He reported that his detachment, operating on the stretch between Yamuga and Klin, had begun demolishing the highway. This took the advancing enemy completely by surprise. The fascists slowed their advance and turned off the road. They finally succeeded in taking Yamuga that evening. The detachment immediately demolished the highway from Yamuga to Klin. Now it was preparing to demolish the Leningrad highway from Klin to Solnechnogorsk.

I received a telegram in Pokrovskoye from Western Front Headquarters, signed by Gen V. D. Sokolovskiy, with orders to report to the command post to report to the commanding general on the operations of OIG-2. I proceeded to get ready to leave.

Suddenly a messenger from Rokossovskiy burst into the room, out of breath, and handed me an urgent message. The army commander ordered that we immediately demolish the Leningrad highway between Klin and Solnechnogorsk. Leoshenya immediately wrote out the order. Both of us signed it and headed by motorcycle with a courier to Shperov.

Since the fate of Klin was already determined, we redeployed our headquarters to Dmitrov. It seemed to me that the time had come to prepare to blow the bridges across the Volga-Moscow Canal at Yakhroma and Dmitrov. Therefore I instructed that an order be sent to Lieutenant Colonel Mel'nikov, instructing him immediately to dispatch a platoon to each bridge, under the command of their commanders, with the requisite quantity of explosives. They were to be ready by 0800 on 24 November, and they were to blow up the bridges on receiving a specific order.

To get to Western Front Headquarters, it was necessary to go through Moscow. By evening I was with M. P. Vorob'yev, Western Front chief of engineer troops. I had known Mikhail Petrovich since 1930, when I met him at an advanced training course at the Military Technical Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. He was a highly educated and erudite military engineer, a man of real talent. He and I had met on numerous occasions in the course of our service, and at one time he was my superior. Therefore there was no need for us to get acquainted. I briefed him on the obstacle map which had been approved by K. K. Rokossovskiy and D. D. Lelyushenko, and told him what we had already accomplished, in particular the preparations to destroy the bridges across the Volga-Moscow Canal in the towns of Dmitrov and Yakhroma. Mikhail Petrovich called the chief of staff, Lt Gen V. D. Sokolovskiy, and reported my arrival. The latter immediately summoned me.

Always somewhat morose and uncommunicative, Sokolovskiy greeted us on this occasion with a smile.

"Well, what did you people do over on the Leningrad highway?" he asked, extending his hand. "You broke all my communication lines."

"Vasilii Danilovich, demolition of the Leningrad highway received Rokossovskiy's approval; his signature is right here on the obstacle map. The explosives were detonated on his orders, when the enemy reached the highway. And it is logical that communication lines were broken. As they say, when you chop wood chips fly. The line poles run right along the highway, nor can we leave communications intact for the enemy, for he will utilize them without delay."

"Alright, what's done is done, and I don't have the time to discuss the matter. Right now I'm going to call the commanding general and find out when he will see you."

Sokolovskiy picked up the telephone receiver and spoke with Zhukov. The latter said he would see me at 0700 on 24 November.

Returning from General Sokolovskiy, Vorob'yev and I discussed a number of matters, and in particular subsequent actions by our OIG. Vorob'yev suggested that the main efforts be focused on demolishing roads and planting mines between the

Leningrad highway and the canal. In addition, obstacles should be constructed forward of the canal in order to stop infantry and prevent them from reaching the right bank. Tanks would not get through on the ice.

Early the next morning I was received by the commanding general of the Western Front, Army Gen G. K. Zhukov. He was very preoccupied, even stern. It seemed to me that Georgiy Konstantinovich was about to bawl me out for breaking the communication line, as Sokolovskiy had done, but with much greater severity. Instead, however, he ordered me to give him a brief report on the operations of OIG-2.

I spread out the map and reported on the locations of the boundaries of constructed obstacle zones, on the deployment of obstacle construction detachments in this zone and what we had done for that day, in particular demolition of the Leningrad highway from Klin to Solnechnogorsk.

"You have created a good deal of alarm and confusion with your blasting. The soldiers were frightened, thinking that the enemy was attacking them in the rear."

"Comrade General, unfortunately we have not yet learned to blast noiselessly. But a soldier who is frightened of explosions taking place behind his back is a poor soldier."

A barely noticeable smile flitted across Zhukov's face.

"You are right. The front is everywhere for the good soldier. Are you doing a good job of demolishing everything?" inquired Georgiy Konstantinovich.

I replied that we were blowing up bridges and pipelines, while we were demolishing the road surface every 100-200 meters. Deep and wide craters were formed, as well as piles of enormous pieces of asphalt and concrete, like big ice hummocks, which tanks cannot negotiate. In addition, we were mining all possible routes to bypass demolished bridges, embankments, and some craters.

Continuing to peruse the obstacle layout map, Zhukov suddenly poked his finger at a crossroads near Teryayeva Sloboda.

"Did you plant mines here?" he asked.

An antitank minefield had indeed been marked by colored pencil on the map.

"Yes," I confirmed.

"Well, fascist tanks went right through here. Your obstacles are not worth much." Zhukov frowned, his thick brows converging above the bridge of his nose.

"That could happen, Comrade General, if the minefield was not covered by antitank weapons. The enemy could clear lanes without any hindrance."

The reply apparently satisfied him. He proceeded to talk more calmly and stated what we had to do on a priority basis: step up mining activities east of the Leningrad highway, on the Dmitrov and Yakhroma axes, in order to keep the fascists from

crossing the canal. Zhukov drew a circle around this area with a red pencil. I reported that we had already mined the bridges across the canal at Dmitrov and Yakhroma. Three combat engineer battalions were being freed, and they would be moved to the canal with the mission of mining the east bank as a defensive line and its immediate depth.

"Work energetically and boldly, construct obstacles and help Rokossovskiy and Lelyushenko halt the enemy," said Zhukov, ending the conversation.

Toward evening I arrived in Dmitrov. Leoshenya had just returned from Mel'nikov and had also touched bases with Shperov. I briefed him on the instructions received from Zhukov and Vorob'yev and at the same time gave instructions to draw up orders for Mel'nikov and Shperov to perform the missions assigned by the commanding general of the Western Front. I ordered the freed battalions in the detachments to be redeployed to the Dmitrov and Yakhroma area and put on the canal to plant minefields.

Leoshenya in turn reported on work accomplished in my absence. Preparations were proceeding at full speed for demolishing the highway and other roads in the zone directly adjacent to the west bank of the Volga-Moscow Canal.

Yevgeniy Varfolomeyevich and I traveled over to headquarters of the 1st Assault Army, which had just been set up in Dmitrov, in the rayon executive committee building. Present in the office of the commanding general, Lt Gen V. I. Kuznetsov, were his chief of staff, Maj Gen N. D. Zakhvatayev, and military council member brigade commissar D. Ye. Kolesnikov. Following brief introductions, I briefed them on the engineer operations situation in that sector and requested that the Dmitrov and Yakhroma bridges across the canal be covered with reliable means, in order to exclude the possibility of their surprise capture by the enemy. The army commander promised to do everything he could.

We left in an encouraged mood, but late that evening Lieutenant Colonel Anisimov learned in the operations section of 1st Assault Army Headquarters that fascist infantry accompanied by tanks were advancing in the direction of Yakhroma. I immediately ordered Colonel Leoshenya to proceed with Kalabin to Yakhroma to talk to the officer in charge of the bridge, to receive a current situation briefing and to verify the state of readiness of the demolition detail. He returned just before dawn. He ran rather than walked into the room, pale and agitated.

"What happened?" I asked.

"The bridge in Yakhroma has been captured by the fascists. They have crossed tanks over to the east bank and are occupying a small bridgehead by the village of Peremilovo."

At first I didn't know what to say, I was so flabbergasted by this piece of news. Then, recovering my composure, I exclaimed: "Well, what are we standing around for? We must check the Dmitrov bridge to make sure that it does not happen again!"

Leoshenya ran out of the office and a minute later brought Lieutenant Colonel Anisimov. We ordered him to head for the Dmitrov bridge. He soon returned and

reported that the situation was normal there: a security detail was vigilantly guarding the bridge, the officer in charge was maintaining direct telephone communications with the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 29th Rifle Brigade (of the 1st Assault Army), which was occupying a forward bridgehead position one and a half to two kilometers west of the bridge.

Nevertheless a difficult, critical situation had developed. The enemy was already on the east bank of the Volga-Moscow Canal. There was a real threat of capture of Dmitrov by an attack from the south and west. This would enable the fascists to amass the necessary forces on the east bank of the canal and subsequently to drive on Moscow, enveloping it from the northeast and east. There was no time to lose; the Germans had to be pushed back across the canal.

An assault mounted at Yakhroma by units of the 29th Rifle Brigade failed. This meant that we had no guarantee that the Hitlerites would not attack Dmitrov and seize the bridge. After discussing this matter with Leoshenya, we reached a unanimous decision -- the bridge at Dmitrov had to be blown up immediately. This would strengthen our position on the Dmitrov axis and would give us a free hand for decisive actions at Yakhroma.

We immediately went to see the commanding general of the 1st Assault Army, General Kuznetsov.

"I just received a call from Mikhaylov (Stalin's code name -- Auth.), who ordered that the Hitlerites be pushed back across the canal as quickly as possible and that the bridge across the canal at Yakhroma be demolished. Your mission is to execute that demolition," stated Kuznetsov.

"We shall accomplish the mission, Vasilii Ivanovich. But right now I have a second urgent matter in connection with capture of the Yakhroma bridge by the Hitlerites and their stepped-up actions on the Dmitrov axis -- we must demolish the bridge across the canal at Dmitrov."

I proposed that we blow up the bridge during the night of 29 September, at 2300, first withdrawing the 1st Rifle Battalion to the east bank. To prevent surprise capture of the bridge, we requested that General Lelyushenko give us two KV tanks to cover it. They would be positioned on two sides, so that they could protect the bridge not only with gunfire but also with their bulk, as a barricade.

"When are you planning to assault the Peremilovo bridgehead?" I asked Kuznetsov.

"On 29 November at 0600," he replied.

"I see. By that time we shall have brought up to the 3d Battalion a demolition detail with everything needed to blow the bridge."

Arriving at headquarters, which was located on the Dmitrov river landing stage, I ordered Colonel Leoshenya immediately to issue an operation order to obstacle construction detachment commander Mel'nikov -- to prepare 2 demolition details of 15 men each, equipped with the requisite quantity of TNT and gear to blow up the Yakhroma bridge. The second detail was assigned as backup. The combat engineers were to assemble by 0500 on 29 November by the brickyard east of Peremilovo.

At the designated time, just before dawn, the 29th and 50th Rifle brigades launched a counterattack. Under cover of darkness, their forward subunits advanced to a position 150-200 meters from Peremilovo without firing a shot, and seized this locality with a surprise assault. Soviet gun and mortar crews immediately proceeded to deliver heavy fire, supporting the actions of the brigades. The enemy immediately began retreating in disarray, abandoning a large percentage of his tanks on the battlefield. The Hitlerites were thrown back onto the west bank of the canal.

I observed the battle from the observation post of the commander of the 3d Rifle Battalion, which was located on a hill by the brickyard. The hill offered a good view of the area: the canal and all of Yakhroma were clearly visible. A factory and some other buildings were burning in the town. Soon the chief of engineer troops of the 1st Assault Army, Col M. M. Pozin, reported to me with a demolition detail. We had two other details concentrated by the brickyard; I placed these at Pozin's disposal.

Within a few minutes the bridge across the canal was captured. Pozin immediately moved one detail to the bridge to blow it up, while he positioned the second detail in reserve behind the tall highway embankment, approximately half a kilometer from the bridge.

The first demolition detail was led by MSgt P. Mosin. The combat engineers crawled on their bellies across 500 meters of exposed ground, then covered the remaining distance to the bridge in short bounds, and took refuge behind the high concrete abutment. Colonel Pozin and I carefully watched them. We heard the first explosion 15 minutes later. But the bridge remained standing. Soon a second explosion occurred, followed by a third, but the bridge continued to stand. We began to be seriously concerned, as we had no idea what the problem was. We later learned that there was a simple reason for the fact that the bridge did not collapse: its individual sections were being blasted sequentially. Finally a fourth explosion took place: the bridge collapsed into the canal, with its opposite end jutting skyward. The fascists opened heavy fire, but the combat engineers, protected by the high embankment, withdrew safely to the nearest shelter. The mission was accomplished.

In the meantime engineer reconnaissance reported that water was being released from the canal into the Yakhroma River. Soon we saw the river beginning to overflow its banks, creating a formidable natural obstacle. The Hitlerites' path eastward was now blocked by a flooded area and the Volga-Moscow Canal, defended by the troops of the 1st Assault, 30th and 16th armies.

It was necessary, however, also to continue developing the obstacle belt on the east bank of the Volga-Moscow Canal. Discussing this matter, we specified the mine-laying locations taking into account the specific features of defense of the 30th and 16th armies of the east bank of the canal, and drew up an obstacle layout. The detachments proceeded without delay laying minefields in their assigned areas, which were coordinated with the commanders of the defending units. The job proceeded well, and three days later the forward defended localities along the Volga-Moscow Canal were protected by antitank minefields, and antipersonnel mines had been placed on the ice. The obstacles helped stop the enemy along this line.

On 5-6 December 1941 Soviet troops shifted to the counteroffensive at Moscow.

Soon General Kotlyar issued instructions to disband OIG-2, to turn the battalions over to the chief of engineer troops of the Western Front, while Leoshenya and I were to return to our regular duties. Before leaving from Moscow we prepared a report on the results of the actions of OIG-2. It had detonated 500 road-cratering demolition charges, had demolished 183 km of highway and other roads, had blown up and burned 310 bridges with a total length of 4,800 meters, had planted 53,000 various landmines, and had constructed approximately 400 roadblocks. Our obstacles had destroyed 43 enemy tanks, 408 trucks and armored personnel carriers.¹ And all this was accomplished in 12 days! Many combat engineers were awarded medals and decorations.

FOOTNOTE

1. "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodinu" [Engineer Troops in Combat for the Soviet homeland], Voenizdat, 1970, page 100.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE LIBERATION OF ROMANIA

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col (Res) I. Shinkarev: "Rout of the Fascist Troops in Romania (On the 37th anniversary of the liberation of the Romanian people)"]

[Text] Romania was the first country the territory of which was entered by units and combined units of the Soviet Army in the course of World War II. Arrival by Soviet troops on the Romanian border was preceded by almost three years of difficult struggle by the Soviet people against the armies of the countries of the fascist bloc. In 1941-1942 troops of the Kingdom of Romania marched with the German-fascist army from the Prut to the Volga. Romania's fascist dictator, I. Antonescu, called himself "the first German warrior" and dreamed of his country becoming the largest on the coast of the Black Sea.¹ The anti-Soviet plans, however, both of the Romanian and German fascists suffered disgraceful failure. The army of the Kingdom of Romania, just as the fascist forces as a whole, suffered a bitter defeat at Stalingrad in 1942. In the spring of 1944 the troops of the Kingdom of Romania were defeated in detail in the Ukraine together with the German-fascist troops, and fell back to the Prut.

The troops of the Second Ukrainian Front, during the Uman'-Botosani Operation, reached the Prut -- the Romanian border -- on 26 March 1944 on an 85 kilometer frontage north of Ungeny, and during the night of 27 March the 3d Guards Airborne Division and the 206th Rifle Division of the 27th Army crossed the river and seized bridgeheads on the far bank. Somewhat later combined units of the 52d and 40th armies crossed over to the west bank at the same spot.

Thus Soviet troops had entered Romania and begun liberating it from fascist domination. This entire process required seven months of difficult combat (from 27 March to 25 October 1944).

In an official statement released on 2 April 1944, the Soviet Government clearly defined the objectives of the Soviet Army's liberation mission, stressing that the USSR laid no claim to any part of Romanian territory, was not seeking to impose a change in Romania's existing social system, and that the entry of Soviet troops into Romania was dictated exclusively by military necessity and the enemy's continuing resistance.² Our country's policy toward Romania was subsequently further detailed in a decree issued by the State Defense Committee (GKO) on 10 April 1944.

It contained concrete practical instructions pertaining to the conduct of Soviet troops on Romanian soil. The "Red Army has entered Romania not as a conqueror," stated the GKO Decree, "but as a liberator, to free the Romanian people from German-fascist oppression, with no aims other than the aim of routing Germany's armies and ending the domination of Hitlerite Germany in the countries enslaved by it."³

The Soviet spring offensive in Romania continued up to mid-April. By this time they had advanced more than 100 kilometers into the Romanian heartland, liberating more than 800 towns and villages, including the towns of Botosani, Radauti, Suceava, and others. The liberated territory, totaling almost 10,000 square kilometers, contained a population of approximately 400,000.⁴

On 12 April 1944 the Soviet Government offered the government of Romania extremely magnanimous armistice terms, which had the agreement of the British and U.S. governments. Antonescu's fascist government, however, not willing to break with Hitlerite Germany, rejected these terms and doomed the Romanian people to additional senseless sacrifices.

The endeavor by the German-fascist command authorities to hold Romania at all costs, as the most important strategic bridgehead in the Balkans, resulted in Hitler's decision to launch a counteroffensive to push the Soviet troops back beyond the Prut. Concentrating 10 divisions in the vicinity of Iasi, including four panzer divisions, the enemy launched his offensive on 30 May.

Fierce fighting continued for 7 days. But the enemy failed to achieve his stated objective. Our fighting men displayed exceptional staunchness, tenacity and heroism. In the course of the fighting the fascists lost more than 500 tanks and assault guns, and 366 aircraft. From 27 March to 20 August 1944 the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front put out of action approximately 200,000 enemy officers and men. A total of 16,000 Soviet soldiers, officers and general officers were killed and 62,500 wounded during this period of the fight to liberate the Romanian people.⁵

From mid-July to 20 August Soviet troops in Romania were not engaged in aggressive combat actions. Preparations had begun for the next, Iasi-Kishinev Operation.

In conformity with the general plan of the Supreme High Command (SHC), the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts, the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Naval Flotilla were ordered to prepare for the summer-fall campaign of 1944 and on 20 August commence the offensive in the Iasi-Kishinev area. The military-political objectives of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation were the defeat of Army Group Southern Ukraine, completion of liberation of the Moldavian SSR, and withdrawal of Romania from the war on the side of fascist Germany.

Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC) designated two massive drives to encircle and defeat in detail the main forces of the enemy's Army Group Southern Ukraine, located in the Iasi, Kishinev, and Bendery area, and to prevent it from withdrawing to defensive positions west of the Prut and Siret rivers. Successful accomplishment of these missions would ensure the rapid advance of Soviet troops into Central Romania. This could not help but lead to large-scale political changes

in that country, and particularly removal of the Antonescu Government. New conditions were forming for a mass struggle by the Romanian people against fascism for the establishment of a democratic government.

The Hitlerites placed against the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts 47 divisions and 5 brigades (25 German divisions, 22 Romanian divisions and 5 Romanian brigades), totaling more than 900,000 men. Weapons and equipment included 7,600 guns and mortars, 404 tanks and assault guns, and 810 combat aircraft.⁶ A multiple-zone defense disposed in depth, backed up by a mountain range and southward-flowing rivers, enhanced the stability of the enemy force grouping.

The Soviet command authorities assigned 92 divisions to perform operation missions, with 55 of these divisions (including the T. Vladimirescu Romanian Volunteer Infantry Division, formed in the USSR) comprising elements of the Second Ukrainian Front, which was operating on the decisive axis. The two fronts totaled 1,250,000 men, as well as 16,000 guns and mortars, 1,870 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2,200 combat aircraft.⁷

The Soviet offensive in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation began on 20 August 1944. Battle groups of the Second Ukrainian Front (Army Gen. R. Ya. Malinovskiy, commanding) began penetration of the enemy defense from an area south of Iasi, and troops of the Third Ukrainian Front (Army Gen. F. I. Tolbukhin, commanding) from a bridgehead south of Bendery. Good preparation and precise operation planning by the fronts ensured its success from the very outset. On the first day Soviet troops advanced from 10 to 16 km and penetrated the enemy defense to its entire tactical depth. The kickoff of the Soviet offensive, in the estimate of General Friessner, commander of Army Group Southern Ukraine, led to the loss of the capability to continue fighting on the part of a number of units and combined units. The Romanian troops sustained particularly heavy losses: of the 22 divisions in the army group, they lost 7, almost one third of the total number on the front.⁸ On the following days the offensive advanced even more successfully. The swift advance of the 6th Tank Army, and subsequently the 18th Tank Corps in the Second Ukrainian Front, and the 4th Guards and 7th Mechanized Corps in the Third Ukrainian Front made it possible to complete on 23 August tactical encirclement of the main forces of the enemy's Kishinev force grouping. Eighteen of the 25 German divisions were encircled. That same day the 46th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front, working in coordination with the Danube Naval Flotilla, completed encirclement of the Romanian 3d Army, the troops of which ceased resistance on the following day.

As a result of the Soviet military operations the anti-fascist movement picked up intensity in Romania, anti-Hitler attitudes in the Romanian army became intensified, and the crisis "at the top" became aggravated. That country's Communist Party, which was operating underground, considered the prevailing domestic political situation and proceeded to establish contacts with opposition-minded officers and palace circles. In mid-June it proposed to them a plan of armed uprising with the objective of overthrowing the fascist Antonescu dictatorship and withdrawing Romania from the war on the side of fascist Germany. It was accepted, and a military committee was immediately established to make preparations for the uprising.

The extremely favorable situation established at the front as a result of the Soviet offensive enabled the Communist Party of Romania to proceed with immediate

preparations for an armed uprising. At a meeting of the military committee held on 19-22 August, the decision was made to begin the uprising on 26 August. The brilliant victories of the Soviet Army, however, created a realistic possibility of advancing the timetable by three days. "The victorious advance of the Soviet Army -- an army of liberation -- and the crushing blow dealt by this army against the German-fascist troops on the Iasi-Kishinev axis," stated Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, "created favorable conditions for executing the plan of action drawn up by the Communist Party of Romania with the objective of overthrowing the fascist dictatorship."⁹

The uprising began on 23 August with the arrest of Antonescu and several of his ministers. In response, units of the Bucharest garrison which supported the uprising, and armed groups of workers, totaling 7,000 men, seized and occupied government offices, the central telephone exchange, the telegraph office, the radio station and other major installations. By midnight the Antonescu fascist dictatorship was overthrown. At 2330 on 23 August Bucharest Radio announced establishment of a "national unity" government, cessation of military actions against the United Nations, and acceptance by Romania of the preliminary truce terms offered by the Soviet Government as early as 12 April 1944.

Receiving news of these events, Field Marshal Keitel and General Guderian, in a report to Hitler, proposed "taking all measures to ensure that Romania disappears from the map of Europe and the Romanian people ceases to exist as a nation."¹⁰ Hitler, realizing that he was losing an ally, issued orders to the commanding general of Army Group Southern Ukraine to put down the uprising immediately, to arrest King Mihai, and to form a pro-German government. On the morning of 24 August the Hitlerites subjected Bucharest to a vicious bombardment, resulting in the destruction of approximately 2,000 residential buildings and a number of cultural monuments, plus the deaths of hundreds of civilians. The commanding general of Army Group Southern Ukraine, however, could not remove a single division from the front. Eighteen divisions were in the Iasi-Kishinev pocket of encirclement, while others took enormous casualties. Therefore only those German-fascist units which were in and around Bucharest, a total of approximately 14,000 men, were employed to put down the uprising. Later some forces were brought in from the Ploesti area, where there was an antiaircraft artillery division, as well as a few subunits from other rear areas in Romania. The insurgent patriotic forces in the capital, led by Communists, contained 50 armed worker groups in addition to 7,000 military personnel.

But the Hitlerite command authorities did not succeed in utilizing their superiority in numbers. Soviet troops, smashing the fascists, were swiftly advancing toward Ploesti and Bucharest, while the leaders of the insurgency were able to replenish the ranks of the insurgents, and the relative strengths rapidly shifted in their favor. By 28 August 39,000 Romanian troops in the capital had gone over to the side of the insurgents, while the patriotic fighting groups totaled about 2,000 men.¹¹ This enabled them to repulse the attacks of punitive troops and to clean Hitlerites out of the city.

In connection with these events, on 25 August the Soviet Government reaffirmed that it was holding to its position regarding Romania which had first been declared on 1 April 1944. Its declaration stated that if Romanian troops ceased military actions against the Soviet forces and would pledge to work in close alliance with

Soviet troops and wage a liberation war against the German-fascist invaders, "the Red Army will not disarm them, will allow them to keep all their weapons, and will give them every assistance in carrying out this honorable mission."¹²

The antifascist national armed uprising, which took place in favorable conditions created by the victories of the USSR Armed Forces, was of enormous significance for the Romanian people. It opened up a historic path of democratic development for that country. But consolidation of the successful uprising and completion of liberation of that country from fascism depended in large measure on further struggle by the Soviet Army against the German-fascist troops and on its swift and decisive actions in Romania.

In view of the internal political situation prevailing in Romania after 23 August, the command authorities of the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts took requisite measures to shorten the timetable of mopping up the encircled force and increase the pace of advance into the Romanian heartland. A lessening of the offensive pressure by the Soviet forces and a slowing of the rate of advance could be exploited by the German-fascist command authorities to bring in fresh forces and to take cruel reprisals against the insurgents.

The Second Ukrainian Front concentrated its main efforts on the outer perimeter of envelopment. Forces included the 6th Tank Army and the 18th Independent Tank Corps, the 27th, 53d and 7th Guards and 40th Combined Arms armies, the Romanian T. Vladimirescu 1st Volunteer Division, as well as front air forces. Hq SHC designated Focsani-Ploesti as the main axis of advance, with a secondary axis toward Brasov, in order to deny German units routes of withdrawal through Northern Transylvania to Hungary.

The 46th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front attacked in the direction of Galati and Constanta, with the objective of reaching the Romanian-Bulgarian border.

The effectiveness of a military drive through the Focsani Gate, the shortest route to Central Romania, had been verified by history time and again, because Russian soldiers followed precisely this route during the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812. And they followed this route to gain victories in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which brought Romania independence and independent nationhood. In 1916 Russian troops came along this route to meet German-Austrian troops which had invaded Romania.

In August 1944 Soviet forces were hurrying to the aid of the Romanian insurgents. They advanced day and night, at an unrelenting pace. The town of Focsani was liberated on 27 August, and Ploesti on 30 August, fighting in cooperation with the insurgents. On 31 August Soviet troops and units of the Romanian T. Vladimirescu 1st Volunteer Division entered Bucharest.

The swift advance of our forces prevented the German command authorities from gathering together forces to put down the uprising.

Combat operations to wipe out the encircled enemy force also proceeded aggressively and for the most part were completed on 29 August. Scattered groups of Hitlerites were mopped up by 3 September. As a result of the fighting from 20

August to 3 September, Soviet troops destroyed 22 German divisions, including 18 encircled divisions, and routed all Romanian divisions at the front. They took 208,600 officers and men prisoner, destroyed and captured large quantities of combat equipment and weapons.¹³ The enemy sustained such serious damage that considerable time was required to reestablish a continuous front. The enemy was forced to transfer to the Romanian sector of the front additional forces from other Balkan countries.

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation -- one of the largest operations of World War II -- ended on 29 August. The enemy's Army Group Southern Ukraine was defeated in detail in the course of this operation, which led to a sharp change in the entire strategic situation in the southern part of the Soviet-German front. The Iasi-Kishinev Operation is a brilliant example of the superiority of Soviet art of warfare over that of fascist Germany. The interrelationship between politics and strategy was particularly clearly revealed in this operation. Major political objectives were achieved with accomplishment of the mission of defeating in detail the strategic enemy force: liberation of the Moldavian SSR was completed, and favorable external conditions were created for the victory of the antifascist uprising of the Romanian people; Romania was withdrawn from the war on the side of fascist Germany; the Soviet Army gained an opportunity to advance to the borders of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary, and to assist them in liberation from fascism. Following the brilliant victory of the Soviet Army in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, the national liberation struggle in the Balkan countries, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia became intensified.

On the day of completion of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, the commanding generals of the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts received new directives from Hq SHC, which specified their subsequent mission. These were as follows: complete the defeat of the Hitlerites in Romania. The main forces of the Second Ukrainian Front were to push the advance in the direction of Turnu-Severin and by 7-8 October to reach a line running Cimpulung-Pitesti-Jiurjiu. They were subsequently to move toward the Danube south of Turnu-Severin. The troops of the right side of the front were to advance in a northwesterly direction, with the mission of seizing the passes through the Eastern Carpathians, and by 15 September they were to reach a line running Bistrita-Cluj-Sibiu. They were then to launch a drive on Satu-Mare, with the objective of supporting the Fourth Ukrainian Front in crossing the Carpathians and reaching the M. Lachevo-Uzhgorod area. The troops of the Third Ukrainian Front were to cross the Danube in the Galati-Izmail area and reach the Romanian-Bulgarian border by 5-6 September.

Following the victory of the August armed uprising, the Romanian Army had two combined-arms armies, which included nine battleworthy and remnants of seven shattered divisions. According to Romanian historians, it totaled 385,000 officers and men.¹⁴ The Romanian units and combined units were poorly armed, had little artillery and almost no tanks.

The Romanian 1st Army covered the border with Hungary on the West and with Yugoslavia. It was deployed at a distance of 200-300 km from the Soviet forces. The Romanian 4th Army, which had been hastily formed of remnants of the shattered divisions, was assigned the mission of covering the Romanian-Hungarian border on the north.

Our command authorities had to establish coordination and cooperation with these armies in difficult conditions of contact with the enemy, as well as sabotage by

reactionary general officers and certain members of the Romanian Government. The troops proved morally unprepared to combat their former allies.

Nevertheless the presence of Romanian forces north and northwest of the Southern Carpathians at the end of August presented an obstacle to the Hitlerite command authorities, who were endeavoring to seize the passes through these mountains before they were captured by Soviet troops. The command authorities of Army Group Southern Ukraine figured on easily removing this obstacle, moving German and Horthy troops into an offensive at the beginning of October.

The troops of the Second Ukrainian Front were advancing swiftly, and on 3 September right-flank combined units of the 27th Army reached the Southern Carpathian passes south of the city of Brasov. The following day they captured the cities of Brasov and Craiova, preventing the Hitlerites from taking the passes. The Romanian 4th Army Corps took part in the fighting for Brasov.

On the morning of 5 September, however, a Hitlerite force of five divisions launched a drive southward from the Turda area. The troops of the Romanian 4th Army, who were in their path, yielded to the onslaught and retreated 20-30 km. At the same time the enemy crossed the Danube in an area southeast of Bela Crkva and south of Turnu-Severin, where Romanian troops were also disposed. Here too the enemy succeeded in capturing a number of localities.

In this crisis situation for the Romanian troops, on 6 September the entire Romanian field army, with the consent of the government, was made operationally subordinate to the commanding general of the Second Ukrainian Front. It took the 1st and 4th armies, the 4th Independent Army Corps and the 1st Air Corps. As of 6 September 1944, according to the figures of the Romanian General Staff, the 20 Romanian divisions totaled 136,073 men and were armed with 8,159 submachineguns, 6,500 machineguns, 1,509 mortars, 611 guns and 113 operable aircraft¹⁶ (as of 5 October 1944 23 Romanian divisions were fighting together with our troops. But 17 Romanian divisions remained at the front after 16 October. The other combined units were withdrawn to the rear). Having taken over control of Romanian troops, the Soviet command authorities showed them solicitous concern. Command groups were set up at army and front headquarters for purposes of coordination, as well as the institution of liaison officers.

Carrying out the orders of Hq SHC, the commanding general of the Second Ukrainian Front sent into the area of operations of the Romanian 4th Army the 6th Tank and 27th armies, and the 53d Army and 18th Tank Corps into the area of operations of the Romanian 1st Army. This was not an easy task. Rugged terrain, hot fall weather, fatigued troops, exhausted by two weeks of continuous fighting, the fact that supply and logistic support had fallen behind, and difficulties in supply were having an adverse effect on the rate of advance.

The effectiveness of Soviet troop actions to defeat the enemy and assist Romanian forces depended on the swiftness of their advance. Just as had been the case at the end of August, in the course of the offensive to assist the insurgent Romanian patriots, of decisive significance was the timetable for our troops to reach the defensive line being held by the now allied Romanian units and combined units.

How did the combat operations of Soviet troops develop in the period 6-15 September, that is, up to the time a new directive was received from Hq SHC? The 27th and 6th Tank armies were advancing on the Cluj axis. On 13 September the tankers, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, fought their way into the town of Turda and captured it. They were unable to hold it, however. With the arrival of the 27th Army, they were finally able to push the enemy back to his initial position and liberate the town. The 6th Tank Army suffered 2,000 killed and wounded in the fighting for Turda.¹⁷

As a result, in the course of 10 days the troops of the 6th Tank and 27th armies advanced 180-250 km and reached the Mures River, and the Romanian 4th Army was saved from a crushing defeat.

The troops of the 53d Army and 18th Tank Corps, advancing in a northwesterly direction, reached a line running Brad-Deva-Turnu-Severin by 12 September. On 13 September the Hungarian 2d Army shifted to an offensive from the Oradea area toward Belus and from the Gyula area toward Arad. Combined units of the Romanian 1st Army were hit by this attack and abandoned the town of Arad under the enemy onslaught. Further advance of the German-Horthy troops, however, was stopped by the Soviet 18th Tank Corps and arriving combined units of the 53d Army. Stubborn fighting continued for 6 days. Through the joint efforts of Soviet and Romanian troops, the enemy was routed and thrown back to his initial position.

By mid-September the German-fascist command authorities had reestablished a continuous front ahead of the advancing Soviet forces, having assembled 27 divisions along this front, including 6 panzer and motorized divisions.¹⁸ The enemy was able to put up this many divisions by transfers from Army Group Northern Ukraine, as well as from Hungary, Greece, Yugoslavia. In September the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front advanced westward from 300 to 500 kilometers. They thwarted the plans of the Hitlerite command authorities to stabilize the front along the line of the Southern Carpathians, liberated the western areas of Romania, cleared the enemy from part of Northern Transylvania, reached the Yugoslav border, and entered Hungarian territory.

The average daily rate of advance in Romania in September was 10-17 km. This rate of advance at operational depth was typical for many offensive operations conducted by Soviet forces in 1944-1945.

Soviet troops, jointly with Romanian troops, liberated the northern part of Transylvania in October 1944. On 12 October combined units of the 27th Army liberated Cluj, and Bel on 15 October. On 25 October units of the Soviet 40th and Romanian 4th armies knocked out the last strongpoints of the German-Horthy forces in Romania, liberating the cities of Satu-Mare and Carei.

Carrying out their liberation mission in Romania, Soviet fighting men displayed a high degree of combat skill and mass heroism. More than 150 units and combined units received honorary name designations. A total of 286,000 Soviet fighting men shed blood to liberate the Romanian people; 69,000 of these were killed in action.¹⁹ Romanian casualties in the fighting against the Hitlerites from 23 August to 30 October 1944 totaled more than 38,300 killed, wounded and missing in action.²⁰

Many documents of the Romanian Communist Party tell of the great merits of the Soviet Army in liberating the Romanian people. "The Romanian people," stresses the message of greeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Romanian Government on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of victory over fascism, "are deeply grateful to the Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces which, under the guidance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, displaying brilliant heroism and at the cost of enormous casualties, carried the brunt of the war on their shoulders, made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascist Germany and rendered invaluable assistance to the liberation of Romania, other countries and peoples from Hitlerite domination."²¹

The fighting alliance between the Soviet Army and the new Romanian army was formed in the course of a joint struggle and has withstood the test of time. The fighting alliance between the peoples and armies of the USSR and the SRR experienced further development in the postwar years.

Of great importance was the economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union in rebuilding the country's demolished economy. On the basis of economic agreements signed in Moscow on 8 May 1945, Romania received Soviet cotton, nonferrous metals, coke, coal, and industrial equipment for the forest products and paper industry. That same year, in spite of its own food supply difficulties, the Soviet Union gave the Romanian people 300,000 tons of grain. In subsequent years the Soviet Union, proceeding from the principles of proletarian internationalism, continued giving Romania all kinds of material aid and supporting it in the international arena.

An exceptionally important role in development of Soviet-Romanian relations was played by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Romania, signed in February 1948. It emphasized that both parties would act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation toward the further development and strengthening of economic and cultural ties between both countries. The traditions of postwar cooperation between the Soviet and Romanian peoples were reaffirmed in a new Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed on 7 July 1970 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of Romania. Closing the road of building socialism, Romania's working people, under the guidance of the Communist Party and in close cooperation with other socialist countries, have achieved great success during the years of the people's rule. Thanks to the heroic labor of the Romanian people and fraternal assistance by the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist community, Romania has been transformed from a backward agrarian country into a socialist nation with highly developed industry and productive agriculture. Within the framework of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Organization, the Socialist Republic of Romania takes part in elaborating a coordinated foreign policy, economic strategy, and collective measures of security and joint defense of the nations of the socialist community.

The Soviet Union is making every effort to achieve further and deeper development of friendly relations with the Socialist Republic of Romania in the political, economic and defense areas. During a meeting held in the Crimea on 31 July 1981, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and President of the Socialist Republic of Romania N. Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, devoted considerable

attention to the most important areas of Soviet-Romanian cooperation. In the course of the meeting it was pointed out that "the CPSU and RCP intend to continue expanding and improving the quality of mutual ties, and to strengthen Soviet-Romanian friendship on the basis of principles of equality, independence, respect for national sovereignty, and socialist solidarity."²²

FOOTNOTES

1. "Yassko-Kishinevskiye Kanny" [The Iasi-Kishinev Cannae], Moscow, Nauka, 1964, page 23.
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21. PRAVDA, 11 May 1975.
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ART OF WARFARE IN THE NOVOROSSIIYSK OPERATION

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific information," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col L. Kozlov: "Some Aspects of the Art of Warfare in the Novorossiysk Operation." Passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] In September-October 1943 the troops of the Northern Caucasus Front, working in coordination with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Naval Flotilla, conducted the Novorossiysk-Taman' Operation and, defeating in detail a large enemy force, totally swept the enemy from the Taman' Peninsula.¹ A most important component part of this front operation was the Novorossiysk Offensive Operation, Conducted from 9 to 16 September 1943 by the forces of the 18th Army and Black Sea Fleet.

The Novorossiysk offensive operation "has gone down in the history of the past war," notes L. I. Brezhnev in the book "Malaya Zemlya," "as an example of the Soviet people's unbending will to win, combat valor and fearlessness, and total dedication to the Leninist Party and the socialist homeland."² Success in the Novorossiysk area was also ensured by correct selection of the main axis of advance, by skillful, decisive and unexpected actions by the 18th Army and Black Sea Fleet, and by aggressive actions by other troops of the front: the 56th Army in the center and the 9th in the northern sector.

We shall briefly examine some questions pertaining to the art of warfare in this operation.

/In selecting the main axis of advance,/ the front's command authorities (Col Gen I. Ye. Petrov, commanding; Maj Gen A. Ya. Fominykh, member of military council; Maj Gen I. A. Laskin, chief of staff), analyzing all the elements of the prevailing situation, particularly carefully considered the military-geographic conditions of the area of forthcoming combat operations.

On the right side the terrain in the zone of the 9th Army (56 km) abounded in low-lying swampy ground, reed swamps, shallow coastal lagoons, rivers and streams. In particular, it was impossible to deploy sufficient forces for a successful offensive in the area of reed marshes along the shore of the Sea of Azov and between the Kuban' and Adagum rivers, which covered approximately 65 percent of the entire territory, and the operations of the troops deployed in that area, especially mobile ~~armored~~ units, were sharply restricted.

The central sector -- in the zone of the 56th Army (32 km) -- consisting of forested mountainous terrain, was most suitable for an offensive. It was an extremely difficult task to penetrate the Blue Line in the center, however, since it was precisely here that the enemy expected our forces to attack and had concentrated the most powerful force grouping -- the main forces of the 17th Army. The avenue running to the center of the Taman' Peninsula was covered by numerous strongpoints and centers of resistance, which were positioned in all villages, farmsteads, and on all commanding heights.

The right flank of the enemy's defense, which included Novorossiysk, remained for the point of attack. Although this area consisted of very difficult forested, mountainous terrain and contained limited-capacity assembly areas for an offensive, the commanding general of the front decided to mount the main attack precisely in this area.

The fact is that capture of the city as well as Neberdzhayevskiy and Volch'i Vorota passes would weaken the enemy's entire defensive system on the Blue Line and would enable the Soviet forces, advancing into the flank and rear of the main forces of the enemy's 17th Army, to push the advance deep into the Taman' Peninsula. In addition, this sector offered the most favorable conditions for close teamwork and cooperation between ground troops, air forces, and the Black Sea Fleet. Also considered was the fact that the Hitlerites, who had been fortifying Novorossiysk and the approaches to the city in the course of the last year, were convinced that their positions were impregnable and therefore least expected us to attack in this sector.

"The German-fascist command authorities," writes L. I. Brezhnev, "assumed that they were thoroughly familiar with Soviet tactics. We would not frontally assault large centers of resistance but would bypass them. Consequently, fortifying Novorossiysk, they did not expect an assault at this point. They were mistaken. One feature of our tactics was their flexibility."³

The fact that the troops of the 18th Army were separated in the Novorossiysk area due to a broad water obstacle -- Tsemesskaya Bay -- influenced the choice of axes of advance. Under these conditions it was most expedient for the troops of the army and forces of the Black Sea Fleet to mount a joint combined attack on the enemy's Novorossiysk center of resistance from three directions: from the land (from the right and left shores of Tsemesskaya Bay, that is, from Malaya Zemlya and from the direction of the cement plants), as well as from the sea -- by a large-scale amphibious assault.⁴

The course and successful outcome of the Novorossiysk Operation confirmed the correctness and exceptional advisability of the selected main and secondary axes of advance.

In order to achieve the element of surprise, the army and navy/ had to resolve a number of complex problems. First of all, measures were taken to conceal their intentions from the enemy and to deceive him as regards the time and direction of the main attack.

"...The first task," comments Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "was to keep the operation completely secret. We forbade any correspondence connected with the forthcoming operation. An extremely limited group of persons were involved in its planning. A thorough intelligence gathering and reconnaissance effort began. In order not to give away our plans, it was conducted on a wide front. Efforts were also made to feed false information to the enemy...."⁵

Bearing in mind that it was practically impossible to achieve secrecy in concentrating assault forces and approximately 150 small vessels and warships in Gelendzhikskaya Bay, and assuming that the enemy was aware of preparations for the forthcoming operation, front headquarters drew up and issued a phony directive calling for preparations to land an amphibious assault force in the vicinity of Yuzhnaya Ozereyka and took steps to ensure that its contents became known to the enemy. Reconnaissance by Black Sea Fleet forces was conducted and airstrikes delivered along a broad front: in the Yuzhnaya Ozereyka area and other areas of secondary significance far from Novorossiysk.

And the enemy was deceived. The 24 August 1943 entry in the war diary of the Hitlerite Army Group A stated that they could expect an amphibious landing operation in Ozereyka Bay simultaneously with a land offensive.

In order to divert the Hitlerites' attention from the forthcoming combined attack by the 18th Army and Black Sea Fleet on Novorossiysk, and to immobilize their reserves, the front's 9th and 56th armies considerably stepped up actions in their zones.

Army and fleet artillery prepared for the operation under the guise of preparing for artillery fire inspection activity. Rehearsal of amphibious assault troops, concentration of landing craft, as well as the deployment of combined units and units of the 18th Army were conducted only during hours of darkness. Troops and ships were carefully concealed during the day.

In order to gain the element of surprise, the amphibious landing operation was scheduled to take place at night. At the same time the plan called for the vessels carrying the landing force to approach the line of departure in the objective area simultaneously and precisely at the moment of commencement of preliminary artillery bombardment and airstrikes. Specially assigned aircraft were to produce noise in the objective area in order to muffle the motor noise of the craft carrying the landing force in Tsemesskaya Bay, and immediately prior to the landing seven IL-4 aircraft were to bomb Kirillovka (5 km northwest of the Novorossiysk Port) with the objective of disrupting control and knocking out communications centers. Specially assigned officers on a fast patrol boat coordinated the actions and movement of the landing force detachments. They would promptly report to the amphibious task force commander the time each detachment passed predesignated reference points. Possessing information on the amphibious assault force's movement to the objective area and its approach to the Novorossiysk Port entrance, the amphibious task force commander (Rear Adm G. N. Knolostyakov) could indicate to the artillery commander the precise time at which to open fire to support the assault force during the landing.

We should note that on the night of 10 September, when the landing force was en route to Novorossiysk, the enemy displayed little activity. He was methodically

shelling the Kabardinka area, was illuminating our forward positions at Myskhako with flares, and on two occasions swept the sea by searchlight in the vicinity of Yuzhnaya Ozereyka. It was apparent that the fascists had no inkling that the landing force was approaching Novorossiysk and that, if they were apprehensive about an amphibious landing, their concern was focused only in the Yuzhnaya Ozereyka area.⁶

The methods of gaining the element of surprise in the Novorossiysk Operation are in our opinion of interest in present-day conditions as well. An important role was played by such measures, for example, as the conduct of reconnaissance on a broad front, diversionary actions and dissemination of false information, skillful utilization of geographic conditions for undetected loading, movement to the objective area and landing the assault force, measures to ensure secrecy in organizing communications, skillful coordination of preparatory artillery bombardment with commencement of the landing, etc.

/Troup control and control of naval forces in the operation/ was characterized first and foremost by strict centralization of control by the commanding general of the front and his staff. The commanding general of the front directed the combined operations. The following were his deputies: for land operations -- the commanding general of the 18th Army, Lt Gen (Col Gen effective 9 October 1943) K. N. Leselidze, who was in command of army troops and amphibious assault troops after landing; for naval operations -- the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Adm L. A. Vladimirov, who directed naval forces assigned to the operation, the assigned air forces, and the amphibious assault detachments until they reached the beach.

The command posts of the front, the 18th Army and the Black Sea Fleet were equipped with communications gear ensuring firm control of all elements of the tactical order of battle, naval forces and reserves, as well as uninterrupted collection of necessary information.

The relative closeness of army and fleet command posts facilitated organization of coordination between the 18th Army and the amphibious landing forces, and to a considerable degree fostered accomplishment of artillery support missions. Its success was ensured by a detailed agreement between army and navy commanders, thorough preparations, and in particular skillfully organized artillery reconnaissance and observation.

Unity of command and precision communications work enabled the commanding general of the front to unite the efforts of all forces and equipment involved in the operation and effectively to influence the course of combat operations (expeditionally to assign supplementary missions, to engage front reserves, and to maneuver men and weapons on the axes where success was being achieved).

The front commanding general and his staff coordinated the efforts of the troops of the 18th Army and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet in mounting a combined attack on the fortified port and city of Novorossiysk, taking into account the actions of the front's other armies. Coordination was organized in the interests of the 18th Army, the actions of which determined to a great extent the success of the front operation as a whole. The principal working document was the scheduled

timetable for coordination between the 18th Army and Black Sea Forces, which was prepared by the headquarters staffs of the front, army and fleet, with the participation of staff representatives of ground troops combined units, warships, and aviation. In particular, it specified what forces were being assigned by the Black Sea Fleet to assist the troops of the 18th Army and what the army was making available for the benefit of the fleet; it specified the objective and army and fleet tactical areas of operations, specified the sequence of employment of their forces, recognition, warning and target designation signals, procedure of maintaining communications, mutual information and exchange of command groups.

/Combat employment of tanks and artillery./ One of the characteristic features of employment of tanks in the operation was an inadequate density in the zone of advance of the 18th Army. It would hardly be fair to present as justification for this deficiency the limited number of tanks available to the front's forces or the impossibility of massing them in mountainous terrain conditions. The front had 165 tanks and self-propelled guns, a large percentage of which could have been used to reinforce the troops of the army operating on the main axis of advance, while the mountainous terrain in the Novorossiysk area, abounding in gentle slopes, valleys, and roads, certainly permitted using them.

Mountainous terrain, as the experience of the past war indicated, greatly complicates but does not prevent the employment of tanks. The degree of massing of tanks depends on the topography. Difficult topography made it possible to employ only tanks with excellent cross-country capability and in small groups. Consequently, when organizing an offensive operation in a mountainous area it is extremely important to determine what influence will be exerted by terrain conditions on employment of tanks and, in conformity with this, to carry out the requisite measures to increase the effectiveness of their employment.

At the same time the operations of the tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade are instructive; this brigade, executing an operation order issued by Headquarters, Northern Caucasus Front, executed a night march from the village of Krymskaya to Kabardinka and at 1100 hours on 13 September 1943 became operationally subordinate to the commanding general of the 18th Army. The brigade was assigned the mission of capturing, operating jointly with the 318th Rifle Division, the Novorossiysk suburb of Melodipevskoye and digging in on its northwestern edge. During the night of 14 September the brigade attack echelon (the 2d Tank Battalion and a motorized rifle-machinegun battalion with reinforcing weapons) entered the city through a fairly narrow gap linking the Otkryabr' and Proletariy cement plants, with the mission of destroying the enemy troops (up to an infantry battalion in strength) occupying a defensive position in two large brick buildings in the center of Melodipevskoye.

Assault teams consisting of a rifle platoon with a squad of combat engineers were assigned to carry out this mission. Each was supported by four tanks and two guns.

The assault on the enemy began with well organized teamwork between tanks and motorized infantry. At the head of the attackers was the 1st Motorized Rifle Company of Sr Lt M. A. Marenin. It was given fire support by the four tanks advancing behind it, of the tank battalion's 3d company of Sr Lt V. A. Pozdeyev.

Fifty meters from a three-story building, the riflemen were pinned down by heavy mortar and machinegun fire. Their advance ground to a halt. The tank crews opened fire on the building. The fascist fire diminished appreciably, but the surviving Hitlerites continued to resist. Then the commander of one of the platoons, Sgt P. M. Maslov, was assigned the mission of having two squads continue exchanging frontal fire with the enemy, while one platoon, led by Pvt S. M. Umrikhin, was to attack the enemy in the flank. This assault was so swift that the enemy machine-gunners did not have time to open fire. The men of the platoon, followed by the entire company, fought their way into the building and cleared it of Hitlerites. Soon the second building was also captured. The mission was accomplished.

There were also deficiencies in the brigade's actions. On 14 September, for example, our tanks followed behind infantry, supporting them with tank gunfire, while on the second day the tankers were ordered to advance ahead of the infantry, as a result of which the enemy pelted them with grenades and Molotov cocktails from foxholes and buildings. Experience indicated that in street combat it would be better if tanks, advancing behind infantry, demolished with gunfire earth-and-timber emplacements and other enemy weapon emplacements impeding the advance of the infantrymen.⁷

In conditions where the 18th Army and fleet forces could not be given effective air support (bad weather) and had few tanks, an especially important role was played by /field and coast artillery,/ which for the most part supported the actions of the army troops and amphibious landing force.

In particular, artillery units of the 18th Army assigned to support the amphibious landing and the coast artillery of the Novorossiysk naval base were consolidated into a landing force artillery support group, subdivided into three subgroups, one for each assault landing point. Mortar units (5 regiments and 1 brigade) comprised a separate amphibious landing support subgroup. The amphibious landing support artillery and mortar units were directed by the artillery commander of the 18th Army.

We should note that torpedoes fired by torpedo boats were employed for the first time to achieve rapid and reliable suppression of enemy weapon positions on the wharves and dockside bulkheads on the Novorossiysk harbor, which comprised concrete-protected targets of relatively small dimensions, which were difficult to neutralize with artillery fire. Following artillery bombardment the port and shore attack group torpedo boats, in spite of the danger of being hit by hostile artillery fire, penetrated through to the weapon emplacements along the shoreline and released their torpedoes, destroying more than 30 permanent pillboxes and earth-and-timber emplacements occupied by the enemy on the shore from Point Lyubvi to the cement plant.⁸ The large number of powerful torpedo explosions not only resulted in the destruction and neutralization of the most dangerous weapon emplacements covering the entrance to the port but also exerted a strong effect on the enemy's morale.

/Party-political work/ was conducted by the joint efforts of army and fleet political agencies, headed by Col L. I. Brezhnev, chief of the political section of the 18th Army; Capt 1st Rank V. I. Semin, chief of the political directorate of the Black Sea Fleet; and Capt 1st Rank M. I. Bakayev, chief of the political section of the Novorossiysk naval base, by the party and Komsomol organizations of

the combined units, units and warships according to a prior-prepared uniform plan. This plan took into careful consideration the wealth of experience in organizing party-political work during the landing of assault forces and fighting on the Kerch' Peninsula (December 1941) and on Malaya Zemlya (February 1942).

In preparing for the operation, pursuant to a directive issued by the fleet political directorate and political section of the 18th Army (it was received by the units and naval ships on 1 September 1943), the principal efforts of all party-political work were directed toward creating in the troops and on the naval ships a high degree of aggressiveness and readiness resolutely to surmount forthcoming difficulties in landing an amphibious assault force in the heavily fortified port and city and in penetrating the enemy's defense. Concrete tasks of political work were specified for the preparatory period, during embarkation, movement to the objective area, and during combat.

Party and Komsomol organizations in the combat troops and on the naval ships were strengthened. By the commencement of the operation the party and Komsomol element in the companies and batteries was boosted to 35-45 percent, and to 70 percent among personnel of the amphibious assault units. Sixty percent of the assault troopers were veterans of previous amphibious assault operations and engagements, while approximately half were decorated combat veterans.⁹

The experience gained in landing amphibious assault forces on the Kerch' Peninsula and Makhako was thoroughly studied by the men of the amphibious assault detachments and assault teams. Exchange of experience was extensively practiced in the units and on the naval ships. Veteran navymen explained to the infantrymen with whom they would be assaulting the fascist fortifications in Novorossiysk just what an amphibious landing operation was and what procedures an amphibious assault trooper should follow during embarkation and in combat, and when landing on a fortified hostile shore. All this advice was contained in a specially prepared "Amphibious Assault Trooper Instruction Booklet."

Close contact was established between army and navy political workers and closely maintained. They were distributed among the amphibious landing force in such a manner that there was a political worker on board each patrol craft and powerboat, and a deputy commander for political affairs in the amphibious landing detachment. Party organizers had two deputies apiece, and Komsomol organizers had three.

We should note that a significant role in the success of the amphibious landing and the entire battle for Novorossiysk was played by the firm friendship between army and navy fighting men. The soldiers became friends with the navymen during joint actions in the amphibious landing operation in February 1942, in the battle for Malaya Zemlya, as well as at exercises and drills preceding the Novorossiysk operation. Navymen, naval infantrymen, naval aviation personnel and fleet coast artillery crews began more deeply to understand their missions working in coordination with ground troops. All previous experience in organizational and party-political work helped create that special atmosphere of mutual understanding which is so necessary in combined operations, especially in an amphibious assault, where it is necessary to fight as one unit. Col Gen M. Kh. Salashnik, a veteran of the Battle of the Caucasus, recalling the smooth coordination of army and navy combat operations, wrote: "This was teamwork in the highest sense of the word, genuine combat assistance."¹⁰

We have discussed above some questions pertaining to the art of warfare and party-political work in the Novorossiysk combined operations by the 18th Army and Black Sea Fleet forces which, in our opinion, are of definite interest today as well.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of the general plan of operation, the course and results of combat operations, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1973, pp 78-83.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskiy kurs" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 43.
3. Ibid., page 35.
4. See excerpt from the operation order issued by the commanding general of the Northern Caucasus Front for conduct of the Novorossiysk Operation (KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1980, pp 19-20).
5. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, page 35.
6. Central Naval Archives, Fund 10, File 21691, Sheet 45.
7. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 3071, List 1, File 9, sheets 49-50; File 29, sheets 91, 92. (Tactical example prepared by Lt Col Yu. K. Laskov).
8. Central Naval Archives, Fund 10, File 21691, Sheet 51.
9. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 32, List 1131a, File 45, sheets 138, 139.
10. M. Kh. Kalashnik, "Ispytaniye ognem" [Trial by Fire], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971, page 41.

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INTERNATIONALISM: FROM SOVIET TRADITION TO SOVIET LAW

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Docent and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Col N. Solntsev: "A Tradition Which Has Become a Law." Passage printed in boldface in source is enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] /"It is the internationalist duty of a citizen of the USSR to assist in the development of friendship and cooperation with the peoples of other countries, in maintaining and strengthening world peace."^{1/}

One of the characteristic features of our Constitution is a unity of the lofty patriotic obligations of Soviet citizens with their international duty. Article 69 of the Fundamental Law, in particular, attests persuasively to this.

Proletarian internationalism, as the international solidarity of workers of different nations and races, emerged during the era of capitalism. It objectively opposes bourgeois nationalism. V. I. Lenin wrote the following on this subject: "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism are two implacably hostile slogans which correspond to the two great class camps of the entire capitalist world and which express two policies (in addition: two ideologies) regarding the nationalities question."^{2/}

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and formation of a world socialist system in the postwar period signaled the beginning of a new type of international relations -- socialist internationalism.

Socialist internationalism, which has found deep expression in the new Constitution of the socialist state of all the people, is characterized by full equality under the law, fraternal cooperation, political, economic, military and cultural mutual assistance among nations and nationalities taking the road of socialist development. The principle of socialist internationalism presupposes a combination of the interests of individual socialist nations with the common interests of all the nations of the community.

In his report entitled "The Great October Revolution and Progress by Mankind," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that "our alliance, our friendship, our cooperation are an alliance, friendship and cooperation of sovereign, equal states, united by

common goals and interests, by bonds of comradely solidarity and mutual assistance. We are marching together, helping one another, unifying our efforts, knowledge, and resources for the most rapid advance possible."³

A graphic confirmation of these words is the cooperation of the nations of the socialist community in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, which ensures stable development of the national economy of the socialist nations. At the present time, for example, the national income of the CEMA nations is approximately 4.3 times the 1950 level, while it has only slightly more than tripled in the EEC countries.⁴

Coordination of the foreign policy activity of the brother parties and nations is of great importance. They jointly elaborate and implement common foreign policy programs. An example is the Peace Program elaborated at the 24th, further developed at the 35th, and augmented at the 36th CPSU Congress, taking present conditions into account. It is coordinated with the nations of the socialist community, is fully in conformity with their national interests, and has become a unified program of struggle for peace and progress.

Developing countries are strongly supported by the socialist countries in their struggle for independent existence and national independence. The Soviet Union and the other CEMA member nations are giving economic and technical assistance to 90 liberated countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Approximately 4,500 major economic projects in these countries have been built, are under construction or are scheduled for construction, including 650 power generating plants and other power industry enterprises, and more than 30 ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical enterprises. The total amount in long-term credits granted to these countries from the USSR alone is 15 billion rubles. In 1984 the USSR alone delivered full sets of equipment for 120 projects, and preliminary survey and design work has been performed for 130 industrial and other economic enterprises. The CEMA member nations are taking part in construction of 270 agricultural facilities; they are assisting in training indigenous cadres. A total of 49,000 persons are enrolled at higher educational institutions in the socialist community. Of these, 2,150 are receiving an education through a CEMA special scholarship fund. A total of 310 educational institutions have been and are being built in liberated countries with the assistance of the CEMA.⁵

Such facts and examples convincingly attest that the Soviet Union is the true and reliable friend of the peoples of the world. This idea was deeply and vividly underscored by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in his speech at the 18th Communist Congress. He stated that Soviet citizens, nurtured in the fraternal family of peoples and indoctrinated in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, are internationalists by their very nature. In various parts of the earth thousands of sons and daughters of our country are performing noble tasks -- building factories and electric power stations, helping develop natural resources, treating sick people and teaching children.⁶ This is genuine proletarian, socialist internationalism at work.

A most important principle of Marxism-Leninism -- proletarian, socialist internationalism -- forms the basis of strengthening and development of the fighting alliance of socialist nations. "...Facing the barbaric threat of imperialist powers," stated N. S. Khrushchev, "we who are fighting imperialism constitute an alliance which resolves firm military unity, and we consider any attempts to disrupt this unity as

absolutely intolerable, as betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism.... We say that a unity of military forces is essential, and that any departure from this unity is intolerable."⁷ The Warsaw Pact is a specifically voluntary defensive alliance of the brother socialist nations. It arose as a forced response measure to the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists and is grounded on the solid unity of the political, economic and ideological foundations of these nations and reflects the common military-theoretical views and principles of military organizational development which proceed from Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and on defense of the socialist homeland.

An important role in strengthening the fighting alliance is played not only by a unity of views in fundamental questions of theory and practice of military organizational development. The following have become effective means of strengthening the bonds of friendship linking the socialist armies: continuous mutual assistance in furnishing armies with the newest combat equipment and weapons, in mastering the modes and methods of their employment on the battlefield, and in training cadres; exchange of experience and know-how in military organizational development, combat, operational and political training, teaching and indoctrination of personnel, and military scientific work; joint exercises, conferences and meetings of leader personnel, at which the performance results and tasks of combat and operational training of the Joint Forces are analyzed.

Regularly held joint exercises are an outstanding school of internationalist fighting comradeship and strengthening of fraternal friendship among the servicemen of the socialist countries. Problems of combat teamwork and coordination are worked on, the skill of commanders, staffs and political agencies is honed, the combat readiness of units and combined units is improved, and the military skill of their personnel is improved in the course of tactical, fleet, special and command and staff exercises. In addition, these exercises promote the development of fraternal relations, strengthening of the bonds between the servicemen of the socialist armies and their mutual understanding.

The multinational Armed Forces of the USSR constitute a friendly fighting family of defenders of the homeland and the nations of the socialist community. This family is constantly growing stronger and is becoming ideologically and morally firmer as all the nationalities and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union prosper and draw closer together. "Our army is indoctrinated in a spirit of deep dedication to the socialist homeland, the ideas of peace and internationalism, and the ideas of friendship among peoples," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "It is precisely this which distinguishes the Soviet Army from bourgeois armies. It is precisely because of this that Soviet citizens love their army and are proud of it."⁸

The Communist Party indoctrinates Soviet servicemen, just as our entire people, in a spirit of proletarian internationalism, which has entered deeply into their daily lives, their flesh and blood, becoming for them a standard of behavior. This is attested by dozens and hundreds of examples of manifestation of genuine humanist feelings on the part of our officers and enlisted personnel toward the citizens of other countries and nationalities. A great historic example of a manifestation of the internationalism of the Soviet people was the liberation mission of its Armed Forces in World War II. Thanks to our victory over fascist Germany, the peoples of a number of countries of Europe were freed from enslavement and received the opportunity of free and independent development.

The great international exploit of Soviet fighting men is etched forever in the people's memory. A great many monuments have been erected in all socialist countries, and works of literature and art have been created, in which the countenance of the Soviet humanist-fighting man stands out in all its nobility and beauty.

For more than 63 years now the Soviet Army and Navy have been vigilantly guarding the achievements of the Great October Revolution. Ranked solidly behind the Communist Party and in a fighting alliance with the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations, they are honorably carrying out their internationalist duty, formally stated in the USSR Constitution -- they are reliably defending socialism and communism and serving as a bulwark of world peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, Article 69.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 24, page 123.
3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Current Problems of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, page 399.
4. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 7, 1981, page 144.
5. KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1981, pp 82-84.
6. See PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.
7. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 40, pp 98-99.
8. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 2, page 171.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ABOUT THE CHINESE ARMY

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[Book review by Yu. Petrov: "The Pillar of the Beijing Regime"]

[Text] There is taking place today in China an intensive process of militarization, which is a characteristic feature of the military-bureaucratic regime in that country. The Beijing leaders consider the army to be the most important means of attaining their hegemonist aspirations. A book by G. N. Mos'kol investigates its place and role in the antisocialist policy of the "great helmsman" and his successors. This is one of the first books to discuss problems of employment of military forces by the Beijing leaders in their antipopular domestic and foreign policy. It demonstrates the savage struggle for power by the Mao Zedong group with the employment of military units and combined units during and after the "cultural revolution," as well as in the aim of implementing the expansionist, aggressive plans of the Maoist leadership.

Failure of the "great leap forward" policy, growing unemployment, impoverishment of the people and hunger on the part of the population evoked dissatisfaction on the part of working people and the realistically thinking segment of the leadership. In these conditions China's ruling clique made every effort to strengthen its position in the army and to eliminate the influence of opposition forces in the military. Employing troops for the forceful resolution of many of the country's internal political and economic problems, the Chinese leaders made them an instrument of implementation of their antisocialist schemes and transformed them into an implement of antipopular policy. Mao's demand that the army be transformed into a "great school" of society (page 42) signified not only "indoctrination" of the Chinese people according to the military model, but also elevation of the army above society. This was especially evident in the course of preparation for and conduct of the "cultural revolution," when 300,000 officers and men were assigned to teach Mao's "shock-work detachments" (June-November 1966), while a 31 December 1966 directive of the CPC Central Committee and State Council instructed that "brief military-political training" of Red Guards be organized nationwide (page 45).

In the summer of 1967 the army was enlisted to take even more active intervention in smashing party and governmental authorities, while beginning in the fall elite "central-subordination military units" began to be sent into the provinces to "impose order" locally. They were empowered to arrest and punish local administrative officials, open fire on persons offering resistance, and to help establish new

agencies of authority. Military personnel, members of revolutionary committees, were to oversee and guide the activities of the new agencies of authority. Army representatives were sent to enterprises. By 1971 military subunits were stationed at one fifth of all enterprises in the PRC (page 59).

In the final stage of the "cultural revolution," the army was assigned the task of breaking up the Red Guard organizations, which Mao and his supporters no longer needed following destruction of that country's party and governmental agencies. It follows from this that China's armed forces were transformed from a defender of the people's revolution into a political force standing over the people, into the main support and instrument of the Maoist regime.

Even preparations for the Ninth CPC Congress were made with the army's assistance. At this congress the armed forces were called the "main component part of the state" (page 65). They became a guarantor for the Maoists against a new wave of the factional struggle within the CPC and Red Guard disturbances.

The CPC Military Council oversaw both the army and China's socioeconomic affairs. Mao saw in strengthening the position of the military both locally and at the central level a certain threat to his personal power. Enlisting the support of the "leftist forces," he took measures as a result of which his successor, Defense Minister Lin Biao, disappeared and high-level military leaders were removed from office. But the army remained and continues to remain the main support of the military-bureaucratic regime.

Even today the military occupy a great many posts in the highest-level agencies of authority. In the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives, Fifth Convocation, they comprise almost 15 percent (more than 500 persons) of the total number of deputies, although the armed forces (more than 4 million men) comprise less than 0.5 percent of the country's population.

In 1979 the army was assigned responsibility for maintaining public order, that is, police functions, to prevent "hooliganism and law violations," with which public security agencies and the police are no longer able to cope.

In addition to crushing opposition by rightists and putting down demonstrations by working people evoked by the difficult living conditions and a lack of prospects for their improvement, the Maoist leaders resort to employment of military forces to carry out their aggressive plans.

Beginning at the end of the 1950's, the Chinese leaders have been almost continuously provoking military incidents against many neighboring countries. Of the 30 military conflicts taking place in Asia since World War II, the author points out, 19 erupted through the fault of Beijing (page 107).

Strategic roads, nuclear missile bases and range facilities, command and control facilities, airfields, and fortified areas are being constructed and troops are being concentrated on the borders with the majority of neighboring countries.

Beijing has territorial claims on practically all its neighbors. Both within China and in the international arena the Maoists preach a cult of violence and are counting

on war. In spite of the backwardness of the economy, the bulk of the nation's assets are being channeled into militarizing China. Allying themselves with imperialism, Zionism and profascist regimes, China's leaders are directing efforts toward shattering the socialist system, directing their main efforts against the Soviet Union, declaring it "enemy number one."

The author stresses that a qualitative change of a counterrevolutionary nature has recently taken place in the international activities of the Beijing leaders. They have shifted from an ideological campaign against the socialist countries to a political, economic and even military struggle (page 103). Declaring itself a "developing country of the third world," Beijing is opposing the national liberation struggle of enslaved and dependent countries and is acting in concert with the imperialists. An example of this is China's subversive activities against the Afghan revolution. It is not only supplying the counterrevolutionaries with weapons and money but is also sending Chinese military "advisers" to their camps. Chinese military units are being sent to Pakistan to secure the rear of the counterrevolutionary bands and for subversive actions against India.

On their path of hegemonist aspirations, the Beijing leaders have resorted to military forces time and again. In 1959 and 1962 they invaded Indian territory, where they seized and continue to hold 36,000 square meters of territory. In 1973-1975 approximately 10,000 Chinese troops waged combat on Burmese territory. In 1974 China seized the Paracel Islands, which belong to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and in February 1979 a 600,000-man Maoist invasion army began wreaking death and destruction on Vietnamese soil. While intending to "teach a lesson" to their peace-loving neighbor, the invaders themselves received a stern lesson. The Vietnamese army and the entire people offered resolute resistance to the aggressor. The enemy succeeded in penetrating 40-50 km at the cost of enormous casualties and equipment losses, but was subsequently forced to retreat to Chinese soil. In addition to the failure of the military campaign, the aggressor sustained a serious moral-political defeat, although he threatened "to teach another lesson" to socialist Vietnam.

Counting on war as a means of resolving the problems of its domestic and foreign policy, Beijing actively supports the imperialists and reactionary regimes in the arms race, in strengthening aggressive military-political blocs, and in escalating international tension. Military cooperation between China and the imperialist powers is expanding, which is giving China access to the arsenals of the Pentagon and NATO. But the Chinese view the Soviet Union as the main obstacle on the road toward establishing world domination; they portray the Soviet Union not only as China's "most dangerous" enemy but also as its sole enemy. Anti-Sovietism predominates in the ideological brainwashing of army and people. Territorial claims are "bolstered" by falsification of the history of Sino-Russian relations in "scholarly" works, in the periodical press, in movies and radio broadcasts. They are doing everything possible to instill hatred toward everything Russian and Soviet.

A special place in anti-Soviet propaganda is occupied by the thesis of the non-existent "Soviet military threat" to China and to other countries of the world. Lying propagandists tirelessly hammer home the claim that the USSR is allegedly

the "main source of threat to peace" and that the "Soviet threat" endangers virtually every continent. The newspaper RENMIN RIBAO runs such articles daily. Even in news reports on combat training of subunits and units and on military exercises it importunately emphasizes that "there exists a threat emanating from great and small hegemonism," ascribing this to the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Hu Yaobang, chairman of the CPC Central Committee, spoke at a conference of cadre workers of the "serious threat emanating from Soviet hegemonism" and appealed for everybody to be prepared "to drown the aggressor in an ocean of popular war." Fifty percent of China's ground and air forces plus 32 home guard divisions are deployed in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union and the MPR under the pretext of strengthening defense (page 108).

China's leaders are intensifying anti-Soviet policy contrary to the will of the Chinese people, the true interests of whom, as was noted in the Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress, "would be met by a policy of peace... and normal relations with other countries."² As for the Soviet Union, "our proposals aimed at normalizing relations with China remain in force, just as our feelings of respect and friendship toward the Chinese people remain unchanged."³ But China's leaders continue to choose the path of confrontation with the USSR and the other socialist countries and are advocating the concept of a "united front" with imperialism against the socialist community. A policy of aggravation of the international situation and closing ranks with imperialism, however, cannot return China to a healthy road of development.

The author exposes in a comprehensive and well-reasoned manner the role of the army in the plans and actions of the Chinese leaders. The author should, however, have shown the moods of Chinese army personnel and the attitude of officers and enlisted men toward the gendarme role which the Beijing leaders have prepared for it. It is a well known fact that a great deal is being said and written in China about dissatisfaction among armed forces command personnel with internal confusion and repressive measures in the people and army against so-called supporters of the "Gang of Four" and Lin Biao, and the clumsy economic and foreign policy activities of the present Maoist leaders.

Publication of this book has evoked considerable interest on the part of numerous readers and propagandists. It concentrates important factological material which reveals the foundations of the military-bureaucratic regime, which is proceeding along the road of militarization and preparations for another world war jointly with imperialism, Zionism, and reactionary profascist regimes. It will help expose the intrigues of the warmongers, who dream in vain of the victorious conclusion of a war and the achievement of world domination.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. N. Mos'ko, "Armiya Kitaya -- orudiye avantyuristicheskoy politiki Maoistov" [China's Army -- Instrument of the Adventuristic Policy of the Maoists], Voenizdat, 1980, 144 pages.

2. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 11.

3. Ibid.

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON ARMY GENERAL LELYUSHENKO

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 81 pp 91-93

[Article by HSU Chief Marshal Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov: "Army General D. D. Lelyushenko (On His 80th Brithday)"]

[Text] I first met him and saw with my own eyes his outstanding military talents during the tensest period of the Battle of Moscow, when the 8th Tank Brigade, under my command, following stubborn fighting near Valday and Kalinin, was placed at the disposal of 30th Army, which was commanded by Gen D. D. Lelyushenko.¹

When the Hitlerites began the second offensive at Moscow in November 1941, the 30th Army was operating on the right (northern) side of the Western Front. The army's troops, extremely weakened in the preceding bloody fighting, were forced to withdraw under the onslaught of superior enemy forces. On the third day of the battle they were fighting in two isolated groups -- on the Volga, and south of the Moscow Reservoir.

Only a military commander of unbending will, firm courage, iron staunchness and flexible operational-tactical thinking could exercise troop control in such an extraordinarily difficult situation and organize resistance to the enemy. Dmitriy Danilovich always was and still is such a man. He constantly offered practical assistance to commanders of units and combined units and skillfully guided the efforts of all army personnel toward successful accomplishment of combat missions.

In 1919 Dmitriy Lelyushenko, an 18-year-old boy, voluntarily joined the Red Army and, in the ranks of the legendary Red Cavalry, took part in the fighting against the White Guardists, interventionists and counterrevolutionary bands, was wounded and received a concussion. This young fighting man and commander gained maturity in battles against the enemies of the Soviet Republic, and his military skills improved. In 1925 he graduated from the Leningrad Military-Political School imeni F. Engel's, and two years later, as an external student, took the examination for the complete course of study at the Red Commanders Cavalry School. In 1933 D. D. Lelyushenko graduated with distinction from the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze.

Completing his higher military education, Dmitriy Danilovich proceeded to devote all his knowledge and energy to service in command slots in the armored and mechanized troops and took part in the campaign to liberate Western Belorussia and

in combat against the White Finns, commanding the 39th Independent Tank Brigade, which was awarded the Order of Lenin for exemplary performance of combat missions, while its commander was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for personal bravery. In 1940 Gen D. D. Lelyushenko was placed in command of the 1st Proletarian Moscow Division.

When the Great Patriotic War began, Dmitriy Danilovich was serving as commander of the 21st Mechanized Corps. And although this corps was still in the process of formation, its personnel bravely repulsed the enemy at Daugavpils, OPOCHKA and Idritsa.

In August 1941 D. D. Lelyushenko was appointed deputy chief of the Red Army Main Armored Directorate and chief of the Armored Troops Formation and Equipment Directorate, with the task of forming and sending to the front 22 tank brigades in an extremely short period of time. The general set about this difficult job with his characteristic energy. He personally kept an eye on the manufacture, repair and dispatch to the combat troops of practically every combat vehicle and met with management and the workers of plants, maintenance shops and personnel of the organized tank brigades.

At the end of September 1941 Dmitriy Danilovich, as an expert on armored equipment, took part in the Moscow Conference of the Big Three -- the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States. At this time the German-fascist command authorities, concentrating almost half of all manpower and combat equipment on the Soviet-German front in the Battle of Moscow, launched a powerful offensive. Working in coordination with other large strategic formations, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps, under the command of D. D. Lelyushenko, was to mount a counterthrust from the vicinity of Mtsensk toward Orel, impeding the advance of the enemy's panzer forces, and was to protect the Tula industrial area with a stubborn defense on the Zusha River. The fighting men of the corps successfully accomplished the assigned mission in the course of fierce engagements. "The planned swift advance on Tula," wrote Guderian, "had to be postponed temporarily."²

In October Gen D. D. Lelyushenko took over command of the 5th Army, which was ordered to take up position on the Mozhaysk defensive line and block the advance on Moscow by General Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group. In savage fighting at Mozhaysk, and especially at Borodino, where in 1812 Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal Kutuzov had defeated Napoleon's army, their exploit was repeated by the fighting men of the 5th Army.

The day of 16 October was particularly difficult. The Hitlerites were pushing hard, moving up to the Soviet positions a large panzer formation supported by artillery and air. In one of their numerous assaults, fascist tanks accompanied by motorized infantry penetrated through to the army observation post. The army commander did not flinch; together with the staff commanders who were with him and motorized riflemen who had hastened to their aid, he engaged the assaulting enemy, fighting him off with grenades and submachine-gun fire until he was seriously wounded. Following his hospital convalescence, Dmitriy Danilovich took command of the 30th Army, the troops of which were standing to the death on the northern approaches to Moscow. Launching resolute counterattacks, by means of bold ambush actions and a mobile defense, they harassed and halted the advancing enemy, gaining the time needed

to concentrate powerful strategic reserves in that area, and subsequently took part in a counteroffensive.

In the battles at Moscow D. D. Lelyushenko proved himself as an outstanding military commander with extensive operational-tactical knowledgeability, who possessed outstanding organizer capabilities and the ability to exercise precision troop control in defensive and offensive operations.

In the Battle of Stalingrad Dmitriy Danilovich was in command of the 1st (subsequently redesignated 3d Guards) Army, which played an important role on the outer perimeter of encirclement of the 330,000-man German-fascist force at Stalingrad. In the spring of 1944 D. D. Lelyushenko assumed command of the 4th Tank Army. Thorough knowledge of the tactics and operational capabilities of mobile combat arms greatly helped Dmitriy Danilovich. The tank army under his command brilliantly executed combat missions in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation, was successful in the battle for Kamenets-Podol'skiy and L'vov, and courageously defended the Sandomierz bridgehead.

In 1945, the year of victory, the 4th Tank Army made a weighty contribution to the defeat in detail of the enemy's large Kielce-Radom force and in capturing Upper and Lower Silesia. For the mass heroism displayed by its fighting men, the army was redesignated guards army, thousands of intrepid soldiers were awarded medals and decorations, and army commander D. D. Lelyushenko was awarded a second Gold Star medal.

In the Berlin Operation the 4th Guards Tank Army, under the command of Col Gen D. D. Lelyushenko, advancing at a swift pace, on 25 April linked up with the right-flank large strategic formations of the First Belorussian Front near Ketzin, closing the ring of encirclement around the German-fascist troops in Berlin.

At the final stages of the war in Europe, carrying out their internationalist liberation mission, Gen D. D. Lelyushenko's tankers, together with others, came to the aid of the brother Czechoslovak people. On 9 May the soldier-liberators of the 4th Guards Tank Army entered Prague. On the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic awarded D. D. Lelyushenko the title Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

D. D. Lelyushenko occupied a number of important command positions in the postwar period. In 1949 he graduated with honors and a gold medal from the General Staff Academy. This veteran skillfully utilized his wealth of experience in training and indoctrination of his men. In 1964 Army Gen D. D. Lelyushenko was appointed military inspector-adviser of the General Inspector's Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He is making a worthy contribution to the development of Soviet art of warfare and to the indoctrination of Soviet youth. He has been awarded four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov, 1st Class, two Orders of Kutuzov, 1st Class, "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Class, medals, foreign decorations, and an honorary weapon. A bronze bust of Lelyushenko stands in Rostov-na-Donu.

We should like to take this occasion to convey to Army General Dmitriy Danilovich Lelyushenko heartfelt wishes of good health and labor successes for the benefit of our beloved homeland and its Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. D. D. Lelyushenko was born on 2 November 1901 in the small village of Novokuznetskiy, in what is now Zernogradskiy Rayon, Rostovskaya Oblast. For more detail on him see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1971, pp 125-128.
2. G. Guderian, "Vospominaniya soldata" [Reminiscences of a Soldier], Voenizdat, 1954, page 223.

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